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UC-NRLF 


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XEbc  XHnivcvBit^  of  (Tbtcaao 

FOUNDED  BY  JOHN  D.  ROCKEFELLER 


THE  ESTIMATES  OF  MORAL  VALUES 
EXPRESSED  IN  CICERO'S  LETTERS 

A  STUDY  OF  THE  MOTIVES  PROFESSED  OR  APPROVED 


A  DISSERTATION 

SUBMITTED    TO    THE    FACULTY    OF    THE     GRADUATE    SCHOOL     OF     ARTS 

AND    LITERATURE    IN    CANDIDACY    FOR    THE    DEGREE     OF 

DOCTOR    OF    PHILOSOPHY 

(department  of  latin) 


BY 

WARREN  STONE  CORDIS 


CHICAGO 

THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  CHICAGO  PRESS 

1905 


u^ 


PRINTED  AT  THE   UNIVERSITY  OF  CHICAGO  PRESS.  APRIL,  iqos 


PREFACE 

This  study  has  grown  out  of  the  author's  coincident  interest  in  Cicero's 
letters  and  in  ancient  ethics.  The  question  asked  on  approaching  the 
correspondence  has  been  simply:  What  does  Cicero  represent  as  being 
worth  while  ?  In  view  of  what  good  or  goods  does  he  himself  profess  to 
act  ?  On  what  does  he  base  his  appeals  to  others,  and  his  approval  or 
disapproval  of  others  ?  An  attempt  has  been  made  to  present  systematically 
the  answers  yielded  by  this  examination  of  the  letters,  permitting  the  mate- 
rial itself,  so  far  as  possible,  to  suggest  the  categories  and  manner  of  treat- 
ment to  be  employed.  The  requirements  of  each  case  have  determined 
the  extent  to  which  the  treatment  of  the  several  topics  should  be  chrono- 
logical. The  correspondence  has  been  studied  as  a  mirror  of  the  Roman 
ethical  consciousness,  rather  than  as  a  source  of  evidence  regarding  the 
character  or  the  consistency  of  Cicero.  Still,  no  account  has  been  taken 
of  the  letters  addressed  to  Cicero.  In  general,  the  discussion  has  been 
limited  to  goods  which  are  in  the  text  presented  as  motives.  This  involves 
the  deliberate  exclusion  of  a  considerable  body  of  interesting  incidental 
ethical  judgments,  which  the  author  may  make  the  subject  of  a  supple- 
mentary paper.  The  question  of  the  genuineness  of  the  letters  admitted 
to  the  editions  of  Miiller  and  of  Tyrrell  has  not  been  raised.  References 
to  passages  cited,  included  within  parentheses,  have  been  placed  in  the 
body  of  the  discussions,  in  the  belief  that  they  will  there  be  of  most  service 
to  the  student  of  Cicero,  while  the  general  reader  can  readily  pass  by  every- 
thing within  the  parentheses. 

Acknowledgment  is  due  Professors  George  L.  Hendrickson  and  Frank 

F.  Abbott,  of   the  University  of  Chicago,  for  suggestions  and  criticisms 

made  during  the  progress  of  the  work. 

W.  S.  G. 
Chicago,  April,  1905. 


Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 

in  2007  with  funding  from 

IVIicrosoft  Corporation 


http://www.archive.org/details/estimatesofmoralOOgordrich 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Introductory.    Cicero's  Letters  as  Material  for  Ethical  Stxjdy        -      7 

Chapter  I.     Estimates  of  Individual  Good  i 

Personal  Welfare  and  Safety  in  General        ----_-_i 

Estimate  Shown  by  Attitude  toward  Danger      -----  i 

Estimates  at  Various  Stages  of  Cicero's  Career       -        -        -        _        _  j 

Individual  Life — Death  Not  the  Greatest  Evil  -----  j 

Life  to  be  Yielded  for  Friends  or  Country     -         -        -        -        -        -15 

Is  Suicide  Justifiable  ?     Is  there  Life  after  Death       -        -        -        -  15 

Individual  Possessions — Wealth;  Villas  and  Their  Equipment      -        -        -  17 

Personal  Satisfaction  from  Liberal  Pursuits      ------  jg 

Cicero's  Devotion  to  Liberal  Pursuits  at  Various  Periods        -        -        -  18 

Continuity  and  Vitality  of  This  Interest     ------  22 

Practical  Benefits  Recognized  but  Liberal  Arts  Valued  Chiefly  as 

Pursuits         _-_-----__.  23 

Chapter  II.    Estimates  of  Semi-Social  Good  -        -        -        -        _  25 

The  Approval  of  Others       ----------25 

Professed  and  Commended  as  a  Motive     -        -        -        -        -        -  25 

Distinctions  and  Grades — Genuine  aad  Empty  Glory    -         -        -        -  29 

Ethical    Supplements — Desire    for    Approval    of    Impartial    Posterity; 

Glory  Sought  for  Family;  Preservation  of  Reputation         -        -  31 
Approval  of  Others  in  Relation  to  Duty         -        -        -        -        -        -^^ 

Public  Expressions  of  the  Approval  of  Others  -        -        _        -        _  - , 

Official  Compliments  Desirable,  but  Not  to  be  Sought  Eagerly       -        -  34 

Official  Position  a  Highly  Valued  Good;  Office-Seeking  Not  Disparaged  36 

The  Conception  of  Dignitas         -        -         --        -        -         -         _        -  ^^ 

Explicit    Grounds    of    Dignitas — Services  Approved,  Official   Compli- 
ments, Official  Position      -         -         -         -        -        -        -         _  ^^ 

Provisional  Definition;  Related  Uses;  Ethical  Aspects     -        -        -        -  40 

The  Series:  Salus,  Dignitas,  Officium — Welfare,  Distinction,  Duty     -  41 

Chapter  III.     Estimates  of  Social  Good     -        -        -        -        -        -        -4^ 

Introductory — Source  and  Aspects  of   Social  Good  -        -        _        .  ^^ 

The  Family  and  the  Motives  Which  it  Supplies 44 

Family   Fellowship   as   a   Good;    Measured  by  Pain  at  Separation, 

Alienation,  or  Bereavement         -----._  ^ 

Welfare  of  the  Family  a  Good;  Implied  Duties 46 

Duties  of  the  Members  of  a  Family  ---.-.  ^g 

Friendship  (Including  Gratitude)  as  a  Source  of  Motive       -         -        -        -  50 

Friendship  in  General — Grounds,  Satisfactions,  Duties      -         -         -  ^o 

Requests  for  Official  Favor  in  the  Interest  of  Friends     -         -         -        -  52 

Friendship  and  Patriotism         --------  ^4 

5 

\ 


6  MORAL   VALUES  IN  CICERO 'S  LETTERS 

PAGE 

Gratitude  and  Its  Obligations 54 

Grateful  Friendship  (as  Seen  in  Cicero's  Relations  with  Pompey)       -  56 

Rank  of  Grateful  Friendship  as  a  Motive      ------  60 

The  State  as  a  Source  of  Motive 62 

Survey  of  Points  Already  Incidentally  Considered           -        -        -        -  62 

The  State  and  the  Citizen  in  General 63 

Terms  for  the  Political  Unit 63 

Duty  of  the  Citizen;  Duty  Modified  by  Circumstances        -        -  64 

Advantage  of  the  State  Professed  and  Enjoined  as  a  Motive    -        -  66 

The  Cause  of  Pompey  and  That  of  Caesar  as  Related  to  Public  Welfare  67 

Peace  as  an  Element  of  PubUc  Welfare          ------  69 

Constitutional  versus  Unconstitutional  Rule       -----  72 

Approval  of  the  Assassination  of  Caesar           -        -        -        -        -  73 

General  Advocacy  of  the  Rule  of  Law        -----  73 

Loyalty  to  Political  Party 74 

Welfare  of  Subjects,  Slaves,  and  Enemies          -         -        -        -        -        -  75 

Welfare  of  Provincials  and  the  Policy  of  Provincial  Governors        -        -  75 

Welfare  of  Slaves;  Attitude  toward  Gladiatorial  Contests            -        -  78 

Attitude  toward  Public  Enemies             - 79 

Chapter  IV.    Estimates  of  Abstract  Good 81 

Character — The  Proper  Type  a  Desideratum        -        -        -        -        -        -81 

Commendation  of  Stability  Balanced  by  Gentleness            -        -        -  81 

Gravitas,  Constantia,  and  Levitas  as  Applied  to  Character      -         -        -  82 

"  Relation  of  the  Idea  of  Stability  to  that  of  Consistency       -        -        -  83 

Applications  of  the  Idea  of  Consistency          ------  85 

Stability  in  Relation  to  the  Virtues — Loyalty,  Courage,  Self-Control, 

Knowledge,  and  Gentleness --  88 

Desirable  Character  Defined          --------  g© 

Self -Approval  as  a  Desideratum ---  p© 

Comparison  of  Earlier  and  Later  Expressions        -         -        -         -        -  91 

Approval  of  Past  Motives  as  Well  as  Deeds  a  Comfort       -        -         -  92 

Right  or  Duty  Conceived  Abstractly  as  a  Desideratum          -         -         -         -  93 

Officium  and  Honestum — Meaning  and  Application            "         "         "  93 

Relation,  in  the  Letters,  of  Abstract  Right  and  Specific  Duties       -        -  94 

Abstract  Right  without  Indication  of  Supernatural  Sanction        -  94 

Terms  for  Right  Regularly  Associated  with  Social  Service       -        -  95 

Right,  in  the  Letters,  a  Generalized  Form  of  Social  Duty           -  96 

Statements  that  Right  is  the  Only  Good  Exceptional  and  Rhetorical  97 

The  Good  of  the  Letters  as  Manifold  as  Human  Life          -        -  98 


BRAH 
OfTHi 

UNIVERSITY 


INTRODUCTORY 

Rational  human  action  springs  from  motive.  Something  immediate 
or  remote,  individualistic  or  social,  specific  or  abstract,  is  thought  or  felt 
to  be  a  good.  Every  such  estimate  of  value  is  a  factor  in  shaping  conduct. 
In  proportion  as  we  understand  the  distinctive  goods  of  a  man,  a  people,  or 
an  epoch,  will  the  conduct  of  that  man,  people,  or  epoch  be  inteUigible 
and  significant.  Sometimes  the  conduct  is  itself  the  only  clue  to  the  goods, 
again,  various  artistic  and  literary  expressions  of  life  give  ghmpses  of  the 
ideals  behind  conduct.  Some  forms  of  art  and  literature  may  be  said  to 
reflect  life.  Others  may  more  justly  be  characterized  as  segments  from 
the  life  itself.  To  the  latter  class  belongs  in  a  peculiar  sense  a  familiar 
correspondence  such  as  Cicero  has  left  us. 

Historians,  biographers,  and  antiquarians  have  pointed  out  the  rare 
value  of  Cicero's  correspondence  for  their  several  objects.  For  the  his- 
tory of  the  practical  ethical  consciousness  this  body  of  material  is  no  less 
promising.  Cicero's  splendid  talents  and  varied  culture,  the  focal  epoch 
during  which  he  lived,  and  the  genius  and  prominence  of  many  of  his  con- 
temporaries have  often  been  emphasized.  Furthermore,  Cicero  must 
have  been,  for  a  Roman,  peculiarly  inclined  to  ethical  reflection,  as  is 
indicated  by  his  unique  service  in  popularizing  for  his  fellow-countrymen 
so  large  a  body  of  contemporary  Greek  philosophy,  predominantly  ethical. 
And  surely  no  Roman  could  more  clearly  and  adequately  express  his  ethical 
reflections  than  this  man  to  whom  is  due  so  much  of  the  world's  subsequent 
philosophical  terminology. 

Not  only  were  the  times  in  which  Cicero  hved  focal  for  history,  but  they 
were  exceedingly  perplexing.  Precedents  and  traditions  suppHed  no 
solution  for  the  problems  that  were  arising — problems  of  which  our  author 
might  well  say  that  they  were  "baffling  and  insoluble;  and  yet  a  solution 
must  be  found"  {A.,  8,  3,  6).^  The  strongest  motives  usually  found  co- 
operating would  be  directly  opposed  to  each  other.  These  were  surely 
circumstances  adapted  to  stimulate  the  balancing  of  values,  the  examination 
of  the  goods  in  view  of  which  choices  are  made. 

No  alleged  characteristic  of  Cicero,  save  vanity,  has  brought  upon  him 
a  greater  amount  of  hostile  criticism  than  his  indecision,  his  vacillation. 

^  In  this  discussion,  A.  designates  the  collection  of  letters  Ad  Atticum;  F.,  those 
Ad  Familiares;  B.,  those  Ad  Brutum;  and  Q.  F.,  those  Ad  QuirUum  Fratrem. 

7 


8  MORAL  VALUES  IN  CICERO'S  LETTERS 

[His  difficulty  in  reaching  a  conclusion  is  patent,  however  we  may  account 
(for  or  judge  it;  and  this  very  trait  increases  the  value  of  his  correspondence 
for  our  present  purpose.  If  he  had  been  able  quickly  and  instinctively  to 
grasp  the  most  feasible  solution  of  a  tangled  question,  we  should  have 
been  given  only  the  conclusion,  or  at  best  a  subsequent  justification  which 
might  or  might  not  represent  the  original  logical  process.  But  Cicero 
appreciated  so  keenly  the  force  of  so  many  conflicting  considerations,  and 
was  so  desirous  of  reaching  the  conclusion  that  would  represent  the  true 
resultant  of  the  forces  involved,  that  the  process  of  decision  was  deliberate 
and  labored.  DeUberate  as  the  process  was,  its  various  stages  would  not 
be  available  for  study,  were  it  not  for  his  unparalleled  frankness  in  his  let- 
ters, especially  those  to  Atticus.  This  frankness  he  himself  presents  in  these 
terms:  ^'*So  often  then  do  you  change  your  opinion?'  I  talk  with  you 
jtist  as  with  myself;  for  who  does  not,  especially  in  so  important  a  matter, 
argue  the  different  sides  of  a  question  with  himself  ?"  {A.,  8,  14,  2). 

This,  then,  is  the  situation:  A  man  of  subtle  and  reflective  mind,  a  man 
temperamentally  incUned  to  defer  decision  until  all  the  conflicting  considera- 
tions are  carefully  estimated  and  balanced  each  against  each,  is  placed  in 
situations  of  pecuHar  perplexity,  and  as  an  aid  in  reaching  his  conclusions 
communicates  to  intimate  friends  from  hour  to  hour  the  varying  phases  of 
tlie  debate  within. 

Now,  it  is  the  purpose  of  this  study  to  examine  the  correspondence  of 
Cicero  for  its  estimates  of  moral  values,  using  the  term  "moral"  in  its  most 
inclusive  sense.  What  objects  does  Cicero  in  these  letters  present  as  worthy 
to  determine  a  man's  choice?  In  other  words,  in  view  of  what  good  or 
goods  should  a  man,  according  to  our  author,  act  ?  From  the  multiplicity 
of  practical  judgments  we  seek  to  define  and  correlate  the  implied  ideals. 
If  the  estimates  of  a  given  aim  expressed  at  different  times  and  under 
different  circumstances  harmonize  with  each  other,  that  fact  should  appear. 
If  they  do  not  harmonize,  it  is  pertinent  to  seek  in  the  circumstances  reasons 
for  the  differences.  In  any  case,  the  aim  will  be  to  present  systematically 
the  articles  of  the  professed  ethical  creed  found  in  the  letters.  If  historical 
or  biographical  matter  is  introduced,  it  will  be  because  it  seems  necessary 
for  the  interpretation  of  the  estimates  of  value.  It  is  no  part  of  our  pur- 
pose to  discuss  the  soundness  of  Cicero's  application  of  his  doctrines  in 
estimating  men  and  measures.  Neither  are  we  primarily  concerned  with 
the  consistency  of  Cicero's  conduct  and  character,  one  of  those  perennial 
enigmas  the  solution  of  which  seems  to  depend  almost  as  much  on  the 
interpreter's  temperament  and  personaHty  as  on  the  intellectual  inter- 
pretation of  the  objective  data.     Nor  is  it  vital  to  determine  in  every  case 


INTRODUCTORY  9 

the  sincerity  of  our  author  in  the  judgments  expressed,  for  any  misrepre- 
sentation of  his  own  sentiments  would  be  due  to  the  pressure  of  surrounding 
sentiment.  The  data  have  a  bearing  for  the  Roman  popular  consciousness 
independently  of  this  issue. 

While  a  study  of  the  ethical  material  contained  in  the  correspondence 
of  Cicero  promises  results  valuable  and  valid,  apart  from  the  controverted 
biographical  questions  with  which  the  material  has  chiefly  been  associated 
such  an  investigation  ought  incidentally  to  shed  Hght  upon  those  personal 
questions.  Points  of  view  may  be  gained  from  which  actions  seemingly 
inconsistent  with  one  another  will  appear  in  a  more  favorable  hght.  On 
the  other  hand,  incongruities  between  professions  and  conduct,  as  well  as 
prejudiced  variations  in  the  appUcation  of  principles,  may  be  brought  into 
clearer  reHef . 

Students  of  Cicero's  philosophical  works  should  be  aided  by  a  systematic 
presentation  of  the  ethical  ideas  which  he  expressed  in  compositions  so 
spontaneous  and  informal  as  are  the  letters.  The  Greek  originals  on  which 
his  philosophical  works  were  based  have  for  the  most  part  been  lost.  To 
what  extent  had  Cicero  assimilated  the  theoretical  works  which  he  at  various 
stages  of  his  career  studied  ?  What  is  the  relation  of  the  moral  judgments 
given  with  approval  in  his  formal  works  to  the  judgments  of  his  every-day 
thought  ?  Upon  these  questions,  which  have  been  the  occasion  of  contro- 
versy, some  Hght  may  perhaps  be  gained  from  the  results  of  such  a  study  as 
that  here  undertaken. 


CHAPTER  I 
INDIVIDUAL  GOOD 

That  individual  welfare  and  safety — life,  health,  possessions,  and  pur- 
suits— were  objects  of  endeavor  to  Cicero  and  his  contemporaries  may  be 
assumed  without  detailed  proof.  In  our  investigation  we  may  properly 
seek  evidence  as  to  the  relative  prominence,  emphasis,  and  rank  given  to 
the  respective  elements  of  individual  welfare,  and  to  these  individual  con- 
siderations, taken  collectively,  in  comparison  with  the  social  and  the  ideal. 

One's  estimate  of  welfare  or  safety  is  disclosed  in  the  presence  of  danger 
affecting  these  objects.  Cicero  professed  to  have  for  danger  neither  con- 
tempt nor  excessive  fear  (A.,  2,  24,  4).  He  claimed  none  of  the  martyr 
spirit.  Fruitless  peril  he  would,  if  possible,  avoid  (e.  g..  A,.  7,  23,  2).  In 
spite  of  an  occasional  confession  of  timidity  (e.  g.,  i^.,  6,  14,  i),  he  usually 
claimed  courage,  as  when  he  wrote  that  his  peace  poUcy  would  bring  him 
greater  credit  than  did  that  of  Hortensius,  since  it  could  not  be  attributed 
to  cowadice  (F.,  2,  16,  3).  The  following  is  a  deliberate  and  significant 
formulation  of  his  own  professed  attitude  toward  danger,  and  by  inference 
of  the  attitude  which  he  would  commend:  ''So  I  whom  those  gallant  and 
philosophical  gentlemen  of  the  stamp  of  Domitius  and  Lentulus  used  to 
call  afraid  (timidus) — and  I  really  was,  for  I  feared  the  occurrence  of  what 
actually  did  happen — I  now  fear  nothing,  but  am  ready  against  any  event. 
So  long  as  any  precaution  seemed  possible  I  was  distressed  that  it  should 
be  neglected;  but  now  that  there  is  no  profit  from  planning,  since  all  is 
ruined,  the  only  way  seems  to  be  to  bear  serenely  whatever  comes"  {F, 
6,  21,  I ;  45  B.  C).  This  general  statement,  applied  to  the  matter  of  per- 
sonal safety,  would  claim  that  clear  apprehension  of  peril,  and  distressed 
effort  to  devise  a  remedy,  so  long  as  a  remedy  is  possible,  are  consistent 
with  an  untroubled  contemplation  of  evils  which  one  is  unable  to  avert, 
and  compatible  with  real  courage. 

The  most  instructive  utterances  which  we  find  in  the  letters  regarding 
the  relation  of  personal  welfare  to  other  considerations  were  occasioned  by 
three  or  four  perplexing  crises  in  Cicero's  life:  just  before  and  just  after 
the  exile,  when  he  was  in  a  measure  compelled  to  choose  between  the  tri- 
umvirs and  the  senate;  in  49  and  48,  when  the  choice  was  between  Caesar 
and  Pompey;  and  in  44,  when  the  issue  was  bet^-een  retirement  and  active 
opposition  to  Antony. 


12  MORAL  VALUES  IN  CICERO'S   LETTERS 

In  60,  feeling  for  various  reasons  the  need  of  strengthening  his  position 
(A.,  I,  19,  6),  he  secured  an  understanding  with  Pompey.  He  meets  or 
forestalls  objections  to  this  action  by  frequent  declarations  that  it  is  more 
beneficial  to  the  state  than  to  himself,  and  that  his  loyalty  to  the  senate 
is  unshaken.  *'It  does  not  concern  me  ....  as  much  as  it  does  the 
state"  (A.,  I,  19,  7);  ".  .  .  .  it  is  assuredly  far  more  beneficial  to  the  state 
than  to  me  that  the  assaults  of  base  citizens  upon  me  be  checked  .  .  .  ." 
(A,.  1,  20,  2);  "From  the  senate  nothing  will  separate  me,  either  because 
that  is  right,  or  because  it  is  most  in  keeping  with  my  interests,  or  because 
I  am  interested  in  my  standing  with  the  senate"  {A.,  i,  20,  3);  ".  .  .  .  you 
must  not  imagine  that  I  have  joined  him  for  my  own  protection,  but  the 
situation  was  such  that  great  dissensions  must  necessarily  break  out  in  the 
state,  should  there  perchance  be  any  disagreement  between  us"  (^4.,  2,  i,  6). 
His  implication  in  such  passages  is  that  he  was  justified  in  seeking  personal 
protection  only  in  so  far  as  this  was  consistent  with  the  interests  of  the 
republic,  and  the  quoted  expressions  are  all  from  letters  to  Atticus,  his  other 
self. 

The  renewal  of  the  understanding  between  Ca?sar  and  Pompey  in  56 
made  it  necessary  for  Cicero  again  to  define  his  attitude  toward  them.  In 
two  respects  the  exile  had  caused  a  marked  change  of  tone.  What  he 
regards  as  the  treachery  of  the  optimates  (^4.,  4,  5,  i)  has  enstranged  him 
from  them.  At  the  same  time,  his  distressing  experience  has  quickened 
his  sense  of  danger  and  of  the  necessity  of  guarding  against  it.  These  two 
influences  conspire  to  give  to  personal  safety  a  position  of  relatively  greater 
prominence  than  at  any  other  period  represented  by  the  letters.  He  has 
not  forgotten  his  standing  (dignitas),  but  concludes  that  some  account 
should  be  taken  of  safety  as  well.  Both  might  easily  be  conserved,  if  only 
the  ex-consuls  were  faithful  and  firm  (F.,  i,  7,  7).  Experience  has  taught 
him  that  neither  position  nor  safety  should  be  sought  apart  from  the  other 
(F.,  I,  7,  10).  To  this  period  belongs  a  remark  depreciating  fame  in  com- 
parison with  safety  (.  .  .  .  multum  enim  interest,  iitrum  laus  imminiiatur, 
an  solus  deseratur,  i^.,  i,  7,  8).  He  admits  that  his  agreement  with  Pom- 
pey and  Caesar,  a  course  to  which  personal  expediency  and  loyalty  to  indi- 
viduals have  led  him,  involves  a  certain  abandonment  of  sound  poHtical 
principles  (F.,  i,  8,  2).  Notwithstanding  this,  he  maintains  to  the  same 
correspondent  that  this  course  is  expedient  for  the  state  as  well  as  for  him- 
self, and  that  it  should  be  followed  entirely  apart  from  personal  considera- 
tions (F.,  I,  9,  21). 

Whether  from  differences  in  the  outward  circumstances  or  from  a  differ- 
ence in  Cicero's  temper,  or  both,  we  find  in  the  crisis  of  49-48  an  admitted 


INDIVIDUAL  GOOD  1 3 

conflict  between  personal  safety  and  other  motives.     This  increases  the 
tension  and  lifts  the  question  to  a  higher  plane. 

His  realization  of  the  personal  peril  is  no  less  keen  than  previously. 
To  Tiro  he  writes  (F.,  i6,  12,  i)  that  his  own  safety  and  that  of  all  good 
citizens  and  of  the  state  are  so  imperiled  that  the  only  hope  lies  with  some 
god  or  with  some  chance.  The  lesson  of  the  exile  evidently  abides,  for  he 
frankly  admits  that  he  is  refraining  from  taking  the  lead  in  a  civil  war,  not 
from  consideration  of  the  merits  of  the  case,  but  because  a  course  less  meri- 
torious formerly  brought  him  disaster.  He  fears  the  hostihty  of  Caesar 
(A.,  7,  26,  2).  He  remembers  that  if  he  had  at  a  former  crisis,  heeded  the 
advice  of  Atticus  to  adopt  plans  looking  somewhat  toward  safety,  as  well 
as  toward  glor)%  trouble  might  have  been  averted  (^4.,  8,  12,  5).  From 
one  epigrammatic  summary  we  might  judge  that  the  alternative  courses 
involved  equal  peril:  "If,  leaving  duty  out  of  question,  account  is  to  be 
taken  of  danger,  there  is  danger  from  one  party  if  I  do  wrong,  from  the 
other  if  I  do  right"  {A.,  10,  8,  5).  The  detailed  analysis  given  in  ^.,  8,  3, 
2-5,  seems  to  indicate  that  the  greater  danger  is  involved  in  following 
Pompey.     We  may  formulate  the  case  thus: 

I.  In  case  of  remaining  in  Italy: 

a)  Caesar  as  a  victorious  despot  may  be  dangerous  even  to  his  supporters. 

b)  Pompey,  victorious,  would  take  vengeance. 
II.  In  case  of  joining  Pompey: 

a)  The  chances  of  Pompey's  victory  are  slight.     (This  involves  the  proba- 
bility of  vengeance  from  Caesar,  cf.  A.,  9,  12,  3.) 

b)  Caesar  is  now  in  position  to  make  withdrawal  from  Italy  difl&cult  and 
dangerous. 

c)  Caesar  would  assail  the  interests  of  the  absent  Cicero. 

As  long  as  possible  Cicero  put  ofif  committing  himself,  expecting  that 
there  would  be  a  reconciliation,  in  which  case  he  hoped  to  retain  undis- 
turbed the  friendship  of  both  chiefs  {A.,  10,  8,  5);  but  as  time  went  on  it 
became  more  and  more  evident  that  choice  must  be  made,  not  only  between 
perils,  but  between  peril  and  other  considerations. 

How,  then,  at  this  time  of  eager  scrutiny  and  weighing  of  values,  did 
the  element  of  personal  safety  appear  when  related  to  other  motives  ?  At 
one  time  Cicero  protests  against  being  driven  by  public  sentiment  to  take 
a  course  harmful  alike  to  himself  and  the  state  (^.,9,  i,  3) ;  at  another  time 
he  would  be  glad  to  suffer  grievous  injury  at  the  hands  of  the  Caesarians 
as  a  demonstration  that  he  was  the  object  of  the  tyrant's  hatred  (A.,  10, 
12a,  i);  that  is,  he  wavers  as  to  the  relative  value  of  persqnal_salet9L-and 
the  approval  of  others.     In  a  politic  letter  to  a  Caesarian  he  expresses  sur- 


14 

prise  that  he  should  be  thought  so  short-sighted  as  to  choose  a  desperate 
cause  instead  of  a  promising  one  (F.,  2,  16,  i) ;  but  when  writing  to  Atticus 
he  disclaims  making  personal  safety  the  prime  consideration  (A.,  7,  13,  3; 
cf.  7,  12,  3);  and,  further,  he  can  express  himself  as  ready  to  suffer  the 
greatest  personal  disaster  (F.,  2,  16,  4)  in  behalf  of  his  country.  Yet, 
while  thus  testifying  to  the  supreme  claims  of  patriotism,  he  does  not  court 
needless  sacrifice.  He  wonders  whether  his  former  services  and  sufferings 
for  his  country  may  not  justify  his  withdrawing  from  a  struggle  against 
odds  and  planning  for  the  safety  of  himself  and  his  family  (A.,  9,  4,  2). 
He  has  made  exceptional  sacrifices  for  the  state,  and  is  exposed  to  excep- 
tional perils  which  he  ought  to  avoid  if  he  can  honorably  (.  .  .  .si  hones  te 
vitare  possem,  A.,  8,  iiD,  7;  to  Pompey,  49  B.  C).  "Suppose  I  can  do 
this  safely,  as  many  urge  me,  can  I  do  it  honorably?"  (^.,  7,  22,  2;  cf.  7, 
23,  3)  is  a  question  presenting  the  same  antithesis,  and  definitely  subordi- 
nating personal  safety  to  higher  ethical  considerations.  This  will  be  more 
fully  illustrated  when  we  come  to  consider  the  social  motives.  The  fact 
that  at  this  crisis  Cicero  did  take  the  course  involving  most  danger,  did 
reject  Coesar  to  his  face  {A.,  9,  18,  i)  and  turn  in  the  direction  prompted 
by  reputation,  gratitude,  and  political  consistency  justifies  us  in  taking  him 
seriously  in  this  ranking  of  motives. 

A  brief  and  less  intense  period  of  perplexity,  over  the  question  of  with- 
drawing from  Italy  after  the  assassination  of  Caesar,  involves  elements 
similar  to  those  already  considered.     It  occasioned  an  interesting  sum- 
mary of  motives  (A.,  14,  13,  4): 
I.  In  favor  of  going  to  Greece: 

a)  Escape  from  threatened  massacre. 

b)  Opportunity  to  look  after  his  son's  welfare. 
II.  In  favor  of  remaining  in  Italy: 

a)  Opinion  of  people. 

b)  Opportunity  to  be  of  use  to  the  state. 

It  should  be  noticed  that  in  this  case  also  the  final  decision  was  in  favor 
of  danger,  reputation,  and  public  service. 

Passing  to  the  specific  elements  of  individual  good,  we  may  first  inquire 
what  rank  Cicero  assigns  to  physical  life.  Life  is  frequently  referred  to 
in  the  letters  as  not  the  greatest  good,  and  death  as  not  the  greatest  evil. 
Such  statements  naturally  have  for  their  primary  purpose  the  emphasizing 
of  the  compared  good  or  evil,  and  in  these  statements  we  must  recognize 
a  large  rhetorical  element.  Yet  even  the  rhetorical  recognition  of  the  idea 
that  life  may  be  of  less  importance  than  the  demands  of  friendship,  grati- 
tude, patriotism,  or  right  has  its  significance  for  our  present  purpose. 


INDIVIDUAL  GOOD  1$ 

"No  wise  man  (or  philosopher,  sapiens)  has  considered  death  a  lament- 
able thing  even  to  the  prosperous  (F.,  6,  3,  3).  The  banishment  of  the 
fear  of  death  secures  independence;  "For  what  man  is  a  slave  who  has 
contempt  of  death?"  (A.,  9,  2a,  2,  quoting  from  a  lost  play  of  Euripides, 
Tts  8'  ia-TL  8ov\o^  Tov  Oavdv  aL<j>povTL<:  wv  ;).  Particularly  may  one  be  freed 
from  this  anxiety  who  has  rounded  out  his  life  with  years  and  deeds  and 
fame  (F.,  10,  i,  i).  If  the  prosperous  should  view  death  with  com- 
placency, those  in  the  opposite  situation  ought  even  to  welcome  it  {F., 
5,  21,4).  The  lot  of  the  murdered  Mucianus  was  rather  to  be  chosen 
than  the  torturing  perplexity  of  the  year  49  (^4.,  9,  12,  7).  Under  the 
wretched  despotism  of  Caesar  it  seems  a  misfortune,  nay  even  a  crime, 
to  remain  alive  (F.,  4,  13,  1-2;  46  B.  C.)  Cato  deserves  praise  for  the 
steadfastness  that  prompted  him  to  die  rather  than  see  this  situation  (A.j 
12,  4,  2).  Likewise  in  the  thick  of  his  last  fight  Cicero  writes:  "All  whose 
sentiments  are  sound  prefer  death  to  slavery"  {F.,  10,  27,  i). 

Expressions  of  willingness  to  die  in  another's  behalf  vary  considerably 
in  tone.  "If  I  should  yield  up  my  life  in  defense  of  your  position,  I  should 
clearly  not  have  begun  to  repay  you,"  written  to  Lentulus  (F.,  i,  4,  3), 
sounds  rather  conventional.  Far  differently  does  Cicero  weigh  his  words 
in  writing  to  Atticus  of  Pompey  (A.,  9,  5,  3).  He  has  reason  to  be  angry 
with  Pompey  both  on  political  and  on  personal  grounds;  but  he  considers 
what  Pompey  has  done  for  him.  Nothing  less  than  Pompey's  death  is  the 
aim  of  his  foes.  Achilles  was  ready  to  die  with  his  friend.  This  man  has 
been  both  friend  and  benefactor;  besides,  he  stands  for  a  noble  cause.  Life 
is  not  too  great  a  price  to  pay  in  return  for  such  services. 

Themistocles  did  right  to  choose  death  rather  than  to  make  war  on  his 
country  (A.,  9,  10,  3).  So  Cicero  professes  to  love  his  country  better  than 
life  (F.,  II,  5,  3).  To  die  in  and  for  one's  country  is  a  glorious  thing 
(praedarum,  ^.,  8,  2,  2 ;  49  B.  C.) ;  and  if  he  should  lay  down  his  life  in  his 
efforts  to  preserve  the  safety  and  freedom  of  his  fellow-citizens,  he  would 
consider  his  lot  a  glorious  one  (praeclare  actum  mecum  putem,  F.,  9,  24,  4; 
43  B.  C).  Caesar's  unconstitutional  course  is  declared  to  involve  violation 
of  the  right  and  honorable  (honestum).  A  thousand  deaths,  even  death 
by  crucifixion,  is  a  less  evil  than  even  to  have  conceived  such  a  deed  (^4.,  7, 
II,  2-3). 

Connected  with  the  estimate  placed  on  life  is  the  matter  of  suicide. 
Cicero's  letters  from  exile  contain  many  expressions  of  regret  that  he  did 
not  take  his  own  life  rather  than  leave  Italy.  His  one  false  step  was  in  not 
letting  his  Ufe  go  with  his  honors  (F.,  14,  4,  5).  There  were  two  reasons 
why  he  should  have  died;  it  would  have  been  the  most  creditable  course. 


l6  MORAL  VALUES   IN  CICERO'S  LETTERS 

and  the  best  means  of  escaping  unendurable  troubles  {Q.  F.,  i,  4,  4)-  He 
regrets  that  the  entreaties  of  his  friends  kept  him  from  taking  his  own  life 
at  the  most  creditable  {honestissimum)  time  {A.,  3,  7,  2),  but  if  there  is  no 
hope  of  a  change,  he  will  do  at  an  inopportune  time  what  at  the  fitting  time 
was  not  permitted  {A.,  3,  9,  2).  From  these  and  similar  passages  it  is  clear 
that  in  Cicero's  opinion  credit  would  have  been  gained  if  he  had  chosen  to 
die  rather  than  to  submit  to  the  humiliation  of  exile.  By  once  submitting 
to  this  degradation  he  forever  lost  the  opportunity  of  showing  efifectively 
that  he  held  life  without  the  approval  of  his  fellow-citizens  a  worthless  and 
unendurable  thing.  But  his  present  life  is  worthless  and  unendurable, 
and  suicide  will  be  the  only  means  of  escape.  He  does  not  in  the  least  seem 
to  question  his  right  to  take  his  own  life.  His  attitude  is  rather  one  of 
apology  for  having  let  the  entreaties  of  family  and  friends  hold  him  back 
from  the  appropriate  deed. 

After  the  defeat  of  Pompey  he  wrote  that  he  saw  no  reason  why  he 
should  inflict  death  on  himself,  though  there  were  many  reasons  why  he 
would  welcome  it  (F.,  7,  3,  4).  We  have  seen  his  unqualified  praise  for 
Cato's  resolute  death. 

With  regard  to  the  right  of  a  man  to  end  his  life  Cicero  was  evidently 
not  influenced  in  his  practical  attitude  by  Plato,  ^  whose  devotee  he  pro- 
fesses to  be;*  how  is  it  as  to  the  question  whether  life  ends  with  physical 
death?  Let  us  look  at  characteristic  expressions.  To  Torquatus  he 
wrote:  ".  .  .  .  if  now  I  should  be  summoned  to  life's  end,  I  should  not 
be  torn  from  a  republic  the  loss  of  which  I  should  feel,  especially  since  that 
would  be  entirely  without  consciousness"  {sine  ullo  sensu  futurum,  F.,  6, 
4,  4;  cf.  sensu  omnino  carebo,  F.,  6,  3,  4).  "But  since  there  is  more  evil  in 
fear  than  even  in  the  object  of  fear,  I  refrain,  especially  as  that  threatens 
which  is  not  only  painless,  but  is  the  end  of  pain  "  (F.,  6,  4,  4).  In  building 
a  shrine  for  Tullia,  "that  long  period  when  I  shall  not  be  {cum  non  ero) 
influences  me  more  than  this  brief  span  which  still  seems  to  me  too  long" 
{A.,  12,  18,  i).  He  endures  with  composure  whatever  comes,  "especially 
since  death  is  the  end  of  all  things "  (.  .  .  .  praesertim  cum  omnium  rerum 
mors  sit  extremum,  F.,  6,  21,  i).  Certainly  there  is  no  hint  here  of  con- 
scious life  after  physical  death.  There  may  seem  to  be  explicit  denial  of 
such  life,  but  it  is  probably  more  just  to  say  that  the  thought  is  limited  to 
physical,  mundane  life,  and  that  the  question  of  immortality  is  not  raised. 

1  Phcedo,  61  ff.;   Laws,  873  C.     Note,  however,  in  the  latter  passage  the  impHca- 
tion  that  circumstances  may  justify  or  excuse  suicide. 

2  E.  g.,  "deus  ille  noster  Plato"  {A.,  4,  16,  3),  and  "ille  quidem  princeps  ingenii 
et  doctrinae,  Plato"  {Q.  F.,  i,  i,  2g). 


INDIVIDUAL  GOOD  l^ 

The  '*  consciousness"  from  which  he  is  freed  and  the  "all  things"  of  which 
death  is  the  end  concern  the  embodied  life  of  the  dweller  of  the  imperial 
city.  Any  other  possible  life  is  not  so  much  denied  as  ignored,  and  that 
under  circumstances  making  reference  to  it  unusually  natural,  if  the  con- 
ception were  present  with  any  vitality.  He  can,  however,  raise  the  possi- 
bihty  of  immortality  as  something  of  which  he  has  "often  read  and  heard; 
that  there  is  no  evil  in  death ;  for  if  consciousness  persists,  it  should  be  con- 
sidered immortality  and  not  death;  but  if  consciousness  is  lost,  that  ought 
not  to  seem  an  affliction  which  is  not  felt"  {F.,  5,  16,  4).  The  entire  con- 
text indicates  that  we  have  here  the  perfunctory  repetition  of  a  conventional 
argument  without  indication  of  personal  conviction.  The  immortality  of 
fame  will  be  considered  in  another  connection. 

The  career  of  a  Crassus  indicates  that  in  ancient  as  well  as  in  modern 
times  material  possessions  could  form  a  prominent  element  in  individual 
good.  If,  however,  the  accumulation  of  wealth  occupied  a  conspicuous 
place  in  Cicero's  thought  as  in  itself  a  good,  the  letters  do  not  reflect  the 
fact.  He  welcomes  affluence  if  it  comes,  but  does  not  make  it  the  object 
of  his  quest  {Q.  F.,  2,  4,  3).  It  is  more  creditable  to  be  anxious  about  one's  v 
friends'  money  than  about  one's  own  (F.,  13,  14,  2).  The  failure  of  a  ^ 
legacy  does  not  matter,  provided  health  is  retained  (Q.  F.,  3,  9,  8).  We 
shall  find  Cicero  during  his  governorship  constantly  maintaining  that  he 
rejects  all  opportunities  for  personal  enrichment.  The  province  shall  not 
bear  a  farthing  of  his  expenses  (A.,  5,  20,  6,  etc.).  None  of  the  plunder 
won  in  battle  shall  be  touched  except  by  the  agents  of  the  Roman  people 
(F.,  2,  17,  4).  "fhe  surplus  from  the  appropriation  for  administrative 
expenses  is  to  be  handed  over  to  the  proper  officers,  notwithstanding  the 
disgust  of  his  staff  (^.,  7,  i,  6).  In  all  these  cases  reputation  is  to  be  con- 
sidered rather  than  gain.  On  the  other  hand,  the  correspondence  with 
Trebatius  shows  no  repugnance  to  the  plan  of  that  young  lawyer  in  joining 
himself  to  Caesar  in  the  province,  with  the  primary,  if  not  exclusive,  aim  of 
finding  opportunities  for  pecuniary  gain.  "  I  hear  that  there  is  neither  gold 
nor  silver  in  Britain.  If  that  is  the  case,  I  advise  you  to  capture  a  chariot 
and  speed  back  to  us  as  soon  as  possible"  (F.,  7,  7,  i).  "Do  not  stand  in 
your  own  light  [by  haste  to  return].  Delay  your  coming,  provided  you 
come  more  heavily  laden"  (F.,  7,  9,  2).  "If  Caesar  is  Hkely  to  do  anything 
for  you,  prolong  your  stay;  but  if  your  enterprise  is  fruitless,  come  home" 
(F.,  7,  II,  2). 

If  Cicero  does  not  show  anxiety  to  accumulate  a  fortune,  he  does  express 
the  need  of,  and  the  satisfaction  in,  objects  requiring  large  expenditure. 


1 8  MORAL   VALUES   IN   CICERO'S   LETTERS 

An  early  letter  to  Quintus  mentions  simultaneous  building  operations  on 
three  sites.  He  adds :  "  I  am  living  on  a  little  better  scale  than  formerly ;  it 
became  necessary"  {Q.  F.,  2,  4,  3).  He  seems  to  have  enlisted  the  aid  of 
his  friends  to  secure  a  house  befitting  his  rank  (A.,  i,  13,  6).  His  anxiety 
to  have  his  confiscated  house  restored  after  the  exile  (e.  g.,  F.,  14,  2,  3)  may 
well  have  been  quite  as  much  for  the  sake  of  retaining  a  favorite  site  and 
removing  visible  reminders  of  his  humiliation,  as  on  account  of  the  money 
value  of  the  property  involved. 

The  improvement  of  his  villas  claimed  keen  personal  interest  (e.  g.,  A., 
I,  6,  18;  4,  10,  2).  Statuary  was  a  favorite  means  of  adorning  them  (A.,  i, 
9,  2;  I,  10,  3,  etc.).  A  Herm- Athena  was  particularly  appropriate  for  his 
"Academia"  (A.,  1,  4,  3);  but  he  belabors  the  agent  who  had  no  more 
sense  of  fitness  than  to  buy  for  him  Bacchae  because  forsooth  they  were 
little  beauties — where  will  he  put  them? — and  a  Mars  for  the  man  of 
peace!  He  is  delighted  that  there  was  no  Saturn  in  the  lot.  A  Mercury 
should  have  been  included,  if  they  are  ever  to  be  paid  for  (F.,  7,  23,  2). 

When  the  power  of  the  triumvirs  made  free  political  activity  impossible, 
Cicero  turned  for  delight  and  comfort  to  these  rural  estates  {Domus  me  et 
rura  nostra  delectant.  A.,  4,  iS,  2;  ....  me  ...  .  otium  villaeque 
delectant,  Q.  F.,  3,  9,  2);  and  when  civil  war  was  breaking  out,  his  real 
affection  for  these  havens  shows  itself  in  his  desire  once  more  to  make  the 
circuit  of  his  villas  {circum  villulas  nostras  errare)  which  he  has  given  up  the 
hope  of  ever  seeing  again  (^.,  8,  9,  3). 

While  Cicero  seems  often  to  have  been  in  debt,  he  had  a  keen  sense  of 
the  importance  of  financial  credit.  The  most  earnest  references  wihch  we 
find  to  money  matters  in  the  letters  are  entreaties  to  Atticus  as  his  agent  to 
arrange  by  loans  or  collections  for  the  payment  of  his  obligations  and  the 
preservation  of  his  financial  standing  (e.  g.,  A.,  5,  5,  2;  11,  i,  1-2). 

We  have  seen  Cicero's  interest  in  fitting  up  his  "Academia"  with 
appropriate  statuary.  It  is  but  a  step  to  the  consideration  of  his  interest 
in  the  liberal  arts — in  study  and  in  writing,  in  philosophy,  in  history,  in 
literature.'  The  passages  in  the  correspondence  bearing  directly  or  indi- 
rectly on  this  subject  are  to  be  numbered  literally  by  hundreds.  Of  the 
various  questions  upon  which  this  body  of  material  throws  light  we  are 
concerned  in  this  investigation  merely  with  the  value  which  Cicero  assigns 
to  pursuits  of  this  sort  as  an  element  in  life. 

That  the  study  of  literature  and  philosophy  formed  an  important  part 

I  For  a  suggestive  discussion  of  the  continuity  of  Cicero's  interest  in  philosophy 
see  Ried's  introduction  to  his  edition  of  the  Academica. 


INDIVIDUAL   GOOD  I9 

of  Cicero's  education  is  a  commonplace.  That,  when  overtaken  by  political 
disappointment  or  domestic  bereavement,  he  turned  to  these  pursuits  for 
employment,  is  equally  well  recognized;  but  what  indication  do  the  letters 
give  of  an  independent  abiding  interest  in  such  studies  ?  With  the  consul- 
ship of  Caesar  in  the  year  59  before  our  era  Cicero  was  checked  in  his  inde- 
pendent political  career.  For  our  purpose,  therefore,  the  few  extant  letters 
from  the  period  of  unimpaired  political  prosperity  possess  especial  value. 

In  the  first  year  of  the  correspondence,  68  B.  C,  he  wrote  to  Atticus 
who  was  in  Athens:  "I  should  be  glad  to  have  you  consider,  in  accordance 
with  your  promise  to  me,  how  you  can  secure  me  a  library.  On  your  kind- 
ness depend  all  my  hopes  of  the  satisfaction  which  I  want  to  take  when  I 
have  leisure"  (A.,  i,  7).  Here  we  have  eagerness  to  seciu-e  Greek  books 
at  a  time  when  disciplinary  training  was  past  and  the  struggle  for  position 
keenest.  The  assigned  motive  is,  not  the  desire  to  secure  material  for 
speeches,  but  personal  satisfaction  when  leisure  should  permit.  A  similar 
request,  belonging  to  the  following  year,  is  aptly  rendered  by  Mr.  Tyrrell 
as  follows:  "Do  not  on  any  account  betroth  yoiu-  library  to  anyone,  no 
matter  how  eager  a  suitor  for  it  you  find.  I  am  hoarding  up  all  my  glean- 
ings (savings)  to  buy  it  as  a  support  (resource)  for  my  old  age"  (A.,  i,  10, 
4).  Do  not  the  metaphors  here  employed  reflect  the  common  feeling  of 
the  book-lover  who  can  scarcely  think  of  congenial  volumes  as  belonging 
altogether  to  the  categor}^  of  things?  It  is  like  his  later  statement,  that 
since  his  books  have  been  arranged  a  soul  seems  to  have  been  imparted  to 
his  house  {A.,  4,  8,  2;  56  B.  C).  To  return  to  the  earlier  period,  he  wTote 
in  67:  "Be  sure  not  to  let  anyone  have  your  books;  save  them  for  me  as 
you  suggest.  I  have  the  greatest  eagerness  for  them"  (^4.,  i,  11,  3);  and 
again:  "Keep  your  books  and  do  not  give  up  the  hope  of  my  being  able 
to  make  them  mine.  If  I  accomplish  this,  I  shall  be  richer  than  Crassus, 
and  shall  look  down  on  everybody's  country  seats  and  meadows"  (A.j  i, 
4,  3;  66  B.  C).  Six  years  later,  just  before  the  clouding  of  his  political 
sky,  we  find  the  same  desire  keen — how  keen  quotation  can  best  indicate. 
A  legacy  of  books  has  been  left  to  him,  and  he  writes  thus:  "As  you  love 
me  and  have  assurance  of  my  afifection,  use  every  efiFort  through  your 
friends,  your  clients,  your  guest-friends,  your  freedmen,  and  finally  your 
slaves,  that  not  a  sheet  be  lost,  for  I  have  most  vu-gent  need  (tnihi  vehementer 
opus  est)  of  those  Greek  books  which  I  suspect  and  the  Latin  ones  which 
I  know  he  left"  {A.,  i,  20,  7;  60  B.  C.) ;"....  see  that  they  are  preserved 
and  sent  to  me;  nothing  can  be  more  welcome"  (-4.,  2,  i,  12). 

To  this  same  period  of  political  prosperity  belongs  the  defense  of  Arch- 
ias,  with  its  familiar  encomium  on  liberal  pursuits,  the  chief  featiures  of 


20  MORAL  VALUES   IN   CICERO'S   LETTERS 

which  find  close  parallels  in  the  correspondence.  In  the  first  chapter  of 
the  Pro  Archia,  for  example,  Cicero  declared  that  no  period  of  his  life  had 
been  destitute  of  the  liberal  arts.  Similar  claims  are  made  at  various 
stages  of  the  correspondence;  for  example:  ".  .  .  .  learning,  to  which  I 
have  devoted  myself  from  boyhood"  (F.,  3,  10,  7);  *'....  my  old  friends, 
my  books"  (F.,  9,  i,  2);  *'.  .  .  .  learning  and  letters,  which  I  have  always 
pursued"  (quibus  semper  usi  sumusj  F,.  6,  12,  5;  cf.  quibus  semper  studui, 
F.,  6,  4,  3);  ".  .  .  .  all  art  and  liberal  learning,  and  especially  philosophy, 
has  been  a  delight  to  me  from  early  life"  {a  prima  aetate,  F.,  4,  4,  4). 

Now,  at  the  very  first  check  to  his  public  activity  in  59  we  find  Cicero 
turning  to  literary  pursuits  with  such  expressions  as  these:  "Meanwhile  I 
shall  with  equanimity,  nay  even  with  gladness  and  willingness,  seek  satis- 
faction in  the  company  of  the  Muses"  {A.,  2,  4,  2;  April  59);  and,  "But 
why  do  I  concern  myself  with  these  [political]  matters,  which  I  desire  to  lay 
aside,  devoting  myself  heart  and  soul  to  philosophy.  Such  in  fact  is  my 
purpose.  I  should  have  been  glad  to  do  so  at  the  beginning,  but  now  that  I 
have  found  how  vain  are  those  objects  which  I  thought  were  glorious,  I 
plan  to  have  dealings  with  all  the  Muses"  {A.,  2,  5,  2;  April,  59).  It 
should  be  clear,  in  view  of  the  facts  already  considered,  that  this  turning  to 
literature  is  no  sudden  afterthought,  but  is  entirely  in  keeping  with  tastes 
and  desires  expressed  from  the  very  beginning  of  the  correspondence  about 
ten  years  before.  Not  less  carefully  should  we  notice  how  definitely  and 
comprehensively  Cicero  thus  early  in  his  career  expresses  his  purpose  to 
substitute  literature  for  unsatisfactory  politics.  The  large  number  of  such 
expressions  in  the  letters  of  the  years  46  and  45  tends  to  create  and  foster 
the  impression  that  at  that  late  date  Cicero  abruptly  turned  back  to  the 
studies  of  his  youth  as  a  convenient  means  of  diversion.  But  such  expres- 
sions as  those  quoted  above  from  59  form  a  link  connecting  the  expressions 
of  literary  interest  distributed  through  the  first  ten  years  of  the  correspond- 
ence with  those  recognitions  of  the  consolations  of  literature  and  philosophy 
found  with  increasing  frequency  in  the  letters  of  the  last  fifteen  years. 

The  question  of  the  continuity  and  vitality  of  our  author's  interest  in 
liberal  pursuits  from  58  to  43  may  best  be  illuminated  by  a  survey  of  his 
estimates  of  them  expressed  during  the  period,  taking  account  both  of 
chronological  distribution  and  variations  in  tone.' 

The  exile  was  so  paralyzing  a  stroke  that  "neither  wisdom  nor  learning" 
had  "sufficient  power  to  be  able  to  support  such  sorrow"  {Q.  F.,  i,  3,  5; 

I  Of  forty-six  of  the  more  important  passages  of  this  nature  belonging  to  the 
period  in  question,  eight  are  distributed  through  the  ten  years  from  58  to  49  inclusive, 
thirty-two  belong  to  46  and  45,  and  four  to  the  following  year. 


INDIVIDUAL   GOOD  21 

58  B.  C).  The  group  of  passages  belonging  to  55  and  54  are  similar  to 
those  of  59.  Cicero  feeds  on  literature,  devours  the  library  of  Faustus, 
professes  satisfaction  in  literary  retirement,  but  eagerly  inquires  about  the 
details  of  Roman  politics  from  which  the  activity  of  the  triumvirs  and  his 
self-respect  exclude  him  (^.,4,  10,  i ;  and  4,  11,  2).  He  can  show  a  bold 
front  and  declare  that  he  is  turning  from  oratory  to  the  gentler  Muses, 
which  have  especially  delighted  him  from  early  youth  (F.,  i,  9,  23) ;  or  in  a 
burst  of  confidence  to  his  brother  he  can  confess  that  he  is  pained  at  the 
shattering  of  his  cherished  ambitions  for  political  eminence,  and  that  his 
literary  work  is  but  a  substitute  for  the  activities  that  should  be  his.^  With 
reasonable  allowance  for  varying  moods,  there  is  no  inherent  inconsistency 
in  the  two  statements. 

The  perplexing  political  situation  in  49,  like  the  exile  in  58,  brought 
Cicero  into  a  frame  of  mind  in  which  "neither  books  nor  literature  nor 
learning"  was  of  any  avail  {A.,  g,  10,  2). 

After  the  struggle  was  over,  even  defeat,  submission,  and  political 
extinction  brought  calm.  In  the  letters  of  46  the  references  to  satisfaction 
in  liberal  pursuits  are  not  only  more  numerous  than  in  those  of  any  other 
year,  but  they  are  of  unusual  serenity  and  comprehensiveness.  The  very 
hopelessness  of  the  political  situation  enabled  Cicero  to  give  himself  to  let- 
ters with  a  completeness  that  previously  had  been  impossible,  however 
much  he  had  declared  his  intention  of  making  literature  his  one  aim.  These 
pursuits  were  his  refuge  (F.,  6,  12,  5  and  5,  21,  2).  They  can  never  be 
taken  from  him  while  life  lasts  (F.,  7,  3,  4).  They  are  serviceable  and 
dehghtful  in  prosperity,  and  indispensable  when  other  occupations  fail 
(F.,  4,  3,  3-4,  suggesting  the  secundas  res  ornant,  adversis  perfugium  ac 
solacium  praebent  of  Pro  A rchia,  chap.  7) .  To  Varro  he  playfully  WTites  that 
he  has  become  reconciled  with  his  old  friends,  his  books.  He  had  dropped 
their  society,  not  through  anger,  but  because  he  felt  shame  at  having  made 
such  poor  use  of  their  practical  maxims.  They  forgive  him  now  and 
summon  him  back  to  the  former  intimacy  {F.,  9,  i,  2).  He  loves  every 
lover  of  knowledge,  which  is  the  one  thing  by  which  the  mind  is  nurtured 
(A.,  12,  6,  2).  The  greatness  of  his  need  has  enabled  him  to  find  in  the 
arts  a  richer  fruitfulness  and  a  greater  potency  than  in  better  days  (F.,  9, 

Early  in  45  Cicero  was  plunged  into  keenest  distress  by  the  death  of  his 
daughter  Tullia.     This  circumstance  colors  most  of  his  references  to  the 

I  ....  "  nostrumque  hoc  tempus  aetatis,  quod  in  ilia  autoritate  senatoria  florere 
debebat,  aut  forensi  labore  iactari  aut  domesticis  litteris  sustentari,  illud  vero,  quod  a 
puero  adamaram  ....  totum  occidisse  .  .  .  ."  {Q.  F.,  3,  5,  4;   cf.  3,  9,  2). 


22  MORAL   VALUES   IN  CICERO 'S   LETTERS 

satisfaction  of  literature  during  this  year.  There  is  no  change  in  the  esti- 
mate of  these  pursuits.  They  are  still  the  embellishment  of  prosperity 
and  the  support  of  adversity  (F.,  5,  13,  5).  But  the  emphasis  is  on  their 
inadequacy  to  afford  any  real  remedy  for  this  grief;  at  best  they  are  a  pallia- 
tive (A.J  12,  38,  i;  F.,  5,  15,  3-4).  Still,  writing  comes  nearer  affording 
relief  than  does  anything  else(^.,  12,  14,  3;  cf.  12,  44,  4;  and  13,  10,  i). 
Even  with  his  studies  he  scarcely  cares  to  live,  but  without  them  no  grain 
of  desire  would  remain  {Mihi  vero  cum  his  ipsis  vix,  his  autem  detractis 
ne  vix  quidem,  F.,  9,  8,  2).  On  the  other  hand,  he  protests  against  the 
impression  that  his  sorrow  has  reduced  him  to  morbid  helplessness. 
The  severe  and  exacting  nature  of  the  subjects  which  are  claiming  his 
attention  should  refute  such  a  suggestion.  He  should  receive  credit  for 
having  chosen  for  the  alleviation  of  his  grief  that  means  which  is  most  noble 
and  most  worthy  of  a  scholar  (qttae  maxime  liberalis  sit  doctoque  homine 
dignissima,  A.,  12,  38a,  i). 

As  after  the  ''Ides  of  March"  political  interests  took  precedence  over 
literary,  this  completes  a  historical  survey  which  may  justly  be  summarized 
in  the  words  of  Cicero  himself:  "For  although  from  youth  all  art  and 
liberal  learning,  and  particularly  philosophy,  have  been  my  delight,  still 
this  pursuit  daily  assumes  greater  importance  (ingravescif),  on  account,  I 
presume,  of  my  having  reached  the  time  of  life  suited  to  reflection  (aetatis 
maturitate  ad  pudenHam),  and  on  account  of  these  evil  times,  so  that  nothing 
else  can  afford  my  mind  relief  from  trouble  "  (F.,  4,  4, 4) .  Here  are  brought 
together  the  essential  elements  of  the  foregoing  presentation,  continuous 
interest  in  liberal  pursuits  from  early  life — an  interest  which  grew  naturally 
with  the  maturing  of  Cicero^s  mind,  which  was  increased  by  enforced  with- 
drawal from  public  life,  and  which  finally  rendered  learning  the  incompar- 
able solace  for  political  and  domestic  disaster.  Learning  as  an  interest  in 
Cicero's  letters  does  not  rank  above  successful  politics.  It  is  nevertheless 
a  real  and  continuous  interest,  with  independent  development  and  highest 
value. 

In  this  survey  no  attempt  has  been  made  to  distinguish  between  the 
study  of  philosophy,  the  study  of  literature,  and  the  work  of  composition, 
or  between  the  various  grounds  for  the  desirability  of  each  or  all  of  these. 
The  example  of  Cicero  himself  has  been  followed  in  treating  as  a  unit  the 
desirability  of  the  group  of  pursuits.  The  passages  before  us  show  that 
they  were  regarded  primarily  as  pursuits,  worthy  and  delightful  in  them- 
selves, affording  congenial  occupation  in  the  absence  of  other  employment, 
and  diverting  the  attention  from  what  otherwise  would  be  absorbing  and 
crushing  trouble. 


INDIVIDUAL  GOOD  23 

Besides  this  value  of  learning  as  an  occupation,  there  is  recognition  of 
the  educational  value  of  liberal  arts  in  preparing  for  the  duties  of  citizenship, 
as  when  Cicero  writes  his  brother  that  whatever  they  have  accomplished 
has  been  due  to  a  training  the  sources  of  which  are  Greek.'  In  the  same 
paragraph  this  practical  value  is  used  to  forestall  the  Roman  objection  that 
such  studies  involved  indolence  and  triviality  {inertiae  aut  levitatis  ulla 
suspicio).  Many  years  later  the  same  apologetic  note  was  still  sounded. 
Those  scholars  who  have  preferred  the  life  of  retirement  to  that  of  political 
activity  have  perhaps  done  so  improperly,  but  who  could  criticise  us  for 
gratifying  our  scholarly  tastes  "when  our  country  is  either  unable  or  unwill- 
ing to  employ  our  services"  (F.,  9,  6,  5;  46  B.  C). 

Philosophy  consoles  and  fortifies  by  the  direct  content  of  its  teaching, 
as  well  as  by  affording  congenial  and  interesting  employment  (e.  g.,  F.,  6, 
I,  3-4).  A  spirit  of  endurance  should  be  imparted  by  the  mere  physical 
presence  of  Athens,  the  birthplace  of  philosophy  (F.,  6,  i,  6),  where  the 
very  walls  of  the  houses  seem  able  to  give  forth  philosophical  comfort 
{F.,  6,  3,  3).  The  gods  have  given  man  no  greater  gift  than  philosophy. 
Others  have  associated  it  with  leisure,  but  Cicero  claims  fellowship  with 
Cato  in  bringing  it  into  public  life  (F.,  15,  4,  16). 

Yet  while  Cicero  thus  gives  full  recognition  to  the  practical  service  of 
learning  to  the  individual  or  to  the  community,  his  own  interest  seems  rather 
rooted  in  the  Hellenic  conception,  expressed  incidentally  in  words  to  Atticus 

already  cited:   "I  love  every  lover  of  knowledge You  desire  to 

know,  and  this  is  the  one  thing  by  which  the  mind  is  fed"  {Amo  enim 
iravra  t^iXrjhrjfjLova  ....  Scire  enim  vis;  quo  uno  animus  olitufyAj  12,  6,  2).  ^ 

^  " .  .  .  .  nos  ea,  quae  consecuti  sumiis,  iis  studiis  et  artibus  esse  adeptos,  quae 
sint  nobis  Graeciae  monumentis  disciplinisque  tradita,"  Q.  F.,  i,  i    28. 


CHAPTER  II 
SEMI-SOCIAL  GOOD 

The  opinion  of  others  and  its  various  manifestations  form  a  class  of 
goods  at  once  social  and  individualistic.  The  individual  thinks  of  his 
reputation,  his  promotion,  his  honors,  and  his  station  as  personal  posses- 
sions; yet  they  are  possessions  without  meaning,  or  even  existence,  apart 
from  his  fellows  in  some  social  group.  Merely  to  care  for  the  opinion  of 
others  as  in  itself  a  good  or  an  evil  involves  deference  to  society.  Besides, 
it  is  usually  on  the  ground  of  some  social  ministry  that  the  coveted  approval 
is  granted.  Hence,  if  no  deception  is  practised,  possession  of  this  approval 
indicates  a  certain  conformity  to  the  collective  sense  of  right — the  perform- 
ance of  some  measure  of  social  duty.  Further  ethical  force  is  given  to  the 
terms  for  popular  approval  by  the  readiness  with  which  in  speech  and  in 
thought  the  transition  is  made  from  the  honored  to  the  honorable,  from 
the  praised  to  the  praiseworthy,  and  from  the  trusted  to  the  trustworthy. 
This  group  of  motives  may  accordingly  be  named  semi-social,  and  given  a 
place  midway  between  duty  and  strictly  individual  good. 

During  the  crucial  period  of  49-48  B.  C.  the  opinion  of  others  was  with 
Cicero  a  factor  of  considerable  prominence.  Yet  he  was  not  at  this  time 
so  much  occupied  with  the  thought  of  reputation  and  glory  in  general  as 
with  a  dread  of  adverse  criticism  from  the  optimates.  The  general  terms 
for  glory,  fame,  and  honor,  so  common  in  other  parts  of  the  correspondence, 
in  large  measure  give  place  to  the  most  concrete  expressions  for  the  approval 
or  disapproval  of  his  fellows,  and  the  element  of  party  loyalty  is  seldom 
entirely  absent. 

His  strongly  expressed  feeHngs  of  obligation  to  Pompey  we  have  good 
reason  to  consider  genuine,  yet,  when  smarting  under  the  lash  of  criticism, 
he  could  write  (^4.,  8,  16,  i) :  '' So  it  is  not  he  [i.  e.,  Pompey]  that  influences 
me,  but  the  speech  of  people  as  reported  to  me  in  a  letter  from  Philotimus. 
For  he  says  that  I  am  being  flayed  by  the  optimates."  After  the  smart 
has  been  mitigated  by  two  days'  time,  a  recantation  follows  (^.,  9,  i,  4)  to 
the  effect  that  not  to  the  talk  of  the  worthless  optimates,  but  primarily  to 
Pompey,  he  will  make  the  concession  of  withdrawing  from  Italy.  A  little 
later  we  have  the  motive  of  gratitude  and  that  of  respect  for  public  opinion 
united  in  the  statement :  ".  .  .  .  I  fear  the  charge  of  an  imgrateful  spirit" 
(.  .  .  .  ingrati  animi  crimen  horreo,  A,  g,  2a,  2).     In  the  following  section     V 

25 


26 

we  find:  ''Nor  in  fact  shall  I  be  able  to  endure  the  talk  of  those  people, 
whoever  they  are,  for  they  certainly  are  not  what  they  are  called — the  good.^^ 

At  least  three  times  during  this  crisis  (A.,  7,  i,  4;  7,  12,  3;  and  8,  16,  2) 
Cicero  expresses  his  dread  of  disapproval  by  quoting  aiSiofiai  Tpwa?,  ''I 
am  ashamed  before  the  Trojans,"  the  rest  of  the  verse  being  ''and  the 
long-robed  Trojan  matrons."  These  are  the  words  twice  attributed  to 
Hector  (//.,  6,  442,  and  22,  105)  when  urged,  first  by  his  wife,  then  by 
his  mother,  to  seek  within  the  city  walls  protection  from  the  dreaded  spear 
of  Achilles.  The  quotation  is  thus  particularly  appropriate  to  express  a 
conflict  between  personal  safety  and  public  opinion.  Cicero  in  one  of 
these  passages  (^.,  7,  i,  4),  as  in  a  letter  written  ten  years  before  (A.,  2,  5, 
i),  refers  in  this  connection  to  Hector's  dread  of  the  reproach  of  Polydamus: 
"Ah  me,  if  I  shall  enter  the  gates  and  the  walls,  Polydamus  would  be  the 
first  to  cast  a  reproach  at  me  .  .  .  ."  (//.,  22,  99-100).  In  the  earlier 
reference,  Polydamus  is  "our  friend  Cato,  who  by  himself  has  with  me  the 
importance  of  a  hundred  thousand  others;"  in  the  later  reference  it  is 
Atticus  whose  censure  is  feared.  The  Trojans  in  all  these  passages  are, 
as  we  should  expect,  the  optimates. 

The  sting  of  the  reproaches  of  the  optimates  was  clearly  in  large  measure 
due  to  the  implication  of  dishonorable  lack  of  party  loyalty  and  consist- 
ency: "To  remain  is  surely  the  more  prudent  course,  to  cross  over  is  con- 
sidered the  more  honorable.  I  sometimes  prefer  that  the  many  regard  my 
course  imprudent,  rather  than  that  the  few  think  it  dishonorable"  {A.,S,  15, 
2).  He  is  willing  to  endure  whatever  lot  fortune  brings,  rather  than  seem 
to  be  out  of  harmony  with  those,  who  are  called  "the  good"  {A.,  8,  i,  3). 
The  suspicion  of  being  at  fault  causes  him  more  pain  than  all  his  other 
troubles  {A.,jg,  13,  3).  Conversely,  the  assurance  that  his  course  thus  far 
meets  the  approval  of  "good  men"  is  a  source  of  joy  (A.,  9,  7,  6).  He  is 
comforted  in  his  anxiety  by  the  belief  expressed  by  Atticus  that  so  far  he 
has  committed  no  fault,  but  he  hopes  that  his  friend  will  persuade  others 
that  such  is  the  case  (A.,  9,  10,  10).  Yet  when  he  reflects  that  public  senti- 
ment is  forcing  him  to  a  course  dangerous  alike  to  himself  and  to  his  coun- 
try, he  impatiently  and  ironically  exclaims:  "So  then  I  had  better  yield, 
and  in  order  to  be  a  good  citizen  make  war  on  Italy  by  land  and  sea,  and 
again  stir  up  against  myself  the  hatred  of  the  base"  (A.,g,  i,  3). 

In  courting  the  favor  of  Caesar  after  Pompey's  fall,  Cicero  puts  forward 
inability  to  withstand  the  speech  of  people  as  his  reason  for  leaving  Italy, 
passing  over  other  motives  in  silence  (^.,  11,  12,  i).  In  writing  to  another, 
however,  a  little  later,  personal  gratitude  to  Pompey  is  given  the  prominence 
it  regularly  has  in  the  correspondence  of  49-48,  and  the  writer  professes 


SEMI- SOCIAL  GOOD  27 

to  have  been  influenced  "either  by  duty,  or  by  the  talk  of  the  optimates,  or 
by  shame"  (F.,  6,  6,  6). 

Passing  from  this  period  of  greatest  stress,  we  next  examine  representa- 
tive expressions  showing  Cicero's  attitude  toward  public  opinion  at  other 
important  stages  of  his  career. 

Early  in  the  extant  correspondence — 60  B.  C. — we  find  an  elaborate 
essay  (Q.  F.,  i,  i)  addressed  to  Quintus,  and  treating  of  the  policy  and 
aims  of  a  provincial  governor.  Quintus  is  earnestly  exhorted  to  strive  to 
be  well  spoken  of — to  devote  all  his  powers  to  gaining  a  brilliant  reputation 
(Q.  F.,  I,  1,3).  Later  in  the  letter  the  admonition  is  repeated  in  language 
even  stronger,  if  possible  (i,  i,  41),  and  toward  the  close  he  professes  an 
unquenchable  thirst  for  his  brother's  renown  (i,  i,  45).  It  is  throughout 
implied  that  this  renown  is  to  be  gained  by  genuine  service,  by  honest 
devotion  to  the  public  good.  Yet  the  prime  motive  of  the  admonition  here 
is  to  stimulate  a  policy  that  will  enhance  the  standing  of  Quintus  and 
Marcus  in  the  commonwealth,  the  point  of  view  being  quite  different  from 
that  of  the  letters  of  44  and  43,  when  Cicero  was  promising  reputation  as  a 
reward  to  those  who  would  support  the  cause  for  which  he  was  straining 
every  nerve. 

The  formation  of  the  triumvirate  or  coalition  by  Caesar,  Pompey,  and 
Crassus  brought  out  in  59,  as  we  have  seen,  Cicero's  earliest  reference  to 
being  ashamed  before  the  Trojans ;  that  is,  he  dreaded  the  criticism  of  Cato 
and  the  optimates  in  case  he  accepted  at  the  hands  of  the  triumvirs  a  "free 
embassy"  as  a  means  of  escaping  an  embarrassing  situation  and  at  the 
same  time  gratifying  his  desire  for  travel  (.4.,  2,  5,  i). 

In  the  year  51,  about  nine  years  after  formulating  for  his  brother  the 
ideals  of  provincial  administration,  Cicero  found  himself  in  charge  of  a 
province.  A  characteristic  utterance  of  this  period  is:  "I  shall  by  my 
self-restraint  and  diligence  maintain  my  reputation"  (A.,  5,  3,  3).  The 
programme  proposed  for  himself  is  precisely  that  commended  to  Quintus.. 
Reputation  is  to  be  gained  through  service.  The  reality  of  the  service  is 
constantly  emphasized  in  the  most  familiar  and  confidential,  as  well  as  in 
the  more  formal  and  politic,  of  the  letters.  Indeed  he  goes  so  far  as  to 
write  to  Atticus  (A.,  5,  20,  6),  in  connection  with  an  exuberant  account  of 
the  purity  of  his  administration:  "Nor  is  it  the  fame,  great  as  that  is,  but 
the  facts  themselves  that  dehght  me."  Yet  it  is  clear  that  this  delight  does 
not  reconcile  him  to  remaining  in  the  province  to  serve  when  once  the  fame 
has  been  secured.  Witness  the  letters  to  CaeUus,  where,  in  giving  reasons 
for  desiring  an  early  return  from  the  province,  he  intimates  that  such  is  his 
reputation  already  that  there  is  less  reason  for  seeking  an  increase  than  for 


28  MORAL   VALUES   IN   CICERO'S   LETTERS 

dreading  some  unfortunate  setback  (F.,  2,  11,  i).  To  Atticus  he  writes, 
in  a  similar  vein  (A.,  5,  17,  5),  that  a  brief  term  promises  more  glory  than  a 
long  one. 

After  the  death  of  Pompey  we  find  Cicero  expressing  anxiety  lest  public 
opinion  should  not  approve  his  return  to  Italy  and  submission  to  Caesar 
(A.,  II,  6,  1-2).  The  most  effective  remedy  for  his  troubles  would  be  the 
assurance  that  he  has  not  absolutely  lost  the  good-will  of  the  optimates 
(A.,  II,  7,  3);  and  this  although  he  has  no  misgivings  as  to  the  propriety 
of  his  withdrawing  from  the  war  (A.,  11,  6,  2),  and  although  the  optimates 
whose  opinion  is  concerned  are  now  discredited  and  politically  helpless. 

The  next  crisis  was  after  the  assassination  of  Caesar.  Cicero  was  planning 
to  withdraw  to  Greece.  "I  think  I  am  escaping  no  small  danger  from  an 
impending  massacre,"  he  writes  to  Atticus  (14,  13,  4),  "but  I  am  likely  to 
incur  more  or  less  criticism  for  forsaking  the  state  at  so  serious  a  crisis." 
Besides  popular  sentiment;  the  possibility  of  being  of  use  to  the  state  was 
mentioned  as  an  argument  for  remaining.  The  interests  of  young  Marcus, 
concerning  whose  gay  Athenian  career  disquieting  rumors  were  being 
received,  reinforced  the  argument  of  personal  safety  in  favor  of  withdrawing 
(A.,  14,  13,  4).  This  was  in  April.  In  June  he  wrote  (A.,  16,  i,  3):  "I 
am  glad  that  my  departure  is  approved;  approval  must  be  gained  for  my 
sojourn."  In  August,  while  delayed  on  his  voyage  to  Greece,  he  heard 
that  Brutus  and  Cassius  had  issued  a  call  to  the  ex-consuls  and  ex-praetors 
to  attend  a  meeting  of  the  senate  on  the  first  of  September.  "They  added 
that  I  was  missed  and  somewhat  criticised"  {me  desiderari,  subaccusari, 
A. J  16,  7,  i).  Note  the  combined  call  of  duty  and  public  opinion.  "When 
I  heard  this,"  h6  continues,  "I  without  any  hesitation  abandoned  the  plan 
of  the  journey,  which  I  assure  you  did  not  even  before  give  me  much 
pleasure." 

While  references  to  reputation  as  a  desideratum  abound  in  the  succeed- 
ing letters,  they  are  usually  in  appeals  to  others,  the  aim  being  to  stimulate 
them  in  the  service  of  the  republic.  Accordingly,  the  survey  here  given 
will  serve  to  indicate  the  place  which  Cicero  professed  to  give  to  the  opinion 
of  others  in  determining  his  own  course  at  various  critical  periods. 

Besides  explicit  statements  of  the  influence  of  the  opinion  of  others, 
the  correspondence  of  Cicero  abounds  in  passages  mentioning  fame  or 
reputation,  with  the  implication  that  it  is  something  valued  as  a  good. 

He  acknowledges  that  others  have  helped  to  secure  for  him  gloria 
(A.,  5,  17,  2),  existimatio  {A.,  11,  i,  i),  or  latis  {A.,  7,  4,  i).  Again,  Cicero 
asks  others  to  aid  in  securing  his  existimatio  (F.,  15,  13,  3),  or  laus  {F.,  2, 
6,  4).     Under  various  circumstances  he  claims  to  have  acted  in  behalf  of 


SEMI- SOCIAL  GOOD  29 

Others'  amplitiido  (F.,  10,  i,  3),  gloria  {F.,  12,  7,  i),  hofwr  {F.,  3,  13,  i), 
or  existimatio  (F.,  3,  4,  i);  qr  he  promises  in  the  future  to  strive  for  their 
laus  (F.,  II,  5,  3),  fama  (F.,  12,  22,  2),  or  honestas  (F.,  5,  8,  4).  In  a  letter 
of  congratulation  the  wish  is  expressed  that  Curio's  tribunate  may  redound 
to  his  everlasting  praise  (F.,  2,  7,  i).  Such  is  the  variety  of  terms  for 
approval  and  its  expression,  and  such  the  variety  of  circumstances  under 
which  these  incidental  references  are  introduced. 

Reputation  is  regularly  represented,  not  only  as  a  natural,  but  a  com- 
mendable motive.  The  assumption-  seems-itTbe  that  society  takes  a  man 
at  his  real  value,  so  far  as  social  service  ls~CCKcerned.  To  seek  reputation 
is  to  be  controlled  by  the  broader  social  considerations,  rather  than  by 
considerations  of  immediate  personal  or  material  gratification  or  acquisi- 
tion. Venal  jurors  are  contemptuously  referred  to  as  those  whom  hunger 
(James)  rather  than  reputation  (fama)  influences  (A.,  1,  16,  5).  The 
desire  for  the  greatest  possible  praise  from  both  individuals  and  community 
is  a  commendable  endowment  bestowed  by  nature  on  noble  souls  (F.,  13, 
12,  2).  To  Lentulus,  Cicero  wrote  (F.,  i,  7,  9):  "But  from  affection  as 
well  as  gratitude  I  both  entreat  and  urge  you  to  pursue  with  all  care  and 
diligence  all  the  glory  for  which  from  boyhood  you  have  had  a  passion, 
and  never  to  suffer  your  high  spirit,  which  I  have  always  admired  and 
always  loved,  to  be  humbled  by  anyone's  injustice."  "Splendid  are  those 
natures  whose  guiding  star  is  glory"  (Praeclara  Ula  quidem  ingenia  quae 
gloria  invitaniur,  5.,  i,  15,  9),  is  a  sentiment  presupposed  throughout  the 
correspondence.  Modern  practicaLetliicsJias  been  so  influenced  by  the 
Christian  thought  of  the  absekUe^sy^rfilcacy  of  duty  that  by  contrast  fame 
has  come  to  be  thought  of  as  individualistic  and  ignoble,  scarcely  higher 
than  the  pursuit  of  pleasure  and  wealth.  It  therefore  becomes  interesting 
to  notice  the  distinctions  and  applications  by  which  Cicero  maintains  the 
social  and  ethical  rank  of  this  motive. 

In  the  course  of  a  letter  asking  Cato  to  favor  a  public  thanksgiving  in 
honor  of  the  wTiter's  victories  in  his  province,  there  is  an  explicit  contrast 
between  praise  that  is  genuine  and  that  which  is  empty  or  vain  (vera  laus 
and  inanis  laus,  F.,  15,  4,  13).  Cicero  in  his  consulship,  as  he  claims  in 
this  letter,  aimed  at  that  "from  which  genuine  praise  might  spring;"  that 
is,  deeds  that  would  naturally  inspire  the  gratitude  of  his  fellow-citizens. 
The  pro\ancial  government,  with  its  promise  of  a  triumph  and  a  priest- 
hood, both  of  which  he  renounced,  seems  to  stand  for  empty  praise.  The 
distinction  is  the  same  as  that  between  the  contrasted  iudicium  bonorum 
and  insignia  gloriae  of  F.,  10,  13,  2.  In  the  letter  to  Cato  Cicero  implies 
that  the  desired  thanksgiving,  if  sought  as  a  good  for  itself,  would  be  empty 


30  MORAL   VALUES   IN   CICERO 'S   LETTERS 

like  the  honors  he  previously  renounced;  but  now  he  is  in  need  of  some 
special  mark  of  approval  to  offset  the  stigma  of  the  exile.  The  distinction 
here  made  is  of  value  in  spite  of  the  consideration  that  Cicero  in  this  letter 
to  Cato  is  minimizing  his  interest  in  official  praise.  Similarly,  the  glory 
involved  in  a  spontaneous  and  enthusiastic  demonstration  in  the  orator's 
honor  during  the  struggle  with  Antony  is  called  ''sound  and  genuine" 
{solida  veraque,  B.,  i,  3,  2).  The  unanimous  thanks  and  congratulations 
move  him  "because,"  he  writes,  "it  is  a  glorious  experience  for  me  to  be 
popular  in  a  matter  concerning  the  Welfare  of  the  people."  There  may 
also  be  a  reminiscence  of  the  distinction  between  true  and  empty  praise  in 
his  statement  that  there  is  nothing  vain  (inane)  in  him,  introduced  in  con- 
nection with  an  expression  of  gratification  at  true  (vera)  glory. 

In  a  famous  letter  to  Lucceius,  Cicero  asks  that,  in  case  his  consular 
administration  does  not  seem  as  praiseworthy  as  he  has  represented  it,  the 
historian  bestow  even  higher  praise  than  perhaps  his  judgment  justifies, 
thus  departing  from  the  principles  of  history  and  bestowing  on  friendship  a 
trifle  more  than  truth  allows  (F.,  5,  12,  3).  How  is  this  to  be  interpreted  ? 
If  we  take  Cicero  literally  at  his  word,  we  must  say  that  his  undoubted  love 
of  credit  has  here  led  him  to  ask  for  what  to  Lucceius  will  be  a  deliberate 
falsification  of  history.  He  would  thus  express,  not  in  an  informal  burst 
of  confidence  to  his  "other  self,"  but  in  a  most  carefully  elaborated  letter, 
sentiments  quite  at  variance  with  what  he  usually  not  only  says,  but  implies. 
This,  rather  than  the  low  estimate  of  historical  honesty  involved,  is  the 
chief  difficulty  with  this  interpretation.  That  he  desired  and  valued  the 
praise  cannot  be  doubted.  That  he  actually  believed  the  most  emphatic 
praise  to  be  well  deserved  is  quite  consistent  with  his  habitual  references 
to  his  consulship.  The  request  to  depart  from  truth  is  introduced  by  the 
hypothesis:  "What  if  those  deeds  do  not  appear  to  you  worthy  of  such 
emphatic  praise?"  Did  Cicero  consider  this  a  serious  possiblity?  Did 
it  occur  to  him  that  either  Lucceius  or  other  expected  readers  of  the  "really 
pretty"  (valde  bella,  A.,  4,  6,  4)  letter  would  think  his  consulship  unworthy 
of  the  most  lavish  praise  ?  Probably  no  more  than  Horace  imagined  that 
his  playful  reference  to  leaving  his  shield  on  the  field  of  battle  w^ould  ever 
be  interpreted  as  a  serious  confession  of  cowardice.  If  this  view  of  the 
conditional  clause  is  correct,  the  following  request  becomes  mere  rhetorical 
byplay. 

The  public  man  has  no  right  to  claim  moral  superiority  on  account  of 
his  choice  of  a  career.  The  private  citizen  may  excel  in  the  "genuine 
praise  of  uprightness,  diligence,  and  loyalty"  (A.,  i,  17,  5);  that  is  to  say, 
a  man  in  private  life  may  have  credit  for  those  virtues  which  are  at  the  basis 
of  geniune  fame. 


SEMI- SOCIAL   GOOD  3 1 

Plancus  has  been  praised  for  what  he  proposes  to  do  against  Antony. 
"But  that  honor  which  can  truly  be  called  such  is  not  a  temporary  induce- 
ment, but  a  reward  for  sustained  merit"  (F.,  lo,  lo,  2).  By  this  appeal  in 
varied  forms  Cicero  tried  to  keep  the  defenders  of  the  republic  at  their  posts. 
**The  one  path  of  glory  ....  is  that  of  successful  public  achievement" 
(F.,  10,  3 J  3).  "Nothing  is  more  glorious  or  illustrious  in  human  experi- 
ence than  to  deserve  well  of  the  state"  {F.,  10,  5,  2).  "Despise  all  imita- 
tions of  glory,  consisting  of  the  most  empty  tokens  of  distinction;  consider 
them  short-lived,  fleeting,  and  fading.  True  glory  depends  on  virtue 
which  is  pre-eminently  displayed  in  great  services  to  the  state"  (F.,  10,  12, 
5).  Throughout  the  closing  months  of  the  correspondence  we  find  duty 
thus  presented  as  the  condition  of  true  glory  which  all  are  assumed  to  crave. 

Praise  is  given  grades  of  value  according  to  the  character  as  well  as  the 
prominence  of  the  bestower.  The  opinion  of  a  Cato  is  worth  that  of  a 
hundred  thousand  others  (/I.,  2,  5,  i).  It  is  not  only  Cato's  conspicuous 
position  that  makes  his  commendation  valuable,  but  his  "impartial  and 
accurate  judgment"  (-F.,  15,  6,  i).  The  praise  of  Lucceius  is  sought  as 
that  of  an  illustrious  and  great  man,  as  well  as  an  able  literary  artist  {F.,  5, 
12,  7).  While  not  explicitly  stated,  the  natural  inference  is  that  Lucceius' 
political  experience  is  thought  of  as  making  him  a  competent  judge  as  well 
as  a  conspicuous  advocate  of  merit  in  statesmanship.  In  the  expression 
"the  verdict  of  the  good"  {iudicium  bonorum),  F.,  10,  13,  2)  the  word 
"good"  seems  to  be  used  with  its  ordinary  meaning,  and  not  to  designate 
the  optimates.  So  in  these  passages  we  find  recognized,  with  varying 
degrees  of  explicitness,  the  idea  that  approval  is  to  be  valued  according  to 
the  competence  and  character  of  the  judge. 

It  is  not  enough  to  have  the  approval  of  worthy  contemporaries.  The 
opinion  of  unborn  generations  is  considered.  The  expressions  "eternal 
glory"  (F.,10, 14,  2),"  undying  glory"  (^4.,  i,  19, 6),and"  everlasting  praise" 
(F.J  2,  7,  i),  had  probably  become  more  or  less  stereotyped  and  conven- 
tional, but  there  are  many  indications  that  the  idea  of  an  immortality  of 
fame  had  with  Cicero  a  real  vitality.  The  glory  of  his  achievements  shall 
not  be  taken  from  him  even  at  death  (F.,  7,  3,  4).  He  used  to  hear  the 
Homeric  summons:  "Be  valiant  that  some  one  even  of  those  late  bom 
may  speak  well  of  thee"  (F.,  13,  15,  i,  quoting  Od.,  i,  302);  he  writes  to 
Caesar  in  a  painfully  jocose  vein.  He  has  now  learned  not  to  heed  Achilles' 
words:  "At  least  let  me  not  die  without  a  struggle  or  ingloriously,  but  in 
some  great  deed  of  arms- whereof  men  yet  to  be  born  shall  hear"  (//.,  22, 
304-5,  Myers'  tr.).  His  appeal  to  Lucceius  is  that  he  wishes  fame  with 
contemporaries  as  well  as  with  posterity.     He  cares  much  more  for  the 


> 


32  MORAL  VALUES   IN   CICERO'S   LETTERS 

opinions  of  men  a  thousand  years  hence  than  for  the  chit-chat  of  those  who 
live  today  (A.,  2,  5,  i).  Most  interesting  is  the  reference  to  a  quahtative 
difference  between  the  judgment  of  contemporaries  and  posterity  (Q.  F., 
I,  I,  43).  The  latter  will  be  more  fair;  they  will  be  free  from  detraction 
and  spite.  It  is  evident  that  we  have  here  at  least  the  germs  of  a  relatively 
high  standard  of  social  ethics;  so  live  that  your  conduct  will  meet  the 
approval  of  the  wisest  and  best  men  of  your  time,  and  of  an  impartial 
posterity  free  from  the  prejudices  that  warp  present  judgment. 

An  altruistic  application  is  given  to  the  pursuit  of  fame  by  the  sugges- 
tion that  the  interests  of  one's  family  as  well  as  of  one's  self  are  involved. 
Quintus  is  urged  to  remember  (Q.  F.,  i,  i,  44)  that  he  is  not  seeking  glory 
for  himself  alone,  but  for  his  brother,  and  for  their  sons  to  whom  this 
legacy  should  be  handed  down.  To  be  indifferent  under  these  circum- 
stances is  to  act  grudgingly  toward  one's  own.  Similarly,  ten  years  later 
Cicero  writes  to  a  friend  {F.,  2,  16,  5)  that  in  case  the  state  is  preserved  he 
will  in  the  memory  of  his  name  leave  his  son  an  estate  sufficiently  large. 

Reputation,  when  in  any  measure  gained,  creates  a  standard  of  expecta- 
tion on  the  part  of  the  community,  and  the  individual  feels  a  new  form  of 
social  pressure.  Hence  the  necessity  of  effort  to  retain  reputation.  This 
thought  has  its  most  elaborate  statement  in  the  essay-letter  to  Quintus  on 
the  provincial  governorship  (Q.  F.,  i,  i,  41-43).  If  we  had  only  average 
reputation,  achievements  would  be  demanded;  ''but  now,  on  account  of 
the  magnificence  and  importance  of  the  enterprises  in  which  we  have  had  a 
part,  unless  we  can  gain  the  highest  renown  from  your  province,  it  seems 
that  we  can  scarcely  avoid  the  severest  censure  "  (nisi  summam  laudem  ex 
ista  provincia  adsequimur,  vix  videmur  summam  vituperationem  posse 
vitare,  Q.  F.,  i,  i,  41).  The  contest  is  not  for  fresh  laurels,  but  concerns 
those  already  won,  the  protection  of  which  is  even  more  important  than 
was  the  original  acquisition  (Q.  F.,  i,  i,  43).  Deeds  are  referred  to  as 
worthy  of  one's  name  (F.,  7,  ^;^,  i)  or  worthy  of  one's  glory  (F.,  12,  2,  3). 
Cicero  fears  that  in  attacking  Hortensius  he  will  show  less  self-restraint 
than  formerly  (^.,4,  6,  3).  He  assures  Atticus  that  his  course  will  not  be 
such  as  to  permit  his  former  deeds  to  appear  accidental  (A.,  i,  20,  3).  The 
implication  is  that  credit  is  given,  not  merely  for  the  deed,  but  for  the 
character  from  which  the  deed  springs.  If  the  original  estimate  was 
correct,  other  similar  deeds  will  follow.  These  faihng,  the  conclusion  is 
that  the  former  act  was  fortuitous  and  no  index  of  the  real  man.  The 
former  credit  is  then  canceled;  perhaps  with  the  addition  of  resentment 
at  the  deception.  This  is  really  an  aspect  of  the  demand  for  consistency, 
which  we  consider  in  another  place. 


SEMI-SOCIAL  GOOD  33 

Thus  far  social  service,  when  it  has  come  into  relation  with  the  opinion 
of  others,  has  appeared  primarily  as  a  means  to  an  end — an  indispensable 
means,  to  be  sure,  and  one  that  distinctly  elevates  and  enriches  the  concep- 
tion of  the  fame  which  it  conditions,  but  nevertheless  logically  subordin- 
ated. A  further  step  brings  us  to  a  class  of  passages  in  which  fame  is 
introduced  as  co-ordinate  with  or  subordinate  to  duty,  conceived  as  an 
independent  good. 

Cicero  will  follow  the  senate  either  because  it  is  right,  or  because  it  is 
to  his  interest,  or  because  he  values  the  opinion  of  the  senate  {A.j  i,  20,  3). 
He  was  moved  to  follow  Pompey  "either  by  duty,  or  by  the  talk  of  the 
optimates,  or  by  shame"  (i^.,  6,  6,  6).  Tullia  desired  her  father  "to  act 
rightly  and  to  be  well  spoken  of"  (A.,  10,  8,  9).  Messala  in  joining  Brutus 
was  at  the  same  time  performing  a  duty  and  following  after  renown  (sum- 
mam  laudem,  B.,  i,  15,  2;  cf.  also  A.,  14,  7,  2,  and  6,  2,  8). 

In  enumerating  the  elements  of  his  life  in  the  year  44  (F.^  10,  1,1), 
there  is  at  least  a  formal  dispargement  of  fame  in  comparison  with  deeds, 
and  all  personal  considerations  are  subordinated  to  the  interests  of  the 
fatherland.  Cicero's  ringing  refusal  to  render  an  unjust  decision  at  the 
earnest  request  of  Marcus  Brutus,  supported  even  by  Atticus  among  others, 
does  not,  it  is  true,  express  a  strict  antithesis  between  duty  and  the  opinion 
of  others,  since  reputation  in  the  broader  sense  was  on  the  side  of  right; 
still,  when  all  allowance  is  made,  the  declaration  is  noteworthy  both  on 
account  of  the  exceptional  weight  with  Cicero  of  the  men  whose  displeasure 
he  risked,  as  well  as  for  the  fine  universal  form  in  which  his  independence 
was  announced:  "So  let  him  be  angry  who  will;  I  will  bear  it,  for  the  right 
is  on  my  side"  {Itaque  irascatur  qui  volet;  patiar.  To  yap  cv  /uter'  e/x<n), 
A.y  6,  I,  8,  incorporating  Aristoph.,  Acharnians,  659).  "Nor  does  the 
fame,  great  as  that  is,  delight  me  as  much  as  does  the  achievement  itself," 
he  had  written  to  Atticus  in  connection  with  a  glowing  description  of  his 
provincial  administration  (A.,  5,  20,  6). 

From  a  letter  written  in  the  year  45  (^4.,  13,  20,  4)  it  appears  that  Cicero 
could  speak  of  the  relative  rank  of  fame  either  on  a  popular  or  on  a  higher 
ethical  plane.  Atticus  had  evidently  taken  him  to  task  for  writing  that 
nothing  is  better  than  reputation.  Cicero  repudiates  the  offending  state- 
ment, which  he  had  made  inadvertently  (stulte).  He  then  quotes  a  philo- 
sophical sentiment  making  strict  adherence  to  right  (recta  conscientia)  the 
standard,  adding  this  challenge:  "  Do  you  think  that  it  is  in  vain  that  I  am 
busy  with  these  [i.  e.,  philosophical]  subjects?  I  wish  you  would  not  be 
troubled  over  such  a  trifle."  He  seems  almost  impatient  that  Atticus 
should  treat  a  loose  popular  phrase  as  a  serious  formulation  of  fundamental 


34  MORAL  VALUES   IN  CICERO 'S  LETTERS 

ethics;  much  as  a  believer  in  Divine  Providence  today  might  protest  at 
being  called  to  account  for  a  careless  reference  to  fate,  fortune,  or  the 
weather  man. 

A  passage  near  the  close  of  the  correspondence  admirably  co-ordinates 
the  various  references  to  the  rank  of  glory.  "Is  any  praetorship,"  he  asks 
Furnius  (F.,  lo,  26,  3),  ''sweeter  to  you  than  duty  which  the  jew  or  glory 
which  all  follow?^'  Duty  and  glory  ahke  may  incite  men  to  act  for  the 
good  of  the  community  or  commonwealth  rather  than  for  strictly  individ- 
ualistic ends.  Glory  appeals  to  all  but  the  very  basest.  It  is  effective  with 
the  many,  while  the  noblest  souls  are  keenly  susceptible  to  its  stimulus — 
and  creditably  so.  A  few,  however — the  Catos,  the  moralists,  and  the  true 
philosophers — recognize  the  paramount  authority  of  duty.  To  this  select 
group  Cicero,  when  really  challenged,  claims  to  belong,  however  much 
under  ordinary  circumstances  he  may  lapse  in  speech  or  even  in  thought. 

So  far  the  opinion  of  others  has  been  considered  as  a  unit.  We  now 
turn  to  consider  specifically  public  honors  and  offices  as  expressions  of  this 
opinion. 

If  one  may  with  credit  frankly  profess  praise  to  be  his  goal,  we  should 
naturally  suppose  that  an  ambition  for  such  pubHc  and  official  expressions 
of  praise  as  complimentary  resolutions,  periods  of  formal  thanksgiving, 
and  triumphs,  might  be  professed  with  equal  frankness.  Yet  we  have 
already  seen  several  cases  where  such  official  honors  were  classified  as  vain 
or  empty  praise,  in  contrast  with  the  approval  on  which  they  were  supposed 
to  be  based  (pp.  29  ff.).  Cicero's  earnestness  in  desiring  official  honors 
for  his  services  in  the  province  is  indicated  by  the  long  and  elaborate  letter 
to  Cato  (F.,  15,  4)  directed  to  this  single  end,  as  is  the  briefer  supplementary 
letter  (i^.,  15,  6);  it  is  expressed  in  letters  to  the  consuls  and  to  Appius 
Claudius  (F.,  15,  10;  15,  13;  15,  i ;  3,  9)  and  repeatedly  in  letters  to  Atticus. 
Along  with  the  evident  eagerness  for  the  honor,  there  is  a  frequently  occur- 
ring note  of  apology  for  the  desire.  A  single  word  of  appreciation  from 
Cato  fulfils  his  highest  ideal  of  praise ;  he  cares  not  for  empty  glory  and  the 
speech  of  the  crowd;  yet  the  stigma  of  the  exile  places  him  in  exceptional 
need  of  public  approval — and  this  plea  is  not  without  reason  {F.,  15,  4,  13). 
A  Cato's  praise  is  more  valuable  than  laurels  or  a  triumphal  car  {F.,  15, 
6,  i) ;  but  when  Cato  sees  fit  to  grant  the  greater,  while  withholding  the  less, 
Cicero  writes  to  Atticus:  "He  has  been  shamefully  spiteful  toward  me. 
He  has  given  testimony  to  my  honesty,  justice,  mercy,  and  good  faith — 
something  I  was  not  seeking;  what  I  asked  for  he  has  refused"  {A.,  7,  2,  7). 
A  supplementary  reason  given  to  Atticus  for  desiring  official  honors  was 


SEMI-SOCIAL  GOOD  35 

that  such  honors  were,  with  the  support  of  Cato,  being  sought  by  Bibulus, 
Cato's  son-in-law,  a  man  whose  personaUty  Cicero  represents  as  offensive 
and  his  services  to  the  state  as  petty  (A.j  6,  8,  5).  To  honor  Bibulus  over 
Cicero  was  an  affront  (dedecus)  to  the  latter  (^.,  7,  2,  6).  After  returning 
to  Italy,  Cicero  admits  that  the  canvass  for  a  triumph  interferes  with  his 
poUtical  independence  and  activity.  He  is  willing  to  renounce  the  honor, 
if  that  is  his  duty  {A.,  7,  3,  2;  9,  7,  5).  Yet  for  two  whole  years — years  so 
filled  with  momentous  events  and  absorbing  interests — we  find  him  shad- 
owed by  his  troublesome  lictors,  never  able  to  bring  himself  quite  to  the 
point  of  dismissing  them  (e.  g.,  A.,  11,  6,  2;  11,  7,  i). 

Twice  in  the  correspondence  Cicero  defines  his  attitude  toward  official 
praise  in  practically  equivalent  terms.  Regarding  the  triumph  he  wrote 
to  Atticus  (6,  9,  2):  ''You  will  find  me  neither  vain  (kcvos)  in  seeking  it, 
nor  apathetic  (arvc^os)  in  rejecting  it."  To  Cato  he  wTOte  {F.,  15,  6,  2) 
that  the  honor  should  not  too  earnestly  be  coveted  (non  nimis  concupis- 
cendus),  but  still,  in  case  it  should  be  offered  by  the  senate,  it  should  by  no 
means  be  rejected  (niinime  aspernandus).  In  these  statements  he  is 
apparently  expressing  what  he  considers  the  normal  and  approved  attitude 
of  a  citizen  toward  such  honors.  As  spontaneous  expressions  of  approval 
they  are  to  be  valued;  still  any  manifestation  of  eagerness  for  them,  or  any 
direct  efforts  to  secure  their  bestowal,  may  expose  one  to  the  charge  of 
vanity. 

If  we  had  only  instances  where  Cicero  refers  to  honors  proposed  for 
himself,  we  might  be  uncertain  how  far  the  tone  was  affected  by  the  assumed 
modesty  of  the  petitioner;  but  we  find  the  same  implication  where  the  honors 
are  for  others  than  the  writer.  The  most  complimentary  resolutions  had 
been  passed  by  the  senate  to  honor  and  encourage  Plancus.  In  reporting 
this  action,  Cicero,  with  the  evident  intention  of  being  complimentary, 
wrote  to  Plancus:  "Although  I  have  learned  from  the  letters  which  you 
sent  me  that  you  take  more  pleasure  in  the  approval  of  the  good  than  in 
the  tokens  of  praise,  still  I  thought  that  we  ought  to  consider  how  much 
the  state  was  indebted  to  you,  even  if  you  made  no  demands"  (i^.,  10,  13,  2). 
When  Cicero  was  called  upon  to  defend  the  granting  of  this  honor  and 
similar  honors,  his  plea  was  that,  while  those  are  illustrious  natures  that 
are  led  on  by  glory,  still  the  senate  is  wise  in  using  any  honorable  means  by 
which  it  thinks  anyone  may  be  induced  to  aid  the  state  (5.,  i,  15,  9).  These 
passages  clearly  imply  that  it  is  a  credit  to  a  man  not  to  seek  these  rewards, 
and  not  to  value  them  as  highly  as  the  simple  approval  of  his  fellows. 

If  we  seek  the  reason  for  the  difference  in  the  feeling  toward  the  two 
quests,  we  shall  probably  find  it  in  the  fact  that  efforts  to  gain  the  approval 


36 

of  the  good  regularly  consist  of  acts  of  social  service,  beneficial  to  the  com- 
munity; while  efforts  to  gain  specific  honors  after  the  service  is  rendered 
consist  of  purely  self-seeking  machinations  without  social  value. 

Public  oflSce  as  a  motive  does  not  occupy  a  position  of  prominence  in 
Cicero's  letters  corresponding  to  its  probable  rank  in  his  thought.  Several 
reasons  for  this  are  apparent.  Most  of  the  letters  were  written  after  he 
had  attained  the  highest  offices  under  the  Roman  constitution.  His  pres- 
tige in  the  commonwealth,  though  largely  founded  on  former  official  posi- 
tion, is  spoken  of  as  an  independent  good  which,  as  we  shall  see,  he  seeks 
to  retain  and  enhance.  Furthermore,  the  importance  of  offices  under  the 
Roman  republic  depended  upon  the  integrity  of  the  republican  constitu- 
tion, which  was  being  impaired  by  the  growing  power  of  the  triumvirs; 
hence  much  that  Cicero  says  of  the  value  of  the  republic  and  the  constitu- 
tion may  well  have  its  animus  in  his  appreciation  of  office  and  official 
activity. 

Writing  to  Atticus  of  their  repective  careers,  he  says  {A.,  i.  17,  5)  that 
ambition  impelled  him  to  a  zeal  for  office.  Far  from  implying  that  any 
apology  is  due  for  this  ambition,  he  is,  in  generous  mood,  denying  that  this 
choice  of  an  official  career  proves  any  superiority  of  character  over  his 
friend  who  made  the  legitimate  choice  of  honorable  private  life.  His  law 
practice  was  first  undertaken  (A.,  i,  17,  6)  to  help  his  political  prospects, 
and  was  later  continued  that  he  might  secure  grateful  supporters  of  his 
position.  A  letter  to  Quintus  in  54  expresses  what  must  have  been  his 
constant  regret  at  the  narrowing  of  legitimate  official  activity  by  the  domina- 
tion of  the  triumvirs  (Q.  F.,  3,  5,  3-4).  He  has  no  thirst  for  the  offices  or 
the  glory  that  Caesar  promises.  He  is  filled  with  grief  that  there  is  no  longer 
any  republic,  and  that  at  the  time  of  life  when  he  ought  to  be  at  the  height 
of  his  senatorial  career  he  is  worried  with  legal  practice  or  driven  to  seek 
the  support  of  literature,  while  that  which  from  his  boyhood  has  been  the 
ideal  of  his  heart,  "To  be  by  far  the  best  and  others  to  excel"  (//.,  6,  201), 
is  now  a  dream  of  the  past  (Illud  vero,  quod  a  puero  adamaram  ....  totum 
occidisse). 

Some  supercilious  remarks  of  Appius  Claudius,  who  felt  that  Cicero  did 
not  enough  defer  to  a  man  of  his  august  lineage,  was  the  occasion  of  a  digni- 
fied statement  of  Cicero's  estimate  of  the  relative  value  of  high  birth  and 
high  office  {F.,  3,  7,  5).  He  does  not  place  any  "Appiism"  (Appietas, 
coined  from  the  illustrious  name  Appius)  above  personal  merit.  Even 
before  he  gained  ''those  distinctions  which  are  in  the  opinion  of  men  most 
honorable"  {amplissimi),  he  revered,  not  the  great  names,  but  the  great 
men  who  bore  them;  but  after  he  had  gained  and  held  the  highest  positions 


SEMI-SOCIAL   GOOD  37 

of  authority,  so  that  there  seemed  no  further  height  of  honor  and  renown 
for  which  to  strive  {maxima  imperia,  tit  mihi  nihil  neqtie  ad  honorem  neque 
ad  gloriam  adquirendum  putarem),  he  trusted  that  he  had  become,  not  at  all 
the  superior,  but  the  equal  of  members  of  the  old  famiUes.  If  Appius  dis- 
sents, he  will  not  go  amiss  in  further  informing  himself  on  the  subjects  of 
high  birth  and  nobility. 

It  is  true  that  Fumius  is  urged  (F.,  10,  25;  and  10,  26)  not  to  sacrifice 
the  opportunity  to  serve  the  state  and  win  lasting  fame  for  the  sake  of  gain- 
ing an  immediate  praetorship ;  but  against  seeking  office  in  general  we  find  no 
such  disparagement  as  in  connection  with  seeking  public  honors.  Why  this 
should  be  it  is  difficult  to  see,  unless,  with  all  the  self-seeking  of  the  candi- 
date for  office,  his  ambition  was  assumed  to  have  a  sanctifying  element  of 
patriotism — of  desire  to  serve  the  commonwealth  as  well  as  himself. 

Of  the  terms  used  to  denote  the  good  which  comes  to  a  man  through 
the  favor  of  his  fellows  none  is  more  conspicuous,  by  reason  either  of  fre- 
quency or  emphasis,  than  dignitas.  Various  considerations  seem  to  make  its 
separate  treatment  desirable.  It  is  less  transparent  and  simple  than  the 
related  terms  which  we  have  been  considering.  In  the  letters  it  evidently 
has  a  wide  range  of  application.  What  were  the  chief  associations  that 
the  word  had  for  Cicero  and  his  correspondents  ?  What  is  the  central  core 
of  meaning  giving  unity  to  the  various  uses?  The  lexicons  reflect  the 
variety  of  usage  which  we  find  in  the  text,  but  their  account  of  the  connec- 
tion of  the  various  meanings  is  discredited  by  disagreements  among  the 
etymologists.^  Further  difficulty  arises  from  the  nature  of  the  English 
words  "dignity"  and  ** honor."  Sometimes  they  are  very  appropriate, 
almost  necessary,  renderings  of  dignitas,  but  like  it  they  are  words  of  various 
and  elusive  meanings,  with  associations  and  implications  for  us  which  can- 
not well  have  inhered  in  Cicero's  dignitas. 

So  much  for  the  problem.  If  we  examine  a  considerable  number  of 
cases  where  the  grounds  of  this  desired  good  are  definitely  indicated,  we 
find  one  class  in  which  dignitas,  like  the  approval  of  others,  is  represented 
as  the  direct  consequence  of  performing  duty.  If  Plancus  will  devote 
himself  to  the  support  of  the  repubUc,  he  will  secure  all  dignitas  for  the 

I  If  digitus  and  dignitas  are  to  be  referred  to  the  root  dec,  and  are  connected  with 
decet  and  decus — Brugmann's  first  suggestion,  Grundriss,  2,  136 — then  dignus  has 
kept  near  the  primary  meaning,  while  dignitas  has  almost  passed,  by  metonomy,  from 
"worth"  to  "the  results  of  worth."  If,  on  the  other  hand,  they  are  referred  to  die  or 
deic,  and  are  connected  with  deUvv/u,  zeigen,  and  the  Old  Icelandic  tigenn,  distin- 
guished— Brugmann,  second  suggestion,  and  Fick — then  dignitas  in  the  sense  of  "dis- 
tinction," "rank,"  is  nearer  the  starting-point  than  is  dignus,  "worthy." 


38  MORAL   VALUES   IN   CICERO'S   LETTERS 

remainder  of  his  life  (F.,  10,  3,  2-3).  In  this  same  promise  is  involved 
gloria,  the  term  of  most  richly  elaborated  content  of  those  which  we  con- 
sidered together  as  designating  the  approval  of  others.  Cornificius  is 
assured  that  to  devote  himself  with  all  zeal  to  the  republic  is  in  keeping  with 
the  hope  which  he  ought  to  have  of  increasing  his  dignitas  (F.,  12,  24,  i). 
Of  numerous  passages  connecting  dignitas  with  the  defense  of  the  state, 
these  just  given  are  particularly  valuable  as  leaving  no  possible  doubt  that 
this  good  is  actually  gained  or  increased  by  the  service.  Here  at  least  it 
is  not  an  independent  something  merely  finding  its  natural  and  consistent 
expression  in  the  service.  In  the  same  way  we  are  doubtless  to  take  such 
expressions  as,  ''You  will  have  regard  (consules)  both  for  the  public  interest 
and  your  dignitas^'  (F.,  10,  27,  i);  ''It  very  greatly  advances  your  honor 
and  reputation"  (.  .  .  .  dignitati  et  existimationi  tuae  maxime  conducere 
.  .  .  .  5.,  I,  18,  2);  "It  concerns  (pertinet  ad)  the  commonwealth  and  your 
dignitas^^  (B.,  i,  2,  4) — all  of  which  expressions  were  used  in  urging  men 
to  public  service.  Loyal  political  sentiments  and  the  approval  of  good 
men  are  explicitly  made  aspects  of  dignitas  in  Cicero's  own  case  {F.,  4,  14, 
i),  and  the  governor  Thermus  is  declared  greatly  to  have  increased  his 
dignitas  by  his  uprightness  and  clemency  (F.,  2,  18,  i).  It  concerns  the 
dignitas  of  Lentulus  to  hand  over  his  province  promptly,  though  he  may 
have  a  technical  excuse  for  retaining  it  (F.,  i,  9,  25).  It  is  further  explained 
that  he  will  in  this  way  escape  the  suspicion  of  greed.  The  case  is  inter- 
esting from  the  fact  that  here  official  position  is  less  essential  for  the  reten- 
tion of  dignitas  than  is  the  direct  approval  of  fellow-citizens. 

Another  explicitly  recognized  ground  of  dignitas  is  official  compliment. 
This  is  clearly  and  fully  stated  in  a  letter  to  Plancus  {F.,  10,  13,  i).  "As 
soon  as  an  opportunity  presented  itself  of  enhancing  your  position  (augendae 
dignitatis  tuae),  I  neglected  no  means  of  honoring  you,  as  concerns  either 
rewards  for  gallantry  or  complimentary  expressions."  The  resolution 
which  was  a  direct  transcript  of  Cicero's  proposal  will  give  evidence  of  his 
zeal.  Doubtless  the  element  of  public  or  official  blame  accounts  in  part 
for  the  loss  of  dignitas  involved  in  Cicero's  exile  (e.  g..  A.,  3,  20,  i).  So 
the  dignitas  of  Appius  Claudius  is  imperiled  in  his  prosecution  upon 
returning  from  his  province  (F.,  3,  10,  i).  Cicero  had  written  to  the  same 
Appius,  expressing  delight  at  the  latter's  prospect  of  a  triumph.  The 
reason  for  this  delight  is  his  interest  in  the  dignitas  and  amplitudo  of  Appius 
{F.,  3,  9,  2).  He  thanks  Appius  for  offering  to  aid  him  in  anything  affect- 
ing his  dignitas  (F.,  3,  9,  i);  then,  claiming  the  fulfilment  of  this  very 
promise,  asks  support  for  his  supplicatio  (F.,  3,  9,  4). 

A  third  and  larger  group  of  passages  recognizes  offices  and  political 


SEMI- SOCIAL   GOOD  39 

activity  as  the  ground  of  dignitas.  It  arises  in  connection  with  magis- 
tracies. Cicero  first  practiced  law  for  the  sake  of  gaining  office,  afterward 
that  he  might  secure  gratitude  as  a  support  for  his  position  (ut  dignitatem 
ttteri  gratia  possim,  A.,  i,  17,  6).  The  dignitas  seems  clearly  to  be  what 
was  gained  by  the  magistracies,  culminating  with  the  consulship,  which 
he  held  only  two  years  before  writing  this  letter.  A  recently  elected  aedile 
is  congratulated  on  his  present  and  prospective  dignitas  (i^.,  2,  9,  i).  Gradus 
dignitatis  (F.,  10,  6,  2)  in  a  phrase  used  to  designate  the  steps  of  official 
promotion. 

The  term  is  repeatedly  used  to  designate  something  which  the  provincial 
governor  derived  from  his  office.  Amid  the  conffict  of  authority  in  43 
several  provincial  governors  were  threatened  with  recall  through  the  influ- 
ence of  Caesarians.  This  situation  occasioned  statements  in  Cicero's  let- 
ters to  these  men  to  the  effect  that  he  was  defending  their  dignitas  (e.  g., 
F.,  12,  7,  i). 

The  pubHc  activity  of  the  senator,  the  opportunity  of  having  a  part  in 
deciding  important  issues,  involved  dignitas.  The  complaint  is  that  under 
the  domination  of  Pompey  all  distinction,  so  far  as  senatorial  debate  is  con- 
cerned, has  been  taken  away  (F.,i,  8,  3) ;  there  is  no  constitution,  no  senate, 
no  courts,  no  distinction  for  any  one  of  us  (nullam  in  ullo  nostrum  dignitatem, 
Q.  F.J  3,  4,  i).  The  dignitas  which  was  lost  in  the  exile  (^4.,  3,  20,  i) 
and  restored  upon  the  recall  (F.,  3,  10,  10;  and  i,  7,  8)  must  have  included 
this  opportunity  for  public  activity  and  its  accompanying  prestige,  as  well 
as  that  public  approval  which  exile  formally  withdrew. 

Keeping  in  mind  this  survey  of  the  grounds  assigned  to  dignitas,  -we 
shall  be  helped  to  a  provisional  definition  by  Cicero's  reply  to  congratula- 
tions upon  regaining  his  dignitas  after  the  war  between  Caesar  and  Pompey. 
''If  dignitas  consists  in  having  sound  political  sentiments  and  securing  for 
those  sentiments  the  approval  of  good  men,  then  I  enjoy  dignitas;  but  if 
dignitas  consists  in  being  able  to  carry  out  your  sentiments  in  act  and 
defend  them  with  independent  speech,  not  the  slightest  trace  of  distinction 
has  been  left  us"  (F.,  4, 14,  i).  We  shall  not,  I  believe,  do  violence  to  any 
of  these  passages  if  we  assume  that  dignitas  represents  the  distinction,  the 
position,  the  prestige,  accorded  to  a  man  by  his  fellows,  either  directly  in 
consequence  of  approval  of  his  character  and  conduct,  or  by  a  more  com- 
plex process  involving  the  bestowment  of  public  honors  or  official  position; 
that  it  is  an  inclusive  term  for  the  status  conferred  by  social  approval  in 
any  or  all  its  forms  of  manifestation. 

The  fact  that  the  bestowment  of  offices  and  honors  to  such  an  extent 
depends  upon  the  favor,  influence,  and  efforts  of  others  accounts  for  the 


.^ 


40  MORAL   VALUES   IN   CICERO  S   LETTERS 

great  number  of  passages  of  the  type,  "I  am  the  supporter  of  your  position," 
or,  "You  are  the  supporter  of  my  position."  On  the  other  hand,  the 
impUed  basis  of  social  approval  for  social  service  makes  natural  at  any  time 
the  same  ethical  application  and  emphasis  which  we  have  met  in  the  case 
of  similar  terms. 

Other  uses  of  dignitas  relate  themselves  naturally  to  the  meanings 
already  considered,  whatever  may  have  been  the  historical  connection. 
It  may  indicate  position  or  rank  in  general,  with  no  implication  as  to  ground 
or  grounds.  To  support  the  position  of  Crassus  in  his  absence  {F.,  5,  8,  5) 
is  almost  the  same  as  to  support  Crassus.  The  hope  is  expressed  that  the 
consular  administration  of  Marcellus  (F.,  15,  7,  i)  and  that  of  Paullus 
(F.,  15,  12,  i)  will  be  in  keeping  with  the  position  of  themselves  and  of  their 
ancestors.  The  word  is  even  used  as  a  quite  colorless  term  for  class;  as 
when,  expressing  his  anxiety  for  Terentia,  Cicero  refers  to  "other  ladies  of 
her  class"  {ilia  dignitate,  A.,  7,  14,  3). 

Dignitas  is  without  doubt  used  in  the  letters  where  status  is  not  directly 
involved,  as  where  Cicero  says  that  he  wrote  to  Caesar  "familiarly  and 
with  dignity"  {cum  dignitate,  Q.  F.,  2,  10,  5);  yet  even  here  a  sug- 
gestion of  the  more  common  meaning  is  entirely  appropriate.  He  wrote 
in  a  manner  consistent  with  his  position.  Not  infrequently  where  the  word 
at  first  sight  seems  to  indicate  quality  rather  than  status,  comparison  with 
other  cases  leads  to  a  change  of  interpretation  (e.  g.,  F.,  15,  i,  6,  to  be  con- 
sidered below).  If  we  recognize  in  the  letters  the  rare  meaning  "worth" 
(e.  g.,  F.,  13,  57,  2,  where  a  favor  is  asked  pro  causae  vertitate  et  pro  sua 
dignitate),  the  logical  relation  between  "distinction"  and  "worth"  is  quite 
analogous  to  that  between  the  meanings  "praise"  and  "merit"  in  the  case 
of  laus. 

If  distinction  is  based  upon  the  "recognition  of  merit,"  it  may  be  pre- 
served not  only  by  courting  the  support  of  friends  and  insisting  on  all  the 
deference  due  one,  but  by  conduct  inherently  consistent  with  one's  high 
position.  From  this  latter  point  of  view  the  preservation  of  dignitas  has 
the  same  ethical  and  social  significance  as  the  preservation  of  reputation. 
Regard  for  their  own  standing  on  the  part  of  the  staff  of  Quintus  seems  to 
serve  as  a  sort  of  conscience,  making  it  unnecessary  for  their  chief  to  watch 
them  {Q.  F.,  1,  i,  10).  Here  probably  belongs  the  striking  statement  at 
the  close  of  Cicero's  provincial  report  to  the  magistrates  and  senate :  Utinam 
saluti  nostrae  consulere  possimusl  dignitati  certe  consulemus  (jP.,  15,  i,  6). 
Here  we  have  the  habitual  collocation  of  salus  and  dignitas  in  which  Ji^- 
wi/a5  regularly  indicates  status  (e.  g.,  F.,  15,  7,  I,  ....  matris  tuae  .... 
erga  salutem  dignitatemque  meam  studia).     Cicero  wishes  to  assure  the 


SEMI-SOCIAL  GOOD  4I 

senate  that,  whether  or  not  his  forces  permit  him  to  meet  the  impending 
invasion  with  the  prospect  of  safety  to  himself,  his  course  will  be  such  as  to 
bring  no  discredit  to  the  man  who  once  was  hailed  the  father  of  his  country. 
Referring  to  his  motive  in  entering  the  civil  war  he  wrote  {F.,  6,  i,  3) :  "We 
thought  we  were  following  duty,  righteous  and  sacred,  and  due  to  the 
commonwealth  and  to  our  position"  (.  .  .  .  officium  iustum  et  pium  et 
debitum  rei  publicae  et  nostrae  dignitati).  That  is,  the  performance  of 
highest  duty  is  demanded  as  a  debt  by  his  illustrious  past  not  less  than  by 
considerations  of  patriotism. 

In  the  case  of  dignitas,  as  in  that  of  laus  and  similar  words,  the  emphasis 
of  the  element  of  servdce  rather  than  the  element  of  recognition  gives  the 
terms  a  higher  ethical  sense.  Caesar  is  striking  at  his  fatherland  for  the 
sake  of  his  honor  (dignitas),  but  where  is  there  any  honor  (dignitas)  in  the 
absence  of  the  honorable  (honestas,  A.,  7,  11,  i)  ?  OflSices  {gradus  digni- 
tatis— ordinary  plane)  apart  from  patriotic  services  will  be  mere  names 
and  not  marks  of  (true)  distinction  (dignitatis  insignia — higher  plane). 
Nay,  under  these  circumstances  not  only  will  these  splendid  titles  of  honor 
be  devoid  of  (real)  distinction,  but  they  will  involve  the  extreme  of  disgrace 
(summa  de/ormitas,  F.,  10,  6,  2-3).  The  sufficiency  of  worth,  apart  from 
recognition,  as  constituting  true  distinction,  is  carried  well  toward  the  point 
of  stoicism  in  a  letter  to  Lentulus  (F.,  i,  5a,  4),  whose  position  was  threat- 
ened by  a  movement  to  recall  him  from  his  province.  The  passage  tells 
its  own  story:  "It  is  the  part  of  your  wisdom  and  loftiness  of  spirit  to  con- 
sider that  all  your  honor  and  distinction  (dignitas)  rest  on  your  worth  and 
achievements ;  and  that  if  the  treachery  of  any  shall  take  away  any  of  those 
gifts  which  fortune  has  bestowed  upon  you,  this  will  be  a  greater  injury  to 
them  than  to  you." 

If  dignitas  in  the  letters  regularly  designates  that  distinction  which  is 
conferred  by  any  or  all  forms  of  social  approval,  it  is  an  appropriate  symbol 
to  summarize  the  entire  class  of  goods  considered  in  this  chapter.  The 
phrase  salus  et  dignitas  would  add  to  the  summary  the  strictly  individual- 
istic goods.  The  collocation  is  frequent.  It  is  worth  while  to  see  how 
Cicero  used  it.  We  cited  above  an  instance  where  he  credits  a  lady  with 
zeal  for  his  "safety  and  position"  (F.,  15,  7,  i).  Cicero  wrote  in  similar 
terms  to  the  father  of  the  former  correspondent  (totam  denique  domum  vestram 
vel  salutis  vel  dignitatis  meae  studiosissimam  cupidissimamque  cognovi,  F., 
15,  8,  i).  Lentulus  cared  for  safety  in  the  past;  he  will  care  for  stand- 
ing in  the  future  (F.,  i,  9,  22).  Cicero's  excuse  for  not  presenting  him- 
self to  support  a  certain  measure  in  the  senate  during  the  domination 
of  the  Caesarians  was  that  he  could  not  do  so  safely  or  with  self-respect; 


42  MORAL  VALUES  IN  CICERO'S  LETTERS 

hence  he  craves  regard  for  his  safety  and  his  dignity  (salutis  et  dignitatis 
meae,  F.,  lo,  2,  2).  After  the  lesson  of  the  exile  he  determined  to  remember 
salus  as  well  as  dignitas  (F.,  i,  7,  7),  concluding  that  neither  should  be 
sought  to  the  neglect  of  the  other  (F.,  i,  7,  10).  He  prefers  to  speak  of 
the  prosecution  of  Appius  Claudius  as  affecting  the  latter's  dignitas  rather 
than  salus  (F.,  3,  10,  i;  cf.  3,  10,  11).  We  have  seen  how  he  assured  the 
senate  that,  while  he  hoped  he  might  take  account  of  his  saluSy  he  surely 
would  of  his  dignitas  (F.,  15,  i,  6). 

The  interests  of  that  composite  individual,  the  commonwealth,  are 
summarized  in  the  same  terms.  As  long  as  possible  he  strove  for  the 
dignitas  of  the  state,  but  when  that  was  lost — in  the  conflict  between  Pompey 
and  Caesar — he  wished  to  maintain  its  salus  {F.,  6,  21,  i);  while  the  charge 
against  the  rival  captains  was  that  they  had  subordinated  the  salus  and 
dignitas  of  the  fatherland  to  personal  interests. 

As  dignitas  is  linked  with  salus  to  summarize  the  goods  involving  the 
individual  element,  so  it  is  linked  with  duty  to  summarize  those  involving 
the  social  element.  A  perfect  counterpart  to  the  group  just  examined  is 
found  where  Cicero  writes  (A.,  7,  17,  4):  ''But  if  there  shall  be  a  war,  I 
shall  prove  false  neither  to  my  duty  (officium)  nor  to  my  position  (dignitas)." 
Liberal  provision  for  his  son's  needs  concerns  his  duty  (officium),  reputation 
(existimatio) ,  and  standing  (dignitas,  A.,  14,  7,  2).  Governors  are  asked 
to  confer  favors  so  far  as  consistent  with  their  honor  and  their  position 
(fides  and  dignitas,  F.,  13,  53,  i;  13,  61,  i).  Here  fides,  honor,  good  faith, 
faithfulness,  like  officium  above,  represents  the  higher  social  consideration, 
which  may  also  be  represented  by  public  interest  or  commonwealth  (res 
publica) ;  for  example,  Consides  et  rei  publicae  et  dignitati  tuae  (JP.,  10,  27,  i), 
and  Fads  ex  tua  dignitate  et  ex  re  publica  (B.,  1,  2,  2) 

This  phraseology  is  quite  in  keeping  with  the  foregoing  analysis,  and 
confirms  the  conclusion  that  Cicero  thought  of  dignitas,  and  the  group  of 
goods  which  it  represents,  as  forming  a  mean  between  duty  and  interests 
strictly  personal,  giving  us  the  series  salus,  dignitas,  officium. 


CHAPTER  III 
SOCIAL  GOOD 

The  Epicurean  Atticus  had  evidently  expressed  great  delight  in  the 
daughter  born  to  him  in  his  mature  years.  Cicero  uses  this  conceded 
experience  of  the  reality  and  power  of  the  parental  instinct  to  controvert 
the  individualistic  ethics  of  the  Epicureans.  We  have  here,  he  argues, 
the  ultimate  bond  that  unites  man  to  man  and  makes  human  society  possi- 
ble. The  Epicureans  are  wTong  in  referring  everything  to  self  and  denying 
the  existence  of  altruistic  motives.  The  so-called  goodness,  which  is  based 
on  individual  utility  instead  of  natural  right,  is  not  goodness  at  all,  but  only 
shrewdness.^  This  is  the  same  derivation  of  the  social  virtues  from  the 
natural  love  of  offspring  which  we  find  elaborated  in  Cicero's  philosophical 
works  (e.  g.,  De  Fin.,  3,  19,  62-64;  5,  23,  65-67).  Beginning  with  the 
family,  the  concentric  circles  ever  widen,  until  all  mankind  are  recognized 
as  being  bound  together  with  natural  ties,  so  that  even  on  the  ground  of 
a  common  humanity  the  interests  of  all  are  to  each  an  essential  good 
{propter  se  expetendi  sint,  De  Fin.,  5,  23,  67) ;  nay,  the  bonds  reach  farther 
than  mere  humanity,  they  embrace  a  cosmic  commonwealth  of  gods  and 
men  in  which  the  individual  unit  is,  by  reason  and  by  nature,  bound  in  his 
actions  to  take  account  of  the  all  (De  Fin.,  3,  19,  64). 

Each  social  unit — family,  friends,  state,  or  race — presents  itself  as  a 
good  in  at  least  three  aspects  which  may  logically,  and  sometimes  prac- 
tically, be  distinguished,  but  which  frequently  tend  to  intermingle  and 
coalesce.  Friendship,  for  example,  as  a  spring  of  action  may  be  my  desire 
for  fellowship — my  appreciation  for  what  the  friend  is  to  me;  or  I  may  so 
far  identify  myself  with  my  friend  as  to  desire  his  welfare  as  an  independent 
good  without  conscious  thought  of  his  ministry  to  my  social  needs;  or, 
finally,  the  motive  may  present  itself  still  more  abstractly  as  duty  to  seek 
the  welfare  of  the  friend.  The  first  and  least  altruistic  of  these  aspects  is 
still  to  be  distinguished  from  what  Cicero  opposes  as  the  Epicurean  type 
of  friendship — devotion  to  one  for  what  he  contributes  other  than  himself; 
for  example,  when  support  or  influence  rather  than  fellowship  is  the  object 

I  "Lucius  noster  et  Patro,  qui  cum  omnia  ad  se  leferant,  numquam  quidquam 
alterius  causa  fieri  putent  et  cum  ea  re  bonum  virum  oportere  esse  dicant,  ne  malum 
habeat,  non  quo  id  natura  rectum  sit,  non  intellegunt  se  de  callido  homine  loqui  non 
de  bono  viro"  {A.,  7,  2,  4;   50  B.  C). 

43 


i 


44  MORAL   VALUES   IN   CICERO'S   LETTERS 

(cf.  F.,  3,  9,  2).  The  third  aspect,  that  of  duty,  might  be  treated  as  an 
abstract  rather  than  a  social  good;  but  as  the  duty  is  the  abstract  form 
whose  content  is  made  up  of  concrete  social  relations,  this  aspect  may 
properly  [as  well  as  conveniently  be  treated  in  connection  with  those  relations. 

I.    THE   FAMILY 

In  considering  Cicero's  practical  estimates  of  social  goods,  it  is  appro- 
priate to  follow  the  order  of  treatment  which  he  has  himself  outlined,  and 
to  proceed  from  the  family. 

Cicero  recognizes  the  fellowship  of  the  family  circle  as  a  deUght.  "I 
have  no  peace  except  the  time  I  spend  with  my  wife  and  daughter  and  dear 
little  Cicero,"  he  wrote  to  Atticus  (i,  18,  i).  This  fellowship,  while  more 
satisfying  than  the  hollow  so-called  friendships  of  public  life,  appears, 
however,  to  be  scarcely  a  substitute  for  the  company  of  men  with  whom 
he  has  close  sympathy — his  friend  Atticus  or  his  brother  Quintus.  Between 
the  brothers  the  relation  is  so  intimate  that  neither  has  any  real  deUght 
without  the  other  (Q.  i^.,  i,  3,  3).  An  exiled  friend  receives  commiseration 
for  the  hardship  of  being  separated  from  his  children,  than  whom  nothing 
can  be  more  deHghtful  (fesHvius,  F.j  6,  4,  3).  Perhaps  the  reference  here  is 
to  that  charming  gayety  which  he  recognizes  as  the  most  delightful  char- 
acteristic of  children  (A.,  16,  11,  8,  where  a  kiss  is  sent  to  Attica,  quoniam, 
quod  optimum  in  pueris  est,  hilarula  est).  Another  exiled  friend  is  com- 
forted by  the  suggestion  that  the  loyal  affection,  the  character,  and  the  dili- 
gence of  his  son,  are  his  possessions,  absent  as  well  as  present  (F.,  5,  17,  4). 
''And  especially  our  children"  are  the  words  with  which  Cicero  closes  an 
enumeration  of  the  sources  of  his  comfort  at  a  period  of  dulness  in  politics 
(Q.  F.,  3,  9,  2). 

Delight  in  the  fellowship  of  kin  is  also  indicated  by  expressions  of  pain 
or  regret  when  that  fellowship  is  broken  off  by  absence,  alienation,  or  death. 
This  is  conspicuous  during  the  period  of  exile,  as  a  few  examples  will  indi- 
cate. "This  is  the  greatest  of  all  my  miseries,"  Cicero  wrote  regarding 
the  difficulty  of  having  an  interview  with  Quintus  {A.,  3,  7,  3).  ''My 
Pomponius,  strive  that  I  may  have  the  privilege  of  living  with  you  and  with 
my  family  {cum  meis) ,....!  am  overwhelmed  with  grief  and  with  long- 
ing for  all  my  own,  who  have  always  been  dearer  to  me  than  myself."^  In 
Quintus  he  misses  one  who  is  at  once  brother,  son,  and  father  to  him.  He 
misses  his  daughter,  so  loyal,  so  modest,  so  talented,  his  very  likeness  in 
features,  speech,  and  temperament.     He  misses  his  charming  boy,  the 

I  "Premor  luctu,  desiderio  omnium  meorum,  qui  mihi  me  cariores  semper  fuerunt" 
{A.,  3,  22,  3). 


SOCIAL  GOOD  45 

delight  of  his  heart,  as  well  as  his  nephew,  his  son's  loved  comrade.  Finally 
he  misses  his  wife,  so  faithful,  so  unhappy,  whom  he  has  not  permitted  to 
follow  him,  but  has  left  to  guard  their  children  {Q.  F.y  i,  3,  3,  abridged). 
However  much  significance  there  may  be  in  the  mention  of  Terentia  after 
the  others,  it  is  worthy  of  note,  in  view  of  the  later  estrangement,  that  at 
this  period  Cicero  seems  to  refer  to  her  with  genuine  sympathy  and  affec- 
tion, and  when  addressing  others  as  well  as  herself.  The  letters  to  Terentia 
during  this  period  contain  the  most  ardent  expressions.  She  is  his  ''life," 
and  her  image  is  before  his  eyes  night  and  day  (F.,  14,  2,  3).  No  object 
is  or  ever  has  been  dearer  (F.,  14,  3,  5).  He  longs  to  see  her  as  soon  as 
possible,  and  die  in  her  embrace  (jP.,  14,  4,  i).  This  same  letter  refers  to 
his  most  precious  daughter  and  to  Cicero  the  remnant  of  his  hopes  {mea 
carissima  filiola  et  spes  reliqua  nostra  Cicero,  F.,  14,  4,  6). 

Pain  at  alienation  is  an  index  of  delight  in  fellowship  now  broken. 
During  the  period  of  Cicero's  alienation  from  his  brother  his  letters  express 
pain  rather  than  ill-will.  That  Quintus  should  accuse  him  to  Caesar  is  a 
more  grievous  (acerbum)  trouble  than  anything  in  the  civil  war  (^4.,  11,  8, 
2).  He  is  prostrated  with  grief  {A.,  11,  9,  2)  and  wishes  he  had  never  been 
bom,  or  else  that  he  had  never  had  a  younger  brother  (^.,11,9,3).  Further 
reports  of  the  hostility  of  his  brother  and  his  nephew  bring  an  increment 
to  his  heavy  load  of  grief  {ad  tneas  incredibiles  aegritudines  aliquid  novi 
accedit).  Their  course  will  cause  Atticus  pain  (or  indignation,  dolor)  \  to 
Cicero  it  is  torture  (yl.,  11,  10,  i).  A  bitter  letter  from  his  brother  calls 
out  the  statement  that  there  is  no  conceivable  evil  which  he  does  not  suffer 
{Nihil  fingi  potest  mali  quo  non  urgear,  A.,  11,  15,  2). 

However  the  responsibility  for  the  rupture  with  Terentia  may  be  dis- 
tributed, Cicero  seems  to  have  looked  back  at  the  episode  with  distress, 
although  references  are  not  as  frequent  as  in  the  case  of  the  trouble  with 
Quintus.  He  wished  Atticus  to  effect  some  financial  settlement  with 
Terentia  without  dragging  him  into  the  business.  His  trouble  does  not 
seem  to  arise  from  the  financial  considerations  involved,  for  in  case  of  doubt 
he  prefers  that  Terentia  rather  than  himself  should  have  the  advantage 
{A.,  12,  21,  3),  and  Atticus  is  commissioned,  if  possible,  to  make  such 
terms  as  will  satisfy  her  {A.,  12,  28,  i);  still  he  writes:  "In  that  you  lay 
upon  me  the  whole  burden  of  the  deahng  with  Terentia  I  do  not  recognize 
your  usual  kindness.  For  those  are  the  very  wounds  which  I  am  unable 
to  touch  without  the  deepest  groan. "^ 

The  most  conspicuous'  of  these  indirect  tributes  to  the  delight  of  family 

^  "Ista  enim  sunt  ipsa  vulnera,  quae  non  possvim  tractare  sine  maximo  gemitu" 
{A.,  12,  22,  i;   cf.,  12,  23). 


46  MORAL   VALUES   IN   CICERO'S   LETTERS 

fellowship  is  the  grief  of  Cicero  at  the  death  of  TuUia.  "My  grief  sur- 
passes the  power  of  any  comfort"  (A.,  12,  14,  3);  "I  sometimes  think  that 
in  doing  this  [controUing  grief]  I  am  doing  wrong;  again  it  seems  a  wrong 
not  to  do  so.  Solitude  is  of  some  help,  but  it  would  be  of  much  more  use 
to  have  you  here"  (A.,  12, 14,  3);  "The  lamenting  I  have  checked,  the  sor- 
row I  have  not  been  able  to,  nor  would  I  if  I  could"  {nee  si  possem  vellem, 
A.,  12,  28,  2) ;  "Long,  long,  have  I  been  ruined,  Atticus,  but  now  that  I  have 
lost  the  one  link  that  bound  me  to  life,  I  confess  my  ruin"  (A.,  12,  23,  i); 
"I  had  in  former  troubles  a  place  to  which  I  could  flee  for  refuge  and 
for  peace;  I  had  one  in  whose  charming  society  I  could  cast  aside  all 
my  anxieties  and  troubles.  Now,  however,  at  this  so  grievous  wound 
those  which  I  thought  were  healed  break  out  afresh"  (F.,  4,  6,  2). 
Here  we  see  the  chief  features  of  Cicero's  experience  in  the  first  half  of  45 — 
inconsolable  grief,  moderated  in  expression,  but  frankly  justified,  the  crav- 
ing for  soHtude  or  the  presence  of  an  intimate  friend,  and  the  sense  that  the 
chief  remaining  prop  of  his  life  was  removed.  His  refuge  from  public 
disaster  had  been  the  home.  In  an  earlier  chapter  we  have  seen  how  from 
this  domestic  disaster  he  sought  a  refuge  in  literature.  An  additional 
palliative  occupied  much  of  his  thought  for  several  months.  He  would 
discharge  a  sacred  obligation  to  the  departed  (A.,  12,  18,  i)  by  building, 
adorning,  and  consecrating  as  a  lasting  memorial  to  her  name  a  shrine 
(fanum).  This  would  be  better  than  a  tomb  (sepulchrum) ,  because  it 
would  not  only  be  exempt  from  the  provisions  of  a  certain  sumptuary  law, 
but  would  involve  an  approach  to  divide  honors  (dTro^ewo-ts,  A,  12.,  36,  i; 
etc.).  The  plan  was  never  carried  out;  yet  it  is  most  interesting  as  a  pro- 
posal to  do  literally  what  is  involved  in  our  metaphorical  expressions 
"idolize"  and  "worship"  as  applied  to  members  of  one's  family. 

There  is  an  advance  in  the  altruistic  scale  when  the  welfare  of  kin  rather 
than  gratification  from  kin  is  the  controlling  thought.  This  higher  attitude 
is  amply  illustrated  in  the  letters. 

"I  am  so  disturbed  about  Quintus  that  I  cannot  come  to  any  conclu- 
sion," wrote  Cicero  .to  Atticus  early  in  the  exile  (^.,  3,  8,  3).  A  reason  for 
renouncing  the  satisfaction  of  an  interview  with  Quintus,  who  was  returning 
from  his  province  in  the  East,  was  that  Quintus'  interests  required  a  prompt 
return  to  the  city  (^.,  3,  9,  i).  He  exclaims  that  he  has  been  the  cause  of 
his  brother's  ruin  (Q.  F.,  1,  ^,  i).  He  is  more  distressed  at  Terentia's  mis- 
fortunes than  at  his  own  {F.,  14,  4,  6).  Apprehensions  for  his  family  fill 
him  with  keenest  anxiety  (e.  g.,  F.,  14,  4,  3).  Among  the  most  vehement 
expressions  of  that  troubled  period  are  his  regrets,  not  only  that  his  family 
have  fallen  into  such  troubles,  but  that  he  who  should  have  been  their  pro- 


SOCIAL  GOOD  47 

tector  is  the  occasion  of  it  all.*  Similar  sentiments  are  found  in  the  letters 
which  he  sent  to  Atticus  bespeaking  his  support  for  Quintus,  Terentia,  and 
the  children.*  That  this  interest  in  the  welfare  of  others  was  so  strongly 
and  so  frequently  expressed,  at  the  time  when  more  than  at  any  other  he 
was  prostrated  by  personal  trouble,  has  direct  bearing  upon  the  sincerity  of 
the  sentiments.  Quite  consistent  with  the  foregoing  is  the  comfort  long 
after  sent  to  an  exiled  friend :  Torquatus  should  remember  that  the  mem- 
bers of  his  family  are  maintaining  their  position  as  well  as  if  he  were  pres- 
ent, and  that  they  are  in  no  personal  peril  {F.,  6,  i,  i). 

We  should  expect  the  various  interests  of  TulUa  to  receive  frequent 
mention  as  matters  of  concern  at  various  periods,  and  such  is  the  case. 
Now  it  is  her  property  (A.,  ii,  9,  3),  now  her  health  (^4.,  11,  6,  4),  and  now 
her  numerous  marital  troubles  (e.  g.,  A.^  11,  24,  i;  11,  3,  i).  The  tone  of 
these  passages  may  be  judged  from  this  message  to  Atticus,  written  during 
Tullia's  trouble  with  Dolabella:  '*A  second  reason  why  I  am  unwilling 
to  go  away  is  TuUia's  calling  upon  you  for  aid,  as  you  write.  Alas!  Alas! 
(O  rem  miserami)  What  shall  I  write  or  what  shall  I  desire  ?  I  will  be 
brief,  for  I  am  suddenly  overcome  with  tears.  I  leave  the  matter  with  you, 
you  must  plan;  only  make  sure  that  at  this  crisis  no  harm  befalls  her. 
Pardon  me,  pray,  I  cannot  for  grief  and  tears  dwell  longer  on  this  theme. 
Only  let  me  say  that  nothing  gives  me  more  pleasure  than  your  regard  for 
her"  {A.,  II,  7,  6). 

This  passage  introduces  us  to  the  dilemma  of  49-48,  and  shows  that  at 
that  crisis  the  welfare  of  family  was  a  vital  consideration.  A  single  para- 
graph {A.,  7,  13,  3)  summarizes  the  chief  aspects  of  the  domestic  problem 
at  this  time.  Cicero  is  uncertain  what  course  will  best  advance  the  inter- 
ests of  his  son  and  nephew,  sometimes  thinking  that  they  should  be  sent  to 
Greece.3  With  regard  to  Terentia  and  TuUia,  the  first  consideration  is 
that  of  safety,  whether  the  protection  of  Dolabella  will  seciure  them  from 
violence  at  the  hands  of  Caesar's  forces  in  Rome;  the  second  consideration 
is  that  of  honor,  whether  pubHc  opinion  will  justify  them  in  remaining  after 
the  general  flight  of  the  optimates.^    This  giving  to  safety  precedence  over 

1  "  Conficior  enim  maerore,  mea  Terentia,  nee  me  meae  miseriae  magis  excruciant 
quam  tuae  vestraeque.  Ego  autem  hoc  miserior  sum  quam  tu,  quae  es  miserrima, 
quod  ipsa  calamitas  est  utriusque  nostrum,  sed  culpa  mea  propria  est;  etc."  {F., 
14,  3,  1-2;   cf.  14,  I,  i). 

2  Examples  are  A.,  3,  13,  2;   3,  23,  5;   3,  19,  3. 

3  Cf.  ^.,  10,  4,  5;  also  6,  7,  2,  where  the  welfare  of  the  boys  seems  a  reason  for 
retiring  to  Rhodes. 

4  Cf.  F.J  14,  14,  I,  and  14,  18,  i. 


48 

reputation  is  justifiable  in  planning  for  one's  family,  however  the  case  may 
be  in  planning  for  one's  self  {aliier  enim  mihi  de  illis  ac  de  me  ipso  consulen- 
dum  est).  This  principle,  that  the  safety  of  one's  family  and  one's  own 
safety  occupy  different  planes  as  proper  motives  for  action,  is  likewise 
/  recognized  in  the  exclamation:  *' Would  that  my  decision  affected  my  own 
person  only"  {A.,  lo,  9,  2)! 

The  freedom  of  Athenian  student  life,  joined  with  a  liberal  allowance 
for  expenses,  seems  to  have  presented  temptations  too  strong  for  the  self- 
control  of  the  young  Marcus.  Even  before  the  assassination  of  Caesar, 
Cicero  had  contemplated  a  ''free  embassy"  to  Greece  for  no  other  reason, 
he  asserts,  than  to  look  after  his  son  {A.,  14,  13,  4).  After  the  ''Ides  of 
March  "  prudence  supplied  a  further  motive  for  the  journey,  but  the  domes- 
tic interest  was  still  emphasized:  "It  is  very  important  for  my  son,  or  for 
me,  or  in  fact  for  both  of  us,  that  I  drop  in  upon  his  studies"  {A.,  14,  16,  3). 
The  reports  as  to  his  progress  were  very  ambiguous.  The  father  is  inclined 
to  give  the  boy  the  benefit  of  the  doubt,  and  even  has  declared  himself 
wiUing  to  be  deceived  {A.,  15,  16,  i);  still  the  journey  to  Athens  will  give 
an  opportunity  to  be  of  service  to  Marcus,  or  at  least  to  judge  how  far  he 
is  capable  of  improvement  (^.,  16,  3,  4).  In  an  earlier  section  we  have 
seen  how  this  journey  was  begun  and  broken  off. 

In  connection  with  effort  for  the  welfare  of  kin,  the  idea  of  duty  is  fre- 
quently present  by  implication  and  sometimes  present  explicitly.  It  was 
Cicero's  duty  (officium)  to  have  saved  his  family  from  trouble  (F.,  14,  3, 
i);  and  duty  is  to  determine  his  dealings  with  Terentia  after  the  divorce 
(A.y  12,  21,  3).  The  sacred  character  of  this  bond  of  duty  between  kin  is 
seen  in  the  fact  that  it  receives  the  same  term,  pietas,  which  designates 
allegiance  due  the  gods.  Its  binding  force  is  recognized  even  when  it  leads 
others  to  unwelcome  action ;  for  example,  the  ill-natured  attack  of  Metellus 
on  Cicero  is  excused  because  prompted  by  pietas;  i.  e.,  resentment  at  a 
fancied  wrong  to  a  brother  (F.,  5,  2,  6  and  10);  and  the  offense  of  joining 
Antony  is,  in  one  case,  to  be  condoned  because  due  to  pietas;  i.  e.,  gratitude 
for  a  father's  restoration  {F.,  11,  22,  i).  The  same  high  estimate  of  the 
bond  is  shown  by  the  strong  terms  used  to  characterize  its  violation.  The 
act  of  Quintus,  father  and  son,  in  denouncing  Cicero  to  Caesar  is  repeatedly 
called  a  scelus,  a  crime,  an  enormity  (^4.,  10,  7,  3;  11,  21,  i;  cf.  11,  9,  2). 
In  one  passage  (F.,  4,  14,  3)  scelus  seems  to  include  some  treacherous  act 
on  the  part  of  Terentia  as  well  as  of  Quintus. 

Certain  distinctive  duties  Cicero  more  or  less  explicitly  connects  with 
the  specific  relationships  of  family  life.  The  relation  of  brothers  permits 
great  frankness  of  criticism  {Q.  F.,  i,  2,  13),  but  anything  approaching 


SOCIAL  GOOD  49 

anger  is  unbrotherly  {parum  fraterne,  Q.  F.j  i,  2,  12).  Between  brothers 
difference  in  policy  or  lack  of  agreement  in  domestic  affairs  of  common 
interest  is  unseemly  (A.,  13,  41,  2).  Cicero  questioned  whether  it  was  a 
loyal  act  to  leave  Quintus  as  his  representative  in  a  post  that  might  prove 
perilous  (^4.,  6,  3,  2).  He  claims  that  after  he  knew  the  fact,  though  not 
the  extent,  of  Quintus'  aUenation,  he  wrote  to  Caesar  exculpating  his  brother 
from  all  responsibility  for  his,  Marcus',  withdrawal  from  Italy.  Such  an 
act  would  illustrate  the  spirit  of  fraternal  pietas  (A.^  11,  12,  2). 

The  same  term  pietas,  'Uoyal  affection,"  summarizes  the  duty  of  the 
child  to  the  parent.  An  exile  is  congratulated  on  the  pietas  of  his  son 
(F.,  5,  17,  4).  Young  Cicero's  lack  of  pietas,  in  turning  to  Caesar  against 
his  father's  will,  is  a  source  of  pain  {A.,  10,  4,  5).  Quintus,  the  younger, 
is  commended  for  the  pietas  which  he  showed  by  his  grief  on  accidentally 
learning  of  his  father's  design  to  divorce  Pomponia  (A.,  6,  3,  8);  and 
afterward  in  effecting  a  temporary  reconciliation  {A.,  6,  7,  i).  A  few  years 
later  Cicero  seems  skeptical  about  the  sincerity  or  consistency  of  his  nephew's 
filial  sentiments,  for  just  before  the  divorce  resentment  against  his  mother, 
to  whom  nevertheless  he  continues  to  write  in  affectionate  terms,  is  his 
ostensible  motive  for  shunning  his  father's  house  (A.,  13,  38,  i;  13,  39,  i); 
while  after  the  divorce  sympathy  with  his  mother  seems  the  ground  of  the 
young  man's  trouble  with  his  father  (A.,  14,  10,  4). 

The  father's  duty  to  provide  for  and  protect  his  children  has  already 
been  illustrated.  We  are  several  times  definitely  told  that  it  is  a  matter 
of  duty  and  reputation  for  a  father  to  make  liberal  provision  for  a  son's 
expenses  {A.,  14,  7,  2,  etc.).  At  the  same  time  excessive  indulgence  will 
render  a  youth  difl&cult  or  impossible  to  control  (e.  g..  A.,  10,  6,  2).  It  is 
always  Quintus  and  not  Marcus  who  is  in  danger  of  spoiling  his  son  by 
indulgence,  if  we  are  to  trust  the  latter. 

Husband  and  wife  owe  each  other  courtesy.  This  is  made  prominent 
in  connection  with  the  relations  of  Quintus  and  Pomponia.  It  is  Quintus' 
spirit  (animus)  toward  Pomponia  that  is  the  subject  of  intercession  {A.,  1, 
5,  2;  I,  6,  2).  It  is  on  the  basis  of  courtesy,  as  shown  in  voice,  manner, 
and  facial  expression,  that  Cicero  contrasts  the  pair  to  the  disadvantage  of 
Pomponia  (A.,  5,  i,  3-4).  Cicero's  conception  of  the  marriage  relation 
may  further  be  illustrated  by  occasional  references  to  the  circumstances 
of  entering  into  it.  Young  Quintus  is  to  marry  and  settle  down  according 
to  the  plans  of  his  family.  The  colloquy  between  Cicero  and  his  nephew, 
in  i4.,  13,  42,  I,  might  almost  be  from  the  close  of  a  comedy  by  Plautus  or 
Terence.  The  youth  needs  money,  which  seems  to  have  been  withheld 
by  way  of  discipline.     But  now  he  is  very  meek.     He  will  marry  as  the 


so 

family  think  best.  The  time  is  a  matter  of  indifiFerence.  He  even  seems 
to  assent  to  his  uncle's  proposal  for  an  immediate  wedding.  The  betrothal 
and  marriage  of  TuUia  to  Dolabella  during  Cicero's  absence  in  Cilicia 
seem  to  have  been  arranged  by  Terentia  and  Tullia  without  waiting  for 
word  from  the  head  of  the  house  (F.,  3,  12,  2-3).  "The  ladies,  I  under- 
stand are  very  much  pleased  with  the  agreeableness  and  courtesy  of  the 
young  man,"  the  father  later  wrote  (A.,  6,  6,  i).  A  probable  reference 
to  a  candidate  for  the  hand  of  Attica  includes  more  comprehensively  the 
qualifications  of  a  desirable  suitor:  "I  heartily  approve  of  the  man,  his 
family,  and  his  means"  {valde  probo  hominem,  domum,  jacultatem,  A.,  13, 
21,  7). 

II.    FRIENDSHIP 

From  the  prominence  of  friendship  in  ancient  life,  the  composition  by 
Cicero  of  one  of  the  world's  classics  on  that  relationship,  and  the  fame  of 
his  intimate  and  unbroken  friendship  with  Atticus,  we  should  expect  to 
find  personal  attachment  between  man  and  man  conspicuous  among  the 
motives  recognized  in  the  letters.  This  natural  expectation,  as  one  studies 
the  correspondence  of  Cicero,  is  fulfilled. 

The  various  grounds  assigned  for  friendship  or  intimacy  fall  into  two 
general  classes — common  experience  and  reciprocal  ministry.  To  the 
former  may  be  referred  certain  forms  of  inherited  intimacy,^  long  personal 
association  (F.,  13,  10,  2),  common  intellectual  pusuits  (F.,  3,  10,  9;  5,  15, 
2),  common  professional  or  class  affiliations  {F.,  13,  10,  2),  membership 
in  a  common  board,  and  connection  with  a  common  friend  {F.,  ^,  10,  9-10). 
Among  forms  of  ministry  are  personal  characteristics,  such  as  the  lovable- 
ness  and  wit  of  Paetus  (F.,  9,  15,  1-2),  or  the  quiet  refinement  of  Tiro  (A., 
7,  5,  2),  as  well  as  the  serviceableness  of  the  same  freedman  friend  for  busi- 
ness or  study  (ibid.),  and  all  the  varied  forms  of  ministry  which  in  the  rela- 
tions of  life  one  man  has  opportunity  to  give  to  another  (e.  g.,  officiis,  F., 
10,  10,  2).  The  letters  of  recommendation  (F.,  13)  supply  numerous  illus- 
trations of  these  grounds  of  intimacy,  which  as  illustrations  are  valid 
whether  or  not  the  particular  friendships  were  deep  and  genuine ;  for  where 
the  purpose  was  to  create  the  impression  that  the  beneficiary  was  the 
friend  of  the  writer  of  the  letter,  circumstances  would  be  cited  which  were 
generally  recognized  as  appropriate  grounds  for  genuine  friendship. 

That  Cicero  took  the  utmost  delight  in  the  fellowship  of  friends  is  a 
fact  so  well  recognized  that  it  may  be  assumed  with  the  citation  of  a  few 
of  its  clearest  and  most  comprehensive  expressions.     With  reference  to 

I  For  example,  F.,  10,  3,  2,  "  Necessitudinem  constitutam  habui  cum  domo  vestra 
ante  aliquanto,  quam  tu  natus  es." 


SOCIAL   GOOD  51 

Atticus  there  is  no  substitute  for  the  classic  heart-cry  which  epitomizes 
much  that  is  most  characteristic  in  the  twenty  years '  correspondence  between 
these  friends  (^.,  i,  18,  i;  60  B.  C):  "Be  assured  that  I  lack  nothing  so 
much  as  someone  in  whom  to  confide  all  the  things  that  give  me  anxiety, 
someone  who  loves  me,  who  has  sense,  one  with  whom  I  can  talk  without 
pretense,  disguise,  or  concealment  ....  Metellus  is  not  a  fellow-man, 
but  'shore  and  air  and  empty  waste.'  But  you  who  have  so  often  reUeved 
my  care  and  my  anxiety  with  your  speech  and  coimsel,  you  who  are  my 
partner  in  public  interests  and  my  confidant  in  personal  affairs,  the  sharer  of 
all  my  conversations  and  deliberations,  where,  pray,  are  you  ?  .  .  .  .  For 
the  spurious  friendships  of  politics  have  a  sort  of  glitter  in  the  public  eye, 
but  they  yield  no  genuine  comfort.  So  when  my  house  is  filled  to  overflowing 
at  the  morning  hour,  and  when  I  go  down  to  the  forum  thronged  about  w^th 
troops  of  friends,  I  cannot  find  one  in  all  the  crowd  with  whom  I  can  jest 
freely  or  breathe  a  familiar  sigh.  Wherefore  I  look  for  you,  I  long  for  you, 
I  now  even  summon  you.  Many  things  trouble  and  harry  me,  but  I  think  that 
if  I  could  get  your  ear,  I  could  clear  them  all  away  by  having  a  single  walk 
and  talk  with  you."  When  everything  was  stripped  away  by  the  exile, 
Cicero  still  had  confidence  that  his  friend  had  cared  for  him,  not  his :  "This 
only  I  beg,  that,  as  you  have  always  loved  my  own  self,  you  continue  in 
the  same  love,  for  I  am  the  same.  My  enemies  have  taken  away  what  was 
mine,  not  my  own  self"  (A.,  3,  5,  i). 

To  the  student  of  the  letters  there  is  particular  interest  in  expressions 
of  satisfaction  in  the  mere  act  of  writing  to  the  absent  friend,  without 
immediate  reference  to  the  significance  of  the  message  written  or  to  the 
desire  for  a  reply:  "Although  I  have  nothing  to  wTite  to  you,  still  I  write 
because  I  seem  to  be  talking  with  you"  {A.,  12,  53;  cf.  7,  15,  i,  and  8,  14, 
i).  To  Atticus  the  writer  makes  the  hyperbolical  claim  that  he  confides 
more  boldly  in  his  friend  than  in  himself  {A.,  12,  36,  i).  No  charge  of 
inconsistency,  he  claims,  can  be  based  on  the  fact  that  in  successive  letters 
to  Atticus  he  favors  opposite  courses ;  for  these  letters  are  like  the  soliloquies 
of  a  man  who  talks  over  with  himself  the  pros  and  cons  of  an  important 
matter  before  deciding  {A.,  8,  14,  2). 

But  Atticus  is  not  the  only  friend  whose  fellowship  Cicero  values. 
In  a  letter  to  Paetus  he  shows  himself  a  charming  advocate  of  the  dinner 
party  as  a  social  institution.  Association  with  congenial  friends  is  a  most 
notable  element  in  human  happiness.  The  distinctive  and  delightful  thing 
about  the  banquet  is  not  the  physical  pleasure  of  eating,  and  drinking  but 
the  human  fellowship  and  the  refreshment  of  friendly  converse.'  How 
I  "  Sed  mehercule,  mi  Paete,  extra  iocum  moneo  te,  quod  pertinere  ad  beate  viven- 
dum  arbitxor,  ut  cum  viris  bonis,  iucundis,  amantibus  tui  vivas.     Nihil  est  aptius 


52  MORAL   VALUES   IN   CICERO'S   LETTERS 

independent  this  human  interest  was  of  conventional  barriers  is  indicated 
by  the  letters  to  Tiro.  Notice,  for  example,  the  one  beginning  with  the 
assurance  that  Tiro  is  missed  more  seriously  than  had  been  anticipated, 
and  closing  with  a  contrast  between  affection  and  longing  {desiderium) ,  of 
which  the  former  would  defer  Tiro's  home-coming  in  the  interest  of  his 
recovery,  while  the  latter  clamored  for  the  earliest  possible  return  {F.,  i6, 
I ;  cf.  also  i6,  i8,  and  i6,  20). 

There  rests  upon  friends  a  special  obligation  to  deal  sincerely  and  frankly 
with  each  other  {vere,  F.,  12,  22,  4;  aperte,  F.,  5,  7,  3).  Cicero  professes 
to  welcome  not  only  admonition,  but  even  reproof,  if  accompanied  by 
judgment  and  good-will  (A,,  16,  11,  2).  It  is  not  only  a  privilege,  but  a 
specific  duty,  for  a  friend  to  offer  his  friend  comfort  in  time  of  trouble 
(F.,  5,  17,  3;  6,  10,  4).  Whether  or  not  he  succeeds  in  consoling  his  friend, 
he  has  the  satisfaction  of  having  done  his  duty  in  making  the  attempt. 

Cicero  accepts  the  general  principle  that  every  man  ought  to  look  after 
the  interests  of  his  friends  (suos  enim  quisque  debet  tueri,  A.,  16,  16C,  i). 
This  is  a  sentiment  which  all  recognize  as  social  and  moral  when  applied 
to  the  sphere  of  individual  effort  and  sacrifice,  whatever  complications  may 
arise  upon  its  appHcation  to  political  Hfe.  Even  the  letters  of  recommenda- 
tion (F.,  13)  include  unexceptionable  personal  requests  addressed  to  friends 
in  behalf  of  friends.  Its  rare  tactfulness  makes  conspicuous  a  letter  request- 
ing Memmius  to  respect  the  sentiments  of  Atticus'  Epicurean  friends  and 
grant  them  possession  of  a  spot  sacred  to  them  from  having  once  belonged 
to  Epicurus  (F.,  13,  i).  Equally  innocent  seems  the  plea  that  a  governor 
give  ''a  high-born,  talented,  and  upright  young  man"  opportunity  in  his 
province  to  display  his  merits  (F.,  13,  64,  2).  It  happens,  however,  that 
many  of  the  letters  of  Cicero  which  actively  seek  the  welfare  of  his  friends 
are  requests  for  favorable  administrative  or  judicial  decisions.  For  exam- 
ple, a  group  of  letters  {A.,  16, 16A-16F)  were  sent  to  Plancus  and  others 
near  to  him  to  secure  a  favorable  decision  for  the  people  of  Buthrotum,  so 
that  they  could  repay  Atticus  borrowed  money.  The  apparently  co- 
ordinate grounds  on  which  the  plea  is  based  are  the  justice  of  the  cause  and 
Cicero's  common  friendship  for  Atticus  and  Plancus.  There  seems  to  be 
no  consciousness  that  there  is  any  impropriety  or  inconsistency  in  thus 
putting  personal  favor  along  with  justice  as  a  motive  for  administrative 
decision.  This  type  of  request  is  frequent  among  the  letters  of  recommen- 
dation.    Nothing  is  needed  but  a  decision  in  accord  with  the  propraetor's 

vitae,  nihil  ad  beate  vivendum  accomodatius.  Nee  id  ad  voluptatem  refero,  sed  ad 
communitatem  vitae  atque  victus  remissionemque  animorum,  quae  jnaxime  sermone 
efficitur  familiari "  {F.,  9,  24,  3). 


SOCIAL  GOOD  53 

established  policy  (F.,  13,  55,  2).  Nothing  is  asked  that  will  be  inconsistent 
with  right  and  honor  {F.,  13,  61 ;  13,  63,  2).  Of  course,  the  judge,  as  he  is 
in  honor  bound,  will  follow  his  established  edict  in  the  decision,  but  will 
he  not  out  of  friendship  for  Cicero  grant  the  man's  rights  cheerfully  (F.,  13, 
59)  ?  Perhaps  the  most  striking  example  of  this  sort  of  request  is  a  letter 
to  the  legate  Valerius  (F.,  13,  5).  Cicero  begins  by  saying  that  he  would 
not  have  personal  considerations  interfere  with  the  legate's  faithful  per- 
formance of  his  difl&cult  duties.  He  next  sets  forth  the  justice  of  his  friend's 
claim,  breaking  off  with  this  statement,  remarkable  even  if  not  intended  to 
be  taken  too  seriously:  ''But  I  am  unwilUng  to  speak  at  length  about  the 
justice  of  the  contention,  lest  I  seem  to  have  won  on  the  merits  of  the  case 
rather  than  through  favor."  These  requests  all  assume  that  friendship 
may  have  a  proper  influence  on  the  decision  of  administrative  and  judicial 
questions  which  are  supposed  to  be  under  law.  There  is  reiterated  assur- 
ance that  law  and  right  are  strictly  to  be  observed.  Where,  then,  is  the 
sphere  for  the  operation  of  personal  influence?  Is  it  the  inference  that 
without  such  considerations  the  governor  would  not  act  justly  ?  But  this 
would  be  an  insult  that  ought  to  ruin  the  petitioner's  case.  The  only  con- 
sistent alternative  seems  to  be  that  within  the  domain  of  properly  adminis- 
tered law  and  justice  there  lies  a  discretionary  zone  where  the  governor 
may  be  controlled  by  considerations  of  friendship.  This  Cicero  probably 
would  not  seriously  claim.  The  fact  seems  to  be  that,  by  reason  of  the 
corrupt  political  customs  of  his  time  and  his  genuine  desire  to  advance  the 
interests  of  his  friends,  he  was  betrayed  into  a  position  logically  and  morally 
inconsistent. 

In  considering  the  requests  which  his  friends  made  of  him  during  his 
own  governorship,  he  insists  on  giving  right  and  reputation  precedence 
over  friendship.  Caelius  wished  Cicero's  provincials  to  hunt  panthers  for 
his  games  at  the  capital,  as  well  as  make  a  money  contribution  for  the 
same  purpose.  Cicero  regrets  that  his  policy  is  so  little  understood  at 
Rome.  His  friend  should  realize  that  such  exactions  are  improper  (^4,, 
6,  I,  21).  He  admits  that  he  is  supporting  Appius  Claudius,  but  in  a  way 
consistent  with  honor  {honeste  tamen,  A.,  6,  2,  10).  Brutus,  with  the  sup- 
port of  Atticus,  sought  Cicero's  aid  in  making  collections  from  the  pro- 
vincials under  oppressive  and  unjust  conditions.  Cicero  declares  that  he 
will  not  violate  his  edict  and  be  a  party  to  oppression,  although  he  is  ready 
to  give  all  proper  aid  in  collecting  rightful  dues.  If  Brutus  is  not  satisfied 
with  this,  his  friendship 'may  go,  if  necessary-  (^4.,  5,  21,  10-13).  The  dis- 
pleasure of  Brutus  will  be  a  source  of  sorrow;  disappointment  in  Brutus 
will  be  a  much  greater  grief  {A.,  6,  i,  6).     Atticus  concedes  too  much  to 


54  MORAL   VALUES   IN   CICERO 'S   LETTERS 

his  friendship  for  Brutus  when  he  urges  Cicero  to  act  dishonorably  in 
Brutus'  behalf  (A.,  6,  2,  g). 

The  motives  of  friendship  and  of  patriotism,  now  and  then,  are  brought 
into  formal  comparison.  The  friendship  between  Cicero  and  Mattius 
seemed  imperiled  on  account  of  the  latter's  devotion  to  the  memory  of  the 
slain  dictator.  The  circumstances  called  out  one  of  those  matchless  letters 
of  conciliation  in  which  our  author's  varied  powers  of  mind  and  heart  are 
so  happily  displayed.  Tactfully  and  delicately,  while  seeming  to  excuse 
the  attitude  of  Mattius  as  dictated  by  loyalty  to  one  held  dear,  he  suggests 
an  opposing  view  as  held  by  certain  people:  "But  a  man  so  clever  as  you 
are  cannot  overlook  the  fact  that,  assuming  Caesar  to  have  been  a  tyrant — 
as  for  my  part  I  decidedly  hold — two  views  may  be  taken  of  your  duty: 
either  the  one  which  I  am  wont  to  support — that  your  loyalty  and  sympathy 
in  loving  your  friend  even  after  his  death  are  praiseworthy;  or  the  one 
which  some  support — that  the  freedom  of  your  country  should  have  been 
valued  above  the  life  of  your  friend"  (F.,  11,  27,  8).  That  Cicero  at  heart 
sympathized  with  the  latter  of  the  contrasted  views  seems  a  fair  inference 
from  his  approving  reference  to  Labienus  as  one  who  had  for  the  sake  of 
the  republic  pronounced  a  man  who  was  his  friend  guilty  of  crime  (A.,  7, 
12,  5).  Just  before  returning  from  his  province  Cicero,  in  a  letter  to  Caelius 
compared  the  claims  of  friendship  and  of  patriotism,  apparently  giving 
precedence  to  the  latter.  The  passage  is  also  valuable  as  a  deliberate 
statement  of  his  own  attitude,  while  yet  free  from  the  emotional  stress  under 
which  a  few  months  later  he  viewed  the  political  situation:  "Public  affairs 
cause  me  great  anxiety.  I  am  well-disposed  to  Curio.  I  want  Caesar  to 
take  the  right  course.  I  am  equal  to  dying  for  Pompey;  but  still  nothing 
is  dearer  to  me  than  the  repubhc  itself,  in  which  you  are  not  particularly 
active,  for  you  seem  to  me  to  be  embarrassed  by  being  at  once  a  good  citizen 
and  a  good  friend"  {F.,  2,  15,  3;  50  B.  C).  An  incidental  remark  to  Plan- 
cus  (F.,  10,  5,  i)  is  not  without  psychological  interest  in  this  connection: 
"Love  of  country  is  in  my  opinion  the  supreme  consideration,  but  affection 
and  personal  attachment  surely  come  closer  to  the  heart "  (plus  certe  habet 
simvitatis). 

We  have  met  the  principle  that  services  are  a  ground  for  friendship. 
This  brings  gratitude  and  friendship  into  such  close  connection  that  they 
must  almost  necessarily  be  treated  together,  especially  as  the  two  concep- 
tions are  so  fused  in  the  case  of  the  relations  of  Cicero  and  Pompey,  the 
most  conspicuous  instance  of  friendship  as  a  motive  in  the  correspondence 
which  we  are  studying. 

The  recipient  of  services  from  another  is  under  solemn  obligation  both 


SOCIAL  GOOD  55 

to  feel  thankful  and  to  render  in  return  similar  services  as  occasion  may 
offer.  This  principle  is  often  expressed  as  a  general  proposition  and  in 
concrete  instances  as  well  where  the  writer  has  been  the  beneficiary  as 
where  he  has  conferred  the  favor.  A  particularly  disinterested  profession 
of  gratitude  is  where  Cicero  tells  Terentia  of  kindness  received  while  jour- 
neying into  exile:  "I  remained  in  Brundisium  thirteen  days  at  the  house 
of  M.  Laenius  Flaccus,  a  most  excellent  man,  who  out  of  consideration  for 
my  welfare  disregarded  the  peril  to  his  own  fortimes  and  person  and  was 
not,  by  the  penalty  threatened  by  an  execrable  law,  deterred  from  proffering 
the  rights  and  offices  of  hospitality  and  friendship.  I  hope  I  may  be  able 
sometime  to  show  my  gratitude.  Certainly  I  shall  always  feel  it"  (F.,  14, 
4,  2).  The  letters  to  Lentulus  (F.,  i,  1-9  )  abound  in  expressions  of  grate- 
ful appreciation  for  personal  services.  He  may  meet  the  standards  of 
others  in  showing  devotion  to  Lentulus;  his  own  he  never  meets.  Lentulus 
never  ceased  efforts  in  his  behalf  until  the  desired  good  was  reached.  Noth- 
ing short  of  similar  success  in  Lentulus'  behalf  will  pay  the  debt  (F.,  i,  i, 
i;  cf.  I,  4,  3;  I,  5,  i).  Gratitude  to  the  state  for  his  recall  imposes  new 
obligations  beyond  the  common  duty  of  a  citizen  {F.,  i,  9,  4).  Even  the 
debt  of  the  Roman  world  to  Greece  for  the  arts  of  civihzation  should  win 
for  that  land  particularly  considerate  treatment  from  its  governor  (Q.  F., 

1,  I,  27). 

Cicero  expected  others  to  show,  in  view  of  his  services,  the  same  grati- 
tude which  he  professed  toward  others.  In  writing  to  his  former  colleague 
in  the  consulship,  he  frankly  urges  services  rendered  as  the  reason  why  his 
requests  should  be  heeded  (-^-,5,5,3);  though  on  another  occasion  he  did 
acknowledge  that  to  a  modest  man  it  is  embarrassing  to  ask  a  favor  of  one 
to  whom  he  is  under  obligation  (F.,  2,  6,  i).  While  gratitude  in  others  is 
commended  (cf.  F.,  5,  11,  i;  10,  19,  i),  nothing  is  more  indignantly  denoun- 
ced than  ingratitude.  It  is  a  vice  which  includes  all  possible  evil  (in  quo 
vitio  nihil  mali  non  est,  A.,  8,  4,  2).  He  feels  more  bitter  over  the  opposition 
of  Bursa  than  that  of  Clodius,  because  he  had  defended  the  former  (F.,  7, 

2,  3).  The  commonwealth  collectively  may  be  guilty  of  ingratitude.  After 
the  period  of  the  exile,  Cicero  felt  that  Rome  had  been  ungrateful  to  him, 
notwithstanding  the  recall  (F.,  7.  32,  3;  i,  9,  5).  *'It  is  the  characteristic 
of  a  people  in  general,  and  particularly  of  ours,  to  abuse  their  liberty  most 
of  all  in  dealing  with  the  man  through  whom  they  have  gained  it"  {F.,  11, 
12,  2).     This  sounds  like  the  traditional  ingratitude  of  repubUcs. 

In  cases  where  it  is  the  reputation  for  ingratitude  rather  than  the  ingrati- 
tude itself  which  is  presented  as  the  object  of  dread  (Q.  F.,  2,  4,  i,  and  fre- 
quently in  the  case  of  Pompey),  we  have  simply  the  recognition  of  society's 


56  MORAL   VALUES   IN   CICERO'S   LETTERS 

estimate  of  the  vice.  When  in  letters  of  recommendation  the  gratitude  of 
the  beneficiary  is  emphasized  (F.,  13,  65,  2,  and  frequently  in  13),  the  sug- 
gestion is  practical  rather  than  ethical.  Favors  granted  a  man  of  grateful 
disposition  will  prove  a  good  investment. 

It  has  been  intimated  that  the  most  significant  group  of  judgments 
regarding  the  weight  of  friendship  and  gratitude  as  motives  are  con- 
nected with  Cicero's  attitude  to  Pompey  when  hostilities  broke  out  in  49. 
A  notice  of  the  phases  of  Cicero's  personal  relations  with  Pompey,  as 
reflected  in  the  correspondence  prior  to  this  crisis,  will  make  more 
intelligible  the  group  of  statements  in  question. 

We  clearly  have  here  not  a  relation,  like  that  with  Atticus,  based  prima- 
rily on  personal  fellowship.  Mutual  services  are  mentioned  as  a  promi- 
nent ground  of  the  connection.  Personal  and  political  expediency  are 
reasons  for  its  cultivation,  and  yet  the  terms  of  personal  attachment  are 
freely  apphed.  A  letter  to  Pompey  in  the  year  after  Cicero's  consulship 
illustrates  several  of  these  points.  He  remonstrates  with  Pompey  because 
his  public  letters  do  not  contain  clearer  expressions  of  regard  for  himself. 
Pompey  is  hardly  making  adequate  return  for  what  Cicero  has  done  for 
him,  yet  the  writer  is  content  to  let  the  balance  remain  on  his  side.  Public 
policy  should  unite  them,  if  gratitude  does  not.  Cicero's  consulship  is  so 
generally  approved  that  when  Pompey  returns  he  will  be  content  to  take 
the  place  of  an  Africanus,  accepting  Cicero  as  his  Laelius,  bound  by  both 
political  and  personal  ties  (F.,  5,  7,  2-5;  April,  62).  As  Pompey  should 
cultivate  Cicero's  friendship  from  considerations  of  state,  if  for  no  other 
reason,  so  Cicero  claims  that  in  seeking  his  intimacy  he  is  moved  by  the 
consideration  that  disagreement  between  them  would  lead  to  public  dis- 
sensions. He  will  not  forsake  his  own  political  principles,  and  perhaps  he 
can  check  Pompey 's  popular  tendencies  {A.,  2,  i,  6).  That  a  desire  for 
personal  protection  from  enemies  was  an  element  in  his  motive  for  culti- 
vating Pompey  he  acknowledged:  "Since  those  who  have  no  power  reject 
my  friendship,  I  will  seek  to  win  the  regard  of  those  who  have  power" 
(A.,  4,  5,  2). 

There  were,  from  Cicero's  point  of  view,  at  least  two  unquestioned 
grounds  of  antagonism  toward  Pompey.  Pompey  was  reserved  and  secretive, 
so  that  Cicero  hardly  ever  felt  confident  that  he  knew  h  is  real  sentiments :  e.g., 
Pompey  has  urgently  remonstrated  with  Clodius,  "as  he  himself  informs 
me,  I  have  no  other  witness  "(^.,2,22,2);  and,"  I  still  think  Pompey  is  sham- 
ming" (Q.  F.,  1, 3,9;  cf.  A.,4, 15,  7).  Evidently  others  shared  in  this  opinion 
of  the  great  man's  lack  of  openness,  for  Cselius  asks  Cicero  (F.,  8,  i,  3) 
to  find  out  and  report  Pompey 's  ostensible  and  his  real  design,  adding,  "for 


SOCIAL  GOOD  57 

he  usually  says  one  thing  and  thinks  another,  but  has  not  the  ability  to  con- 
ceal what  he  desires."  The  second  ground  of  hostility  was  Pompey's  asso- 
ciation with  Caesar  in  a  plot  to  repress  the  poHtical  activity  of  the  citizens  of 
the  Roman  republic.  It  is  to  the  period  immediately  following  this  bargain 
with  Caesar  that  the  rather  unfriendly  nicknames  are  applied  to  Pompey, 
as  "Epicrates"  (^4.,  2,  3,  i),  ''Sampsiceramus"  (A.j  2,  14,  i;  2,  23,  i),  and 
"Arabarches"  {A.,  2,  17,  3).  The  hostility  of  this  same  period  is  reflected 
in  the  remarks  that,  however  it  may  be  in  town,  the  country  cannot  endure 
tyranny,  and  that  the  name  of  ''Magnus"  is  growing  stale  {A.,  2,  13,  2). 

Despite  all  this,  we  find,  even  mingled  with  the  bitterest  complaints, 
expressions  of  personal  regard  for  Pompey.  Cicero  is  filled  with  grief  at 
the  humiliation  of  the  man  who  used  to  be  his  ideal  {nostri  amores) .  Friend- 
ship keeps  him  from  fighting  a  cause  which  he  could  not  oppose  without 
belying  all  his  past  {A.,  2,  19,  2).  Popular  demonstrations  against  Pompey 
move  him  to  tears.  His  fall  from  the  heights  seems  rather  the  result  of 
mischance  than  of  deliberate  purpose.  As  Cicero  sees  him  whom  he  has 
in  the  past  painted  in  such  brilliant  colors  now  suddenly  disfigvired,  his  grief 
is  such  as  Apelles  would  feel  at  seeing  his  Venus  befouled  with  mud.  Though 
Pompey's  support  of  ^lodius  might  properly  cancel  his  friendship,  his  affec- 
tion for  him  has  been  such  that  no  wrong  can  blot  it  out  (i4.,  2,  21,  3-4). 
These  expressions  are  significant  as  coming  before  Cicero's  gratitude  was 
awakened  by  Pompey's  part  in  his  recall,  and  as  pointing  to  a  devotion  to 
the  ideal  Pompey,  portrayed,  for  instance,  in  the  speech  for  the  Manilian 
Law.  On  the  other  hand,  we  find  in  a  letter  assigned  to  61,  before  the 
animosities  of  the  tirumvirate,  a  comprehensively  disparaging  reference  to 
**your  friend" — apparently  Pompey,  though  no  name  is  used — who  is 
represented  as  pretending  to  esteem,  love,  and  praise  Cicero,  while  secretly 
envying  him.  There  follows  an  estimate  which  Mr.  TjTrell  aptly  renders: 
"No  courtesy,  nor  candor,  nor  political  highmindedness ;  no  brilliancy, 
resolution,  nor  generosity"  {A.,  i,  13,  4).  If  this  was  Cicero's  deUberate 
judgment  of  Pompey  in  61,  there  seems  little  room  for  personal  regard 
between  them.  Yet  it  is  by  no  means  certain  that  we  have  here  a  dehberate 
characterization.  It  opens  with  the  charge  of  insincerity — a  blemish  which 
we  have  found  frequently  ascribed  to  Pompey.  The  rest  may  be  an  exag- 
gerated and  rhetorical  outburst,  springing  from  a  mood  of  impatience  at 
what  the  writer  felt  was  duplicity  on  the  part  of  Pompey. 

At  the  time  of  his  exile  Cicero  naturally  felt  that  Pompey  had  abandoned 
him  {Q.  F.,  i,  4,  4,  dejectfo  Pompei),  yet  after  some  wavering^  we  find  him 

I  "Planus  sum  expectatione  de  Pompeio,  quaenam  de  nobis  velit  aid  ostendaV 
{A.,  3,  14,  i). 


58  MORAL   VALUES   IN   CICERO'S   LETTERS 

placing  his  chief  reliance  in  the  good-will  of  Pompey.^  As  soon  as  the 
recall  was  made  effective,  we  find  rather  surprising  readiness  on  Cicero's 
part  to  enter  into  confidential  relations  with  Pompey  (e.  g.,  A.,  4,  i,  6-7; 
F.,  I,  I,  2) ;  yet  the  old  grounds  of  suspicion  and  resentment  persisted  (e.  g., 
F.,  I,  sb,  2;Q.F.,s,  i,  15)- 

In  the  summer  of  51  occurred  an  incident  which  seems  to  have  had  most 
important  effect  on  the  personal  attitude  of  our  author  toward  the  triumvir. 
On  his  way  to  Cilicia,  Cicero  had  an  interview  of  several  days  with  Pompey 
at  Tarentum.  As  he  was  uncertain  whether  Atticus  was  still  at  Rome,  the 
account  of  the  conference  written  to  this  friend  is  brief  (A.,  5,  6,  1-2).  To 
Caelius  he  wrote  more  in  detail:  ''I  spent  several  days  with  Pompey  in 
conversation  limited  to  the  political  situation.  What  was  said  neither 
can  nor  ought  to  be  reported.  Only  be  assured  that  Pompey  is  an  admir- 
able citizen  (civem  egregium),  and  is  prepared  both  in  disposition  and  in 
understanding  to  take  the  precautions  which  the  public  welfare  demands. 
Therefore  devote  yourself  to  the  man ;  believe  me,  he  will  receive  you  warmly. 
Now  his  views  as  to  who  are  good  and  who  bad  citizens  are  the  same  as  we 
are  wont  to  hold"  (F.,  2,  8,  2).  It  would  be  most  interesting  if  we  could 
know  more  of  the  content  of  those  days  of  converse.  It  is,  however,  easy 
to  see  how  such  a  conference  would  operate  to  break  down  the  two  great 
barriers  which  had  separated  these  men.  Pompey  had  impressed  Cicero 
as  frankly  and  minutely  communicating  his  political  sentiments.  So,  while 
freeing  himself  from  the  charge  of  secret! veness,  he  had  likewise  shown 
that  he  was  the  friend,  not  the  foe,  of  the  aristocratic  party.  Hence  it  can 
be  no  mere  coincidence  that  from  this  time  we  find  in  the  letters  warm 
expressions  of  gratitude  and  personal  devotion.  Delightful  fellowship  and 
tokens  of  affection,  especially  frankness  in  communicating  everything,  are 
assigned,  along  with  gratitude,  as  reasons  for  devotion  to  Pompey  (F.,  3, 
10,  10).  True,  Cicero  is  here  writing  a  conciliatory  letter  to  a  kinsman  of 
Pompey's,  but  at  about  the  same  time  he  wrote  to  Atticus  of  Pompey  as  one 
whom  he  esteems  more  highly  every  day  {quem  mihi  plus  plusque  in  dies 
dUigo,  A.,  6,  2,  10).  The  earlier  charge  of  insincerity  he  definitely  retracts 
{A.,  6,  I,  11),  and  not  long  after  he  wrote  to  Caelius  (F.,  2,  15,  3)  that  he 
would  die  for  Pompey — a  statement  repeated  and  emphasized  in  the  follow- 
ing months. 

The  political  considerations  which  contributed  to  Cicero's  perplexity 
in  49  and  48  will  be  examined  later.  We  shall  see  that,  when  the  issue  was 
joined  between  Caesar  and  Pompey,  the  possibihty  of  supporting  the  former 
was  never  seriously  considered.     The  issue  was  between  neutrality  and 

I  "Id  erit  firmum  si  Pompei  voluntas  erit"  (F.,  14,  2,  2;   cf.  A.,  3,  22,  2). 


SOCIAL  GOOD  59 

more  or  less  active  support  of  Pompey.  The  vital  question  was  whether 
personal  obligation  to  Pompey,  reinforced  by  the  opinion  of  the  optimates, 
required  him  to  support,  at  personal  risk,  a  cause  the  success  of  which  would 
be  scarcely  less  disastrous  to  the  Roman  people  than  would  the  triumph 
of  Caesar  himself. 

Sometimes  the  personal  relation  is  explicitly  defined  as  gratitude;  again 
the  general  terms  of  friendship  are  employed,  with  or  without  a  context 
indicating  that  the  friendship  is  based  on  services.  Friendship  and  grati- 
tude are  clearly  co-ordinated  when  he  says:  "The  eminent  services  of  Pom- 
pey directed  to  my  welfare  and  the  intimacy  existing  between  us,  as  well 
as  the  very  interests  of  the  commonwealth,  bring  me  to  the  belief  that  my 
policy  or  my  fortune  should  be  united  with  his"  (^.,  8,  3,  2).  It  is  by  his 
duty  as  a  friend  {amici  officio)  that  Cicero  is  constrained,  in  spite  of  the 
interests  of  his  children  and  his  disapproval  of  Pompey's  policy  {A.,  7, 12,  3). 
The  three  reasons  for  considering  such  an  extremity  as  abandoning  Italy 
were  "the  friendship  of  Gnaeus,  the  cause  of  the  optimates,  and  the  disgrace 
of  joining  a  tyrant"  {A.,  7,  20,  2).  Pompey  himself  is  assured  that  in 
Cicero  he  will  never  find  lacking  the  spirit  of  a  friend  {A.,  8,  iiD,  8).  Yet^ 
when  exasperated  at  the  abandonment  of  Italy,  Cicero  refers  his  devotion 
to  the  Pompey  of  the  past  or  of  his  dreams  (^4.,  8,  7,  2).  But  the  feeling 
that  he  was  under  obligation  to  stand  by  Pompey,  even  in  the  face  of  con- 
flicting duties,  will  not  down.  "I  see  how  great  and  how  pernicious  this 
war  will  be.  But  one  man  moves  me;  the  companion  of  whose  flight  and 
the  partner  in  whose  attempt  to  restore  the  constitution  I  think  I  ought  to 
be"  (videor  esse  debere,  A.,  8,  14,  2).  To  Pompey  personally  he  owes  a 
debt,  enhanced  by  the  theoretical  soundness  of  his  cause — a  debt  which 
neither  the  interests  of  Quintus  nor  the  wretchedness  of  Pompey's  policy 
can  neutralize.^ 

From  first  to  last,  during  the  period  under  consideration,  gratitude 
specifically  and  emphatically  is  presented  as  giving  validity  to  this  debt. 
T>T3ical  examples  are:  "Pompey  alone  influences  me,  and  by  kindness 
done,  not  by  weight  of  influence"  {heneficio  nan  auctoritate,  A.,  8,  i,  4). 
In  accordance  with  the  advice  of  Atticus,  he  has  cultivated  Pompey  on 
account  of  the  valuable  services  which  he  had  rendered  (quia  de  me  erat 
optume  meritus,  A.,  y,  1,  2);  "I  am  influenced  by  his  services,  not  hjs  cause" 
{Beneftrcium  sequor  ....  non  causam,  A.,  W7^  z)'^  "These  services,  I 
think,  should  be  paid  for  with  my  hfe  as  the  price"  {haec  officia  mercanda 
vita  sunt.  A.,  9,  5,  3). 

I  "Dabimus  hoc  Pompeio,  quod  debemus  ....  Uni,  uni  hoc  damus"  {A., 
9>  i»  4)- 


6o  MORAL  VALUES  IN  CICERO'S  LETTERS 

Atticus  suggests  that  the  apparent  obligation  is  based  rather  on  Cicero's 
proclamation  of  the  services  than  on  the  services  themselves,  and  Cicero 
assents  (A.,  g,  13,  3).  This  goes  beyond  the  simple  relation  between  man 
and  man  created  by  the  services,  and  recognizes  the  social  pressure  to  con- 
form to  the  standards  of  gratitude  in  the  minds  of  others.  This  aim  for 
the  reputation  of  being  grateful,  which  we  have  noticed  before,  has  in  the 
letters  of  the  period  very  definite  illustration:  *'I  shudder  at  the  charge 
of  an  ungrateful  spirit."  This  and  not  fear  of  any  vengeance  at  the  hands 
of  Pompey  is  his  motive  (A.,  9,  2a,  2):  "I  do  not  dare  incur  the  charge  of 
ingratitude"  (-4.,  9,  7,  4).  An  even  clearer  recognition  of  the  opinion  of 
people  in  general  is  a  passage  (A.,  9,  19,  2)  where,  speaking  in  rather  dis- 
paraging terms  of  the  obligation  to  Pompey,  Cicero  expresses  an  impatient 
resolution  to  follow  him  out  of  Italy,  not  with  any  hope  of  helping  the  repub- 
lic, but  simply  ''lest  someone  may  think  me  ungrateful  to  him." 

Whatever  were  Cicero's  real  feelings  for  Pompey,  he  certainly  professed 
to  be  moved  by  friendship  as  well  as  by  gratitude.  Hence,  so  far  as  pro- 
fessed motive  is  concerned,  we  are  justified  in  applying  the  term  "grateful 
friendship  "  to  the  motives  in  question.  If  we  should  conclude  that  Cicero 
was  really  without  personal  attachment  for  Pompey,  then  it  would  follow 
that  gratitude  alone,  and  not  grateful  friendship,  was  Cicero's  real  reason 
for  giving  such  prominence  to  Pompey's  welfare  and  the  obligation  due 
him.  To  the  writer  it  does  not  seem  possible  entirely  to  eliminate  the  ele- 
ment of  personal  attachment  from  this  relation,  however  great  were  the 
obstacles  to  friendship  in  the  fullest  sense. 

The  rank  of  grateful  friendship  as  a  motive  is  effectively  brought  out  by 
the  arguments  in  which  Cicero  maintains  now  this  and  now  that  side  of  the 
question  at  issue,  thus  revealing  the  process  by  which  he  arrives  at  his  con- 
clusion (cf.  A.,  8.  14,  2).  The  obHgation  to  give  Pompey  active  support 
is  weakened  by  his  support  of  the  adoption  of  Clodius,  by  the  tardiness  of 
his  defense  of  Cicero,  and  by  a  long  list  of  political  blunders,  or  worse, 
which  contributed  to  the  final  crisis  (^.,  8,  3,  3 ;  cf.  9,  5,  2).  But  in  view  of 
the  plots  against  Pompey's  life,  these  personal  grounds  of  resentment  are 
forgotten,  and  his  services  are  remembered.  Achilles  was  willing  to  die 
with  his  friend,  but  Pompey  has  been  benefactor  as  well  (A.,  9,  5,  3).  He 
regrets  not  being  with  Pompey,  whatever  his  poHcy  has  been  (A.,  9,  6,  4). 
He  pardons  past  dehnquencies  and  wishes  gratitude  for  service  to  blot  out 
their  memory  (A.,  9,  9,  i).  The  abandonment  of  Rome  and  then  of  Italy 
impressed  Cicero  as  a  wretched  and  shameful  act.  The  noble  thing  would 
be  to  die  in  defense  of  the  fatherland  {A.,  8,  2,  2);  nevertheless  to  gratitude 
is  assigned  sufficient  weight  to  modify  the  judgment  of  what  under  the 


SOCIAL  GOOD  6 1 

circumstances  is  for  him  the  proper  course.*  Is  one  under  obligation  to 
share  the  peril  of  friends  and  benefactors,  when  not  approving  of  their 
policy  (A.,  9,  4,  2)  ?  This  question  becomes  more  urgent  in  view  of  the 
consideration  that  Pompey  plans  a  Sullan  despotism  (A.,  9,  7,  3).  Cicero 
desires  to  fulfil  the  obligations  of  gratitude,  but  he  professes  to  recoil  from 
taking  part  in  a  baleful  war  against  Italy  (A.,  9,  13,  3).  The  issue  seems 
definitely  joined  between  gratitude  and  patriotism.  It  is  probably  in  view 
of  this  issue  that  Cicero  declares  that  he  never  desired  to  be  partner  in  Pom- 
pey's  victory,  but  would  prefer  to  share  his  defeat  (^.,  9,  12,  4).  But  the 
issue  is  resolutely  faced.  Pompey  and  Caesar  alike  threaten  Italy.  Apart 
from  the  consideration  of  gratitude,  right  would  prompt  the  endurance  of 
any  fate  at  home,  but  gratitude  turns  the  scale  {A.j  9,  7,  4).  Others  are 
justified  in  observing  strict  neutrality.  His  case,  however,  is  different; 
obligation  constrains  him,  and  he  cannot  be  ungrateful  (^4.,  10,  7,  i).  The 
context  shows  that  here  some  progress  has  been  made  in  harmonizing  duty 
to  state  and  to  friend,  for  he  hopes  to  discharge  his  debt  to  Ponapey  without 
engaging  actively  in  civil  war.  He  will  show  his  disapproval  of  Caesar  by 
withdrawing  from  Italy  to  some  retired  spot. 

When  Cicero  comes  to  wTite  directly  to  Caesar  a  letter  which  is  evidently 
intended  to  be  most  conciliatory,  this  debt  of  gratitude  to  Caesar's  enemy 
is  emphasized  as  a  reason  why  the  writer  should  be  permitted  to  retain  an 
independent  position.  ''I  beg  and  entreat  ....  that  by  your  generosity 
I  may  be  a  man,  good,  grateful,  loyal  in  fact,  in  view  of  the  memory  of  a 
great  kindness."  Cicero  has  shown  gratitude  to  Caesar;  Caesar  recognizes 
and  appreciates  the  quality;  hence  he  should  be  willing  that  the  same  grati- 
tude be  shown  to  Pompey  {A.,  9,  11  A,  3).  That  Cicero  should  expect  such 
a  plea  to  conciliate  rather  than  irritate  shows  that  he  assumes  Caesar  to 
cherish  so  high  an  estimate  of  gratitude  in  the  abstract  that  he  will  be 
moved  to  honor  it,  though  its  object  is  his  bitterest  enemy.  This  only 
reinforces  the  impression  which  the  references  to  gratitude  as  a  whole  make 
— that  we  have  here  a  motive  recognized  as  of  the  very  highest  dignity,  one 
which  may  maintain  its  effectiveness  even  in  the  presence  of  such  motives 
as  the  welfare  of  fellow-citizens  and  the  duty  to  fatherland.  This,  as  we 
may  remind  ourselves,  remains  true  apart  from  the  genuineness  of  the  par- 
ticular feelings  which  were  the  occasion  of  the  statements  in  question.  Still, 
with  regard  to  the  genuineness  of  these  feelings  it  is  pertinent  that  when 
the  victorious  chief  in  a  personal  interview  strove  to  win  Cicero's  active 

^  "Itaque  mihi  dubitanti  quid  me  facere  par  sit  permagnum  pondus  adfert 
benevolentia  erga  ilium,  qua  dempta  perire  melius  esset  in  patria  quam  patriam  ser- 
vando  evertere"  (A.,  9,  9,  2). 


> 


62 

support,  the  latter  stoutly  maintained  that,  if  he  should  come  into  the 
senate,  he  must  give  full  expression  to  his  sympathy  with  Gnaeus.  This,  of 
course,  would  be  impracticable,  so  what  must  have  been  tremendous  pres- 
sure was  resisted,  and  Caesar  was  denied  the  support  that  he  sought  (A.,  9, 
18,  i),  Cicero's  withdrawal  from  Italy,  and  his  active  or  passive  resistance 
to  the  dictator  until  the  death  of  Pompey,  were  a  natural  sequel,  quite  con- 
sistent with  what  he  had  declared  to  be  his  duty.  And  after  the  struggle 
was  over,  Cicero,  notwithstanding  the  disagreements  of  the  eastern  cam- 
paign, wrote  as  his  final  estimate  of  Pompey:  ''I  cannot  fail  to  grieve  over 
his  fate,  for  I  have  known  him  for  a  man  of  uprightness,  purity,  and  worth" 
{A.,  II,  6,  5). 

III.    THE   STATE 

The  state  has  incidentally  appeared  as  a  source  of  motive  in  connection 
with  several  earlier  topics.  Some  material  of  especial  value  from  more 
than  one  point  of  view  will  be  reintroduced  at  the  risk  of  apparent  repeti- 
tion. Some  classes  of  passages  may  be  passed  with  slight  notice  as  having 
been  already  sufficiently  examined. 

Official  position  and  the  consequent  prestige  have  been  considered  as 
expressions  of  the  opinion  of  others.  They  are  likewise  elements  of  the 
value  which  the  state  has  for  the  citizen.  The  republic  as  a  political  sys- 
tem, offering  opportunity  to  the  citizen  for  varied  public  activity,  has  been 
shown  to  have  been  for  Cicero  a  highly  prized  good  (e.  g.,  Q.  F.,  3,  5,  3-4). 
He  was  thinking  of  the  state  as  in  this  sense  a  good,  when  he  sought  to  com- 
fort a  friend  for  the  loss  of  a  son  by  reminding  him  of  the  condition  of  the 
state.  It  is  not  a  great  evil  to  be  snatched  away  from  a  commonwealth 
that  gives  no  place  for  the  display  of  talents  and  virtues  (F.,  5,  16,  3-4). 
Exiles  too  were  assured  that  their  condition  was  no  worse  than  that  of  those 
at  Rome  in  the  evil  time  of  repression  (e.  g.,  F.,  4,  8,  2).  The  keenness 
with  which  Cicero  felt  the  loss  of  opportunities  for  political  activity  has 
also  appeared  in  connection  with  the  solace  which  he  sought  in  literature 
and  family  life  (e.  g.,  F.,  6,  12,  5;  4,  3,  4;  4,  6,  2). 

The  relative  rank  of  the  welfare  of  country,  considered  as  something 
more  than  the  mere  satisfaction  derived  from  political  relations,  has  appeared 
incidentally  in  connection  with  the  evaluation  of  other  motives.  Thus  we 
have  seen  grateful  friendship  alone  frankly  conceded  a  rank  approaching 
parity  with  public  welfare ;  for  even  at  the  period  when  personal  safety  was 
given  greatest  relative  weight  the  claim  was  made  that  the  course  prompted 
by  prudence  was  also  for  the  welfare  of  the  republic  (F.,  i,  9,  12). 

We  have  already  traced  chronologically  the  rank  assigned  to  personal 
safety  as  compared  with  other  motives,  especially  welfare  of  the  state  (pp. 


SOCIAL  GOOD  63 

12  ff.).  In  general,  these  two  motives  are  emphasized  in  an  inverse  ratio. 
For  example,  in  spite  of  expressions  of  gratitude  to  the  state  for  recall 
from  exile  (F.,  i,  9,  4),  fear  for  personal  safety  and  resentment  at  his 
abandonment  by  the  senatorial  party,  which  Cicero  almost  identified  with 
the  state,  cooled  patriotic  ardor  (F.,  i,  9,  5),  even  prompting  such  an 
expression  of  disgust  and  indifference  as  A.,  4,  18,  2.  Here  he  says,  in 
effect,  that  he  does  not  trouble  himself  about  the  wreck  of  the  aristocratic 
state,  when  he  reflects  how  smoothly  the  ship  sailed  while  he  was  at  the 
helm,  and  then  considers  what  sort  of  recompense  has  been  rendered  him 
— a  tone  scarcely  paralled  in  the  entire  correspondence.  In  51  and  50 
Cicero  was  absorbed  in  showing  what  provincial  administrations  should  be 
like.  With  49  came  the  period  of  suspense,  which  has  given  us  an  exceed- 
ingly comprehensive,  and  at  the  same  time  homogeneous,  body  of  refer- 
ences to  partiotism  as  a  motive.  The  triumph  of  Caesar  is  followed  by  calm 
but  earnest  expressions  of  grief  at  the  downfall  of  the  state,  as:  "I  have 
now  mourned  for  my  country  longer  and  more  grievously  than  any  mother 
for  her  only  son"  (F.,  9,  20,  3) ;  and  the  remark  that  it  is  a  question  whether 
to  live  is  a  gain,  if  a  man  is  to  survive  his  country  {F.,  9,  17,  i).  Then, 
after  the  brief  delusion  that  the  death  of  Caesar  meant  the  restoration  of  the 
constitution,  there  comes  the  discovery  that  "tyranny  lives,  it  was  the  tyrant 
[only]  who  fell"  (A.j  14,  9,  2).  How  after  a  brief  period  of  uncertainty  he 
decided,  from  considerations  of  personal  and  family  welfare  (A.,  14,  13,  4), 
to  visit  Greece  (^4.,  16,  6,  2) ;  and  how  at  the  coincident  summons  of  public 
opinion  and  public  welfare  {me  desiderari,  subaccusari,  A.,  16,  7,  i)  he 
returned  to  Rome,  throwing  himself  unreservedly  into  the  final  struggle 
wnth  Antony,  we  have  already  seen  (pp.  14  and  28).  The  last  fifteen 
months  of  the  correspondence  is  the  period  of  most  frequent  reference  to 
patriotism  as  a  motive ;  yet  the  letters  are  perhaps  second  in  interest  to  those 
of  49,  as  being  the  uniform  professions  and  exhortations  of  a  man  who  is 
fully  decided  regarding  his  own  course,  and  who  only  wishes  to  persuade 
others  to  act  with  him. 

Enough  has  been  said  to  explain  the  method  to  be  followed  in  presenting 
this  topic.  Aspects  already  incidentally  treated  need  not  be  examined 
again  in  detail.  In  the  presentation  of  what  is  characteristic  in  Cicero's 
professed  doctrine  of  the  place  which  the  welfare  of  the  state  should  hold 
as  a  motive,  use  will  be  made  primarily  of  the  letters  of  49  and  48,  illustrated 
and  supplemented  by  material  from  the  other  years,  especially  44  and  43. 

The  political  unit  is  variously  designated.  It  is  fatherland  (patria)  and 
parent,  calling  for  filial  piety  (A.,  9,  9,  2 ;  10,  4,  4).     It  is  civitas,  the  coUec- 


64  MORAL   VALUES   IN   CICERO 'S   LETTERS 

tive  body  of  citizens  (^.,8,11,2).  Again  it  is  the  citizens  (cives) ,  considered 
concretely,  whose  welfare  is  to  be  sought  (F.,  9,  24,  4).  It  is  this  city, 
of  which  Cicero  has  been  called  preserver  and  father,  and  Italy,  that  is 
in  danger  of  famine  and  devastation  (A.,  9,  10,  3).  Pompey  nominally 
represents  the  Roman  people  (A.,  10,  7,  i).  Res  puhlica,  a  more  ambigu- 
ous term,  is  used  with  great  frequency  and  with  a  considerable  range  of 
meaning.  It  is  used  in  the  literal  sense  of  common  welfare,  as  where 
Caesar  is  assured  that  it  concerns  his  honor  and  the  public  good  to  leave 
Cicero  in  an  independent  position  {A.,  9,  11  A,  3).  The  term  res  puhlica 
is  also  without  question  freely  used  of  the  commonwealth,  the  fatherland. 
Cicero  asks  advice  as  to  where  he  can  be  of  most  service  to  the  republic 
(plurimum  prodesse  rei  publicae,  A.,S,  12,  4).  Expressions  are  used  which 
seem  to  imply  much  the  same  personification  as  in  the  case  of  patria;  for 
example,  when  reference  is  made  to  the  prestige  and  safety  of  the  common- 
wealth {res  puhlica,  F.,  6,  21,  i),  or  the  commonwealth  is  spoken  of  as  the 
object  of  duty  {F.,  6,  i,  3),  service  {F.,  10,  5,  2),  and  affection  {F.,  2,  15,  3). 
In  other  cases  res  puhlica  must  mean  the  constitution,  or  a  republican  con- 
stitutional government,  as  where  the  prediction  is  made  that  if  either  Caesar 
or  Pompey  survives  there  will  be  no  res  puhlica  (^.,9,  7,  i),  or  where  Cicero 
writes  to  his  brother  that  there  is  (in  54)  no  res  puhlica,  adding,  apparently 
by  way  of  amplification,  "no  senate,  no  courts,  no  political  standing  for 
any  of  us"  (Q.  F.,  3,  4,  i;  cf.  A.,  4,  18,  2;  Q.  F.,  3,  5,  4).  These  three 
typical  meanings — public  welfare,  commonwealth,  constitution — are  cer- 
tain; but  in  practice  there  is  such  blending  and  fusion  that  certain  classifica- 
tion is  difficult,  if  not  impossible ;  yet  the  very  fact  that  doubtless  contributed 
largely  to  this  ambiguity  diminishes  its  practical  importance;  for  to  Cicero 
the  Roman  state  was  almost  identified  with  the  constitution  of  the  aristo- 
cratic republic,  and  the  preservation  or  restoration  of  that  constitution  was 
the  chief  element  of  common  welfare  for  which  the  citizens  could  strive. 

Cicero  distinctly  recognizes  the  fact  that  by  virtue  of  a  man's  connection 
with  the  political  unit,  however  conceived,  he  enters  a  definite  sphere  of 
motive  and  duty.  For  this  the  most  general  term  is,  ''a  citizen's  duty," 
''a  man's  duty  as  a  citizen,"  civis  officium  (A.,  7,  12,  3;  F.,  9,  16,  5).  An 
ideal  of  political  virtue  is  that  the  state  never  find  lacking  in  one  the  spirit 
of  a  citizen  (civis  animus,  ^4 . ,  8, 1 1 D,  8) .  A  criterion  for  judging  rival  propo- 
sitions is  to  ask  which  is  the  part  of  a  better  citizen  (^.,  9,  6,  7).  As  we 
have  seen,  the  term  ''fatherland"  (patria)  suggests  the  filial  aspect  of  the 
duty  to  one's  country.  It  is  an  impious  crime  to  fail  to  support  one's 
parents,  ''but  our  captains,  in  dealing  with  our  most  venerable  and  inviol- 
able parent,  the  fatherland,  are  planning  to  starve  her  to  death  "  (A.,  9,  9,  2). 


SOCIAL  GOOD  65 

Caesar's  war  upon  his  country  is  called  "parricide"  (A.,  10,  10,  5);  and 
"  parricides  "  was  the  term  for  the  party  of  Antony  in  44  (5.,  i,  15,  5). 

The  content  of  pubhc  duty  in  the  case  of  the  ruler  is  summarized  as 
seeking  the  happiness  of  the  citizens.  This  happiness,  in  defining  which 
Cicero  quotes  from  his  work  De  Re  Puhlica,  upon  which  he  had  recently 
been  engaged,  is  to  include  elements  ranging  all  the  way  from  virtue  down 
to  material  possessions.^  The  course  of  Pompey  as  well  as  that  of  Caesar 
is  tested  by  this  criterion  and  found  wanting.  A  happy  and  virtuous  com- 
munity has  not  been  the  aim  of  either  leader,  but  rather  personal  power, 
dominatio.  On  Pompey's  part  this  is  carried  to  the  point  of  willingness 
to  lead  against  Italy  savage  tribes  in  arms  (^.,  8,  11,  2).  The  welfare  and 
honor  of  the  fatherland  must  not  only  be  an  aim  of  the  public  man,  but  an 
aim  to  which  personal  power  and  private  advantage  must  be  subordinated. 
For  failure  here,  both  Caesar  and  Pompey  are  condemned  as  neither  virtu- 
ous nor  honorable  nor  happy — another  philosophical  touch  which  is  a 
reminiscence  of  Cicero's  De  Re  Puhlica  {A.,  10,  4, 4).  The  picture  which  he 
gives  of  his  own  activity  in  a  letter  to  Paetus  in  43  apparently  embodies  his 
ideal  of  a  citizen's  duty:  "Be  assured,  my  dear  Paetus,  that  night  and  day 
I  do  nothing,  care  for  nothing,  save  that  my  fellow-citizens  be  safe  and  free. 
....  In  short,  my  feeling  is  such  that,  if  the  task  of  directing  this  move- 
ment should  require  the  sacrifice  of  my  life,  I  should  esteem  my  lot  glorious  " 
(F.,  9,  24,  4). 

The  duty  of  the  citizen  is  represented  as  being  modified  by  circumstances. 
The  obligation  may  be  increased  by  the  reception  of  favors  from  the  state. 
Cicero  after  his  recall  thought  he  ought  at  least  {certe)  to  show  the  state  the 
spirit  which  he  had  previously  shown  merely  from  the  ordinary  duty  of  the 
citizen,  without  special  occasion  for  gratitude  (i*'.,  i,  9,  4).  So  the  guilt  of 
Lepidus  in  turning  against  the  senate  was  greater  in  view  of  the  honors  con- 
ferred upon  him  by  that  body  {B.,  i,  12,  i;  i,  18,  2).  On  the  other  had, 
there  were  times  after  the  exile  when  the  ingratitude  of  the  state  seemed  a 
reason  at  least  for  relaxation  of  effort  in  her  behalf;  for  example:  "I  prefer 
to  make  a  bad  voyage  with  someone  else  at  the  helm,  rather  than  to  steer 
successfully  with  such  ungrateful  passengers"  {A.,  2,  9,  3).  Even  in  49 
his  past  services  for  the  state  and  the  hardships  suffered  in  consequence  are 
suggested  as  possibly  purchasing  exemption  from  further  hazard  (A.,  9, 
4,  2).  That  from  which,  in  this  case,  he  wishes  to  be  excused  is  a  struggle 
against  odds;  and  the  hoplessness  of  an  enterprise,  according  to  Cicero,  is, 
and  should  be,  an  important  consideration.     "Will  you  take  the  most 

«  "Beata  civium  vita  .  .  .  .  ut  opibus  firma,  copiis  locuples,  gloria  ampla, 
virtute  honesta  sit"  {A.,  8,  it.  i). 


66  MORAL  VALUES  IN  CICERO'S  LETTERS 

hazardous  action  and  still  be  of  no  service  to  the  republic,  which  you  will 
be  able  to  serve  if  you  remain  ?"  (A.,  9,  10,  5)  was  a  suggestion  which  he 
accepted  as  sound.  He  was  frankly  a  practical  politician  as  distinguished 
from  an  idealist.  Results  rather  than  doctrines  should  determine  the 
action  of  the  citizen.  The  conclusion  that  a  conviction  is  impossible  is  a 
reason  for  relaxing  the  vigor  of  prosecution  (^4.,  i,  16,  2).  The  desirability 
of  preserving  the  harmony  of  the  orders  is  a  reason  for  supporting  the  bad 
case  of  the  equites  against  an  anti-bribing  measure  {A.,  i,  17,  8).  Cato  is 
criticised  as  being  more  honest  than  discreet  in  harassing  the  publicans 
(A.y  I,  18,  7).  Cato  sometimes  with  the  best  of  intentions  injures  public 
interests,  for  he  votes  as  if  in  the  republic  of  Plato  and  not  in  the  Roman 
rabble  {in  Romuli  jaece).  It  is  better  to  purchase  the  support  of  the 
equites  by  concession  than  to  lose  it  (^.,  2,  i,  8).  The  good  cause  makes  it 
necessary  to  side  with  the  publicans  against  the  interests  of  Asia  and  the 
merchants  (.4.,  2,  16,  4).  These  examples  are  from  the  earlier  letters,  but 
the  doctrine  was  strikingly  expressed  as  late  as  45.  Everything  in  Cicero's 
letter  to  Caesar  could,  it  is  claimed,  appropriately  be  written  by  a  most  loyal 
citizen,  "but  by  one  most  loyal  in  such  a  way  as  is  permitted  by  the  times,  con- 
formity to  which  all  political  authorities  enjoin. "'^  The  most  elaborate 
statement  of  the  principle  is  in  the  long  letter  to  Lentulus,  defending  Cicero's 
attitude  toward  the  triumvirs  in  54.  There  is  no  virtue,  he  tells  us,  in 
stubborn  persistence  in  a  policy  when  the  circumstances  have  changed. 
It  is  the  part  of  the  skilful  nagivator  to  give  way  to  the  storm,  even  if  such 
action  temporarily  takes  him  away  from  his  harbor.  It  would  be  foolish 
for  the  sailor  to  incur  peril  in  holding  to  his  original  course  when  he  can 
safely  make  his  harbor  by  a  detour.  So  in  statesmanship  the  goal  should 
always  be  the  same,  peace  with  honor;  but  while  having  this  one  object  in 
view,  it  is  not  necessary  always  to  employ  the  same  terminology  {F.,  i,  9, 
21).  The  distinction  between  the  ultimate  goal  and  the  means  employed 
to  reach  it  could  scarcely  be  more  clearly  stated.  Cicero  insists  that  in 
judging  the  loyalty  of  an  act  the  end  rather  than  the  means  should  be  con- 
sidered. 

Again  and  again  Cicero  asserts  that  nothing  is  dearer  to  him  than  the 
state  (e.  g.,  F.,  2,  15,  3),  even  life  (F.,  7,  28,  3).  The  city — that  is,  his 
fatherland  —  he  loves  {urbem,  id  est  patriam  am^mus,  A,,  9,  6,  2).  His 
anxiety  in  54  is  rather  for  the  general  condition  of  the  commonwealth  than 
for  his  personal  interests  (Q.  F.,  3,  9,  3;  cf.  F.,  10,  i,  i).  It  is  perhaps 
needless  to  continue  the  citation  of  the  numerous  passages  available  to  show 
that  Cicero  habitually  spoke  of  the  state  in  terms  of  affection  and  solicitude. 

I  "Nihil  est  in  ea  nisi  optimi  civis,  sed  ita  optimi,  ut  tempora;    quibus  parere 
omnes  ttoXitikoI  praecipiunt"  (^4,,  12,  51,  2). 


SOCIAL  GOOD  67 

The  advantage  of  the  state  is  frequently  assigned  as  a  motive.  A  rup- 
ture between  Cicero  and  Pompey  would  be  a  very  great  evil  to  the  state 
(A.,  7,  6,  2;  cf.  8,  3,  2).  To  leave  Italy  is  not  expedient  for  the  state  (m 
publicae  utile,  A.,  8,  2,  4).  Caesar's  honor  and  the  public  welfare  require 
that  Cicero  be  left  free  to  work  for  peace  (A.,  9,  iiA,  3).  The  question 
asked  with  all  apparent  earnestness  in  ^.,  8,  12,  4  is:  "What  part  should  I 
take,  and  where  do  you  think  I  shall  be  most  serviceable  to  the  state?" 
{plurimum  prodesse  rei  publicae;  cf.  ^4.,  7,  3,  3).  He  would  most  gladly 
purchase  for  the  republic  immunity  from  peril  at  the  cost  of  personal  dis- 
aster (F.,  2,  16,  4).  A  reason  for  hesitating  to  visit  Greece  in  44  was  given 
thus:  ''I  suspect  there  is  a  possibility  of  my  being  able  to  be  of  use  to  the 
republic"  {A,,  14,  13,  4).  Later  Cicero  speaks  of  the  day  when  he  first 
conceived  the  hope  of  liberty,  and  laid  the  foundations  of  the  republic 
(F.,  12,  25,  2).  ''AH  my  desires,"  he  writes,  "are  for  the  sake  of  the  repub- 
lic" {F.,  10,  19,  2).  It  was  his  love  for  his  country  that  hindered  him  from 
abandoning  it  in  time  of  need  {B.,  i,  15,  5). 

Cicero  appealed  to  others  to  act  from  the  same  patriotic  motives  which 
he  claimed  as  his  own.  A  few  characteristic  appeals  follow:  "Free  the 
republic  forever  from  despotic  rule"  (F.,  11,  5,  3);  "Think  of  the 
republic  and  your  honor"  (F.,  10,  27,  i);  "Come  to  the  rescue  of  the 
fatherland"  (F.,  10,  10,  2);  "So  fly  hither  and  save  the  republic  from 
destruction"  {B.,  i,  10,  4).  If  Brutus  has  any  regard  for  the  republic  for 
which  he  was  born,  he  must  at  once  bring  his  army  to  Italy;  "In  the  name 
of  the  gods,  therefore,  come  to  the  rescue"  {B.,  i,  14,  2).  How  skilfully 
the  love  of  glory  was  made  to  reinforce  the  appeal  of  patriotism  has  been 
shown  (pp.  31,38). 

In  our  author's  statements  of  his  own  motives,  as  well  as  in  his  appeals 
to  others,  the  claim  or  the  implication  is  that  the  welfare  of  the  common- 
wealth should  be  the  decisive  consideration.  How  does  he  apply  this 
principle  to  the  issue  between  Pompey  and  Caesar  ?  If  he  had  admitted 
that  either  chief  represented  the  real  interests  of  the  Roman  people,  con- 
sistency with  his  profession  would  have  compelled  unhesitating  support  of 
the  public  champion;  but  Cicero  uniformly  maintained  that  there  was  no 
such  public  champion.  It  is  worth  while  to  see  just  how  he  defined  the 
position  of  the  two  rivals  with  reference  to  the  public  welfare.  Caesar^s 
cause  is  bad  without  mitigation.  There  is  no  uncertainty  on  this  point. 
Later  we  shall  see  in  greater  detail  how  he  was  the  tyrannus  in  the  fullest 
sense  of  that  odious  word. '  His  power  rested  on  an  utterly  unconstitutional 
basis.  His  supporters  were  those  whom  Cicero  habitually  called  the  bad 
or  base.     His  desperate  course  was  in  keeping  with  his  position  {A.,  10,  4, 


68 

2).  Everything  indicated  that  violence,  cruelty,  and  an  intolerable  despot- 
ism would  follow  his  victory  (e.  g..  A.,  9,  2a,  2;  10,  8,  2;  10,  12,  6).  This  is 
all  very  simple,  and  there  is  never  any  suggestion  that  either  the  personal 
or  the  political  welfare  of  the  Romans  can  be  furthered  by  espousing  the 
cause  of  Caesar. 

Pompey,  however,  stands  in  a  twofold  relation.  He  stands  for  the 
name  of  the  Roman  people  (A.j  10,  7,  i);  his  war  is  not  without  justice; 
it  is  even  necessary  {A.,  10,  4,  3);  the  cause  which  he  represents  is  the  best 
(A.,  9,  7,  4);  that  is,  Pompey  is  technically  the  representative  of  the  con- 
stitutional party.  Cicero,  however,  distinguishes  sharply  between  Pom- 
pey's  professed  political  creed  and  the  results,  actual  or  prospective,  of  his 
campaign.  As  a  leader  he  is  utterly  incompetent  (A.,  7,  13,  1-2;  7,  21,  i 
and  3).  His  victory  would  mean  devastation,  slaughter,  and  proscription 
for  Italy.  The  technically  good  cause  will  be  managed  most  outrageously.' 
He  is  preparing  a  baleful  war  (^.,9,  13,  3),  one  recalling  the  wars  of  Sulla, 
Marius,  and  Cinna ;  a  war  in  which  Goths,  Armenians,  and  Colchians  will 
be  summoned  to  ravage  Italy  (A.,  9,  10,  3;  9,  11,  3).  However  righteous 
Pompey's  cause  may  be  theoretically,  however  disastrous  the  victory  of 
his  rival,  his  own  victory  would  as  truly  be  disastrous  to  his  fellow-citizens 
{A.,  10,  4,  3).  Not  only  would  Pompey's  victory  be  disastrous  to  the  lives 
and  fortunes  of  the  citizens,  but  it  would  involve  the  wreck  of  the  constitu- 
tion, the  destruction  of  all  that  Cicero  and  his  party  stood  for  pohtically, 
the  annihilation  of  the  interests  of  which  Pompey  was  technically  the 
defender.  Men  are  engaged  in  a  combat  for  their  own  supremacy  at  the 
peril  of  the  republic  (^4.,  7,  3,  4).  Each  desires  to  rule  as  king  (^.,  8,  11,  2). 
It  is  no  longer  a  question  of  constitutional  right,  but  a  strife  for  royal  power 
{A,,  10,  7,  i).  This  is  the  ground  of  the  declaration  (A.,  9,  7,  i)  that  the 
survival  of  Pompey  as  well  as  of  Caesar  is  inconsistent  with  the  existence  of 
the  state,  and  that  the  state  is  already  lost  (^.,  9,  5,  2;  cf.  i^.,  4,  i,  i).  To 
recapitulate:  Pompey  is  the  nominal  standard-bearer  of  the  constitutional 
party,  his  cause  being  to  this  extent  ''good;"  but  this  is  offset  by  three  con- 
siderations: he  is  incompetent  as  a  leader,  his  policy  involves  ruthless 
destruction  of  life  and  property,  and,  most  weighty  of  all,  his  ultimate  aim 
is  personal  unconstitutional  power. 

This  antithesis  between  the  theoretical  and  practical  position  of  Pom- 
pey must  constantly  be  kept  in  mind,  if  we  are  to  estimate  correctly  the 
place  given  to  public  welfare  by  Cicero  in  this  entire  discussion.     The 

I  "Causa  igitur  non  bona  est?  Immo  optima,  sed  agetur,  memento,  foedissime. 
Primum  consilium  est  sufFocare  urbem  et  Italiam  fame,  deinde  agros  vastare,  urere, 
pecuniis  locupletum  non  abstinere"  (-4.,  9,  7,  4). 


SOCIAL  GOOD  69 

issue  is  between  active  support  of  Pompey  and  neutrality.  The  theoretical 
Pompey  represents  public  welfare ;  but  when  the  practical  Pompey  is  under 
consideration,  public  welfare  demands  neutrality  rather  than  a  share  in  his 
atrocities.  Thus  public  interests  are  divided,  the  balance  inclining  toward 
neutraUty  {A.,  10,  7,  i);  and  the  field  is  left  comparatively  open  to  such 
motives  as  friendship,  gratitude,  reputation,  and  personal  welfare.  This 
analysis  has  value  quite  apart  from  the  validity  of  Cicero's  estimate  of 
Pompey — quite  apart  from  any  temperamental  or  personal  inclination  of 
Cicero  toward  the  neutral  course. 

Two  specific  elements  of  a  country^s  welfare — peace  as  against  civil 
war,  and  republican  constitutional  government  as  against  arbitrary  rule — 
are  given  such  prominence  among  the  objects  which  the  citizen  should 
choose  that  they  call  for  separate  treatment. 

Mere  frequency  of  reference  indicates  that  peace  was  a  conspicuous 
object  in  Cicero's  thought.  ''Everything  must  be  done  to  prevent  a  clash 
of  arms"  {A.,  7,  6,  2);  "I  never  cease  urging  peace"  (A,  7,  14,  3);  ''I  pre- 
ferred nothing  to  peace  "  (^ .,  8,  i  iD,  7) — these  are  strong  expressions.  Peace, 
even  on  unfavorable  terms,  is  not  to  be  spurned  {F.j  16,  12,  4;  ^.,  7,  18,  i), 
though  there  is  a  degree  of  disgrace  for  which  peace  is  scarcely  a  compensa- 
tion {A.,  7,  18,  2).  There  are  expressions  of  regret  when  hope  of  peace 
recedes  (A.,  7,  20,  i) ;  particularly  when  peace  negotiations  fail  (A.,  9,  13,  8; 
9,  14,  2).  As  long  as  there  is  hope  of  peace  Cicero  will  refrain  from  any 
act  committing  him  to  one  of  the  rivals.  Is  this  due  merely  to  the  caution 
that  studies  to  avoid  needless  danger?  Cicero  himself  presents  another 
and  dififerent  explanation.  All  readers  of  Cicero  know  how  he  prided 
himself  on  his  powers  of  diplomacy  and  conciliation.  The  union  of  the 
orders,  no  less  than  the  crushing  of  Catiline,  was  in  his  eyes  a  glory  of  his 
administration.  We  have  seen  that  he  feared  everything  from  a  victory  of 
Caesar,  and  hoped  for  little  or  nothing  from  a  victory  of  Pompey.  Besides 
the  wrecking  of  the  constitution,  war  meant  slaughter  and  devastation  for 
Italy.  The  lifetime  of  the  state  stretches  beyond  that  of  any  man.  If  the 
clash  can  only  be  postponed  long  enough,  these  individual  disturbers  will 
have  passed  away  and  the  commonwealth  will  stand  unharmed  {A.,  9,  10, 
3).  Does  not  this  situation  present  the  supreme  opportunity  for  the  man 
of  the  toga  to  save  the  state  with  his  own  familiar  arts?  To  leave  Italy 
while  any  hope  of  peace  remained  would  be  finally  to  renounce  this  office 
of  mediator.  His  presencewith  Pompey  will  be  helpful  if  there  shall  be  a 
discussion  of  peace.  ^     When  from  a  letter  of  Caesar's,  as  interpreted  by  a 

^  A.,  8,  2,  4,  has   this   general  force,  whether  we  read,  with  Tyrrell,  projecturus 
from  proficio,  or,  with  Miiller,  promptissimus. 


70  MORAL  VALUES  IN  CICERO'S  LETTERS 

Caesarian,  Cicero  conceived  the  hope  that  his  mediation  would  be  acceptable, 
the  cry  to  Atticus  was:  "  O  that  I  might,  in  this  pitiful  crisis  of  the  common- 
wealth, perform  a  service  worthy  of  a  statesman  "  (.4 .,  9, 1 1 ,  2) !  At  this  time 
a  reply  was  written  to  Caesar  himself,  and  a  copy  sent  to  Atticus  (9, 11  A). 
The  writer  is  not  certain  what  Caesar  meant  by  saying  that  he  desired  to 
enjoy  the  advantages  of  his  favor  and  assistance,  but  hope  has  led  him  to 
the  interpretation  that  Caesar  desires  negotiations  "looking  toward  peace, 
toward  a  settlement,  toward  harmony  among  citizens."  Assuming  this 
to  be  Caesar's  purpose,  the  writer  confidently  offers  himself  as  mediator. 
Both  his  character  (natura)  and  the  part  he  has  played  and  still  maintains 
in  the  state  (persona)  make  him  second  to  none  in  equipment  for  such  an 
office.'  This  is  amplified  by  the  claim  that  both  with  Pompey  and  in  the 
senate  he  has  been  the  consistent  advocate  of  peace,  that  he  has  taken  no 
active  part  in  the  war,  and  that  he  is  the  sympathetic  and  grateful  friend 
alike  of  the  two  leaders.  If,  in  the  interest  of  conciliation,  he  exaggerates 
the  friendliness  of  his  personal  attitude  toward  Caesar  and  his  cause,  the 
fact  does  not  discredit  his  estimate  of  the  desirability  of  peace  or  of  his  own 
fitness  to  act  as  mediator. 

The  strong  expressions  regarding  the  necessity  of  securing  peace  at 
almost  any  sacrifice  suggests  the  question  whether  we  have  here  the  doc- 
trine of  peace  at  any  price,  and  whether  the  attitude  toward  peace  and  war 
here  taken  is  consistent  with  that  taken  by  Cicero  earlier  and  later  in  his 
career. 

It  is  not  so  much  war  as  war  that  he  deprecates,  as  it  is  civil  war  —  war 
between  Roman  citizens.  This  is  suggested  by  the  context  of  at  least  two 
of  the  strongest  passages  already  cited.  After,  '*I  never  cease  urging 
peace"  (A.,  7,  14,  3),  we  find,  "even  the  most  unrighteous  peace  is  more 
expedient  than  the  most  righteous  war  with  fellow-citizens.'*  "I  pre- 
ferred nothing  to  peace"  (A.,  8,  iiD,  7),  is  followed  by,  "not  that  I  did  not 
fear  the  same  things  as  they,  but  I  considered  them  more  endurable  than 
civU  war."  The  same  unqualified  condemnation  of  civil  war  appears  in  a 
letter  to  Tiro  (F.,  16,  12,  2):  "I  for  my  part,  upon  reaching  the  city,  con- 
tinually devoted  all  my  thought,  speech,  and  action  to  furthering  harmony; 
but  a  strange  madness  had  seized,  not  only  the  base,  but  also  those  who  are 
considered  the  good,  so  that  they  were  eager  for  war,  though  I  kept  urging 
that  nothing  was  more  wretched  than  civil  war."     The  utmost  complacency, 

I  "  Ut  te  .  .  .  .  de  otio,  de  pace,  de  concordia  civium  agi  velle  arbitrabar,  et  ad 
earn  rationem  existimabam  satis  aptam  et  naturam  et  personam  meam  ....  magis 
idoneum  quam  ego  sum  ad  eam  causam  profecto  reperies  neminem,  .  .  .  ."  {A.,  9, 
1 1  A,  1-2). 


SOCIAL  GOOD  71 

therefore,  to  Rome's  foreign  wars  is  consistent  with  this  extreme  aversion 
to  contests  between  citizens,  with  the  attendant  horrors  associated  with  the 
names  of  Marius,  Cinna,  and  Sulla. 

But  a  few  years  later  we  find  Cicero  vehemently  urging  senate  and  army 
to  withstand  Antony  with  force:  Antony's  troops  are  miserable  brigands; 
peace  is  to  be  considered  only  in  case  they  lay  down  their  arms  or  are  van- 
quished; it  is  no  time  for  parleying  (F.,  10,  6,  i,  to  Plancus) ;  peace  is  to  be 
sought,  ''not  by  laying  down  our  arms,  but  by  dispelling  the  dread  of  arms 
and  of  slavery  "  (F.,  10,  6,  3).  To  Lepidus  these  words  were  written  in  43 : 
**I  am  pleased  that  you  are  eager  to  secure  peace  among  fellow-citizens. 
If  you  consider  a  peace  that  does  not  involve  slavery  (earn  si  a  servitute 
seiungas),  you  w^ill  have  regard  both  for  the  public  good  and  your  own 
position;  but  if  that  peace  of  yours  is  to  restore  a  desperate  man  to  the 
possession  of  unbridled  despotic  power,  be  assured  that  all  sound  men  are 
resolved  to  prefer  death  to  slavery"  (F.,  10,  27,  i).  Brutus  desires  peace; 
but  under  present  circumstances  peace  is  to  be  gained,  not  by  words,  but 
by  arms  {B.,  2,  5,  i). 

Is  there  anything  in  Cicero's  earlier  pleas  for  peace  between  Pompey 
and  Cassar  to  prepare  one  for  his  advocacy  of  war  against  Antony  ?  "We 
need  peace,"  he  ^vrote  to  Atticus  during  the  earlier  crisis  (7,  5,  4),  "for 
from  a  victory,  besides  other  ills,  a  tyrant  will  certainly  arise."  This  sug- 
gests that  even  civil  war  is  to  be  feared  rather  for  its  consequences  than  as  an 
absolute  evil.  If  we  recall  how  Cicero  represents  Pompey 's  cause  as  related 
to  public  welfare,  we  shall  see  the  conditions  which  made  civil  war  so  much 
to  be  dreaded  in  the  one  case,  but  which  did  not  equally  prevail  in  the  con- 
test with  Antony.  Pompey's  inefficiency  rendered  success  improbable; 
but  until  late  in  the  contest  with  Antony  his  overthrow  was  considered 
feasible  (e.  g.,  F.,  10,  20,  3;  11,  14,  3).  The  ruthlessness  of  Pompey  prom- 
ised widespread  proscriptions;  but  Cicero  naturally  expected  the  triumph 
of  his  party  to  be  free  from  such  a  reproach.  Finally,  and  most  important 
of  all,  Pompey  was  a  potential  tyrant  whose  victory  would  bring,  not  the 
establishment,  but  the  overthrow,  for  the  time  at  least,  of  constitutional 
government;  while  a  decisive  victory  of  the  senatorial  forces  over  those  of 
Antony  was  to  be  a  real  victory  of  the  republic,  freeing  it  from  the  perils 
that  had  been  threatening  its  very  existence  (F.,  11,  5,  3).  These  differ- 
ences in  the  circumstances — differences  clearly  implied  in  the  letters — go 
far  toward  explaining  the  differing  attitude  toward  the  two  ci\il  wars.  One 
may  speculate  as  to  whether  there  is  a  further  psychological  explanation 
in  the  difference  of  Cicero's  situation  in  the  two  contests;  in  one  case  waver- 
ing between  the  two  sides,  in  the  other  thoroughly  decided  and  committed; 


72 

in  one  case  left  outside  the  confidential  counsels  of  the  chiefs,  in  the  other 
himself  foremost  in  counsel  and  leadership. 

We  have  already  seen  that  repubhcan  constitutional  government  held  an 
exalted  position  in  Cicero's  hierarchy  of  public  goods.  It  was  with  refer- 
ence to  this  element  of  common  welfare  that  the  nominal  leader  of  the 
senatorial  party  was  condemned,  with  reference  to  this  that  so  dreadful  an 
evil  as  civil  war  received  its  bitterest  sting  or  its  sufficient  justification. 
Violation  of  constitutional  right  is  the  cardinal  sin  of  the  citizen — final, 
absolute,  unmitigated.  The  letters  contain  no  fiercer  denunciation  than 
that  directed  against  Caesar  at  the  outset  of  his  unconstitutional  career. 
His  crime  is  defined  as  consisting  in  "having  an  army  without  public 
authority,  seizing  the  cities  of  citizens,  ....  being  a  tyrant."  For  this 
he  is  called  a  mad  and  wretched  creature,  wholly  without  honor  or  virtue 
(the  Kokov  or  honestum).  "I  should  rather  die  a  thousand  times  than 
once  entertain  the  thought  of  such  a  course;"  and  later:  ''I  regard  even 
the  possession  of  such  a  wish  a  more  miserable  lot  than  crucifixion.  Only 
one  lot  is  more  miserable,  the  attainment  of  the  wish"  (^.,  7,  11,  1-2). 
References  to  unconstitutional  action  regularly  are  occasions  for  emphatic 
language,  apparently  indicating  strong  feeling.  Tyrannus,  a  word  occur- 
ring in  A.,  7,  5,  4,  and  10,  i,  3,  and  very  frequently  applied  to  Caesar  in 
later  letters,  must  have  had  especially  opprobrious  associations  for  men 
familiar  with  the  Greek  writers.  The  same  would  be  true,  from  the  Roman 
point  of  view,  of  the  derivatives  of  rex;  for  example,  regnum,  regnare,  and 
regnandi  (A.,  8,  11,  2;  10,  7,  i).  The  subjects  of  the  tyrant  are  slaves  (cf. 
servire,  A.,  7,  7,  7).  Dominus,  "lord,"  another  term  for  the  unconstitu- 
tional ruler,  would  necessarily  grate  upon  republican  ears  (A.,  8,  16,  2). 
To  be  associated  with  a  tyrant  involves  a  taint  of  disgrace  {A.,  7,  20,  2), 
and  it  is  a  serious  question  whether  even  a  good  purpose  can  justify  entering 
a  tyrant's  counsel  (^.,  10,  i,  3).  Caesar  will,  if  victorious,  establish  a  king- 
dom intolerable  to  a  Persian,  to  say  nothing  of  a  Roman  {A.,  10,  8,  2).  But 
(10,  8,  6-8)  Plato's  omens  will  not  fail;  the  power  of  the  tyrant  must  soon 
collapse  by  the  acts  either  of  enemies  or  of  the  t)n:ant  himself,  who  is  his 
own  worst  enemy.  Cicero  evidently  regards  the  autocrat's  position  as 
inherently  weak.  In  a  little  time  he  will  pass  away.  The  possibility  of  a 
permanent  Roman  monarchy  is  not  here  imagined.  Cicero  may  or  may 
not  live  to  witness  the  collapse.  That  matters  little  to  him.  He  evidently 
believes  that  his  reputation  will  be  in  the  hands  of  a  republican  posterity, 
who  will  honor  the  memory  of  the  resolute  foe  of  revolutionists  and  tyrants. 

During  the  brief  period  of  submission  to  Caesar's  supremacy  it  was, 
according  to  Cicero,  a  problem  how  to  five  subject  to  the  power  of  one,  that 


SOCIAL   GOOD  73 

one  being  wise  and  liberal  (F.,  4,  6,  3).  It  is  disgraceful  even  to  live  under 
Caesar,  to  say  nothing  of  flattering  him.  While  this  sentiment  seems  to 
have  been  elicited  by  a  rebuff,  it  is  contained  in  a  familiar  letter  to  Atticus 
(13,  28,  2;  cf.  F.,  7,  30,  i).  Halfway  freedom  may  be  secured  by  silence 
and  retirement  {A.j  13,  31,  3). 

But  it  was  after  Caesar's  assassination  that  the  pent  torrent  of  indigna- 
tion burst  forth,  and  the  vehemence  of  the  approval  of  the  deed  is  an  index 
of  the  intensity  of  the  disapproval  with  which  Cicero  viewed  Caesar's  uncon- 
stitutional position.  The  brief  note  written  to  one  of  the  conspirators  on 
the  very  Ides  of  March  sounds  like  a  series  of  breathless  exclamations.' 
Congratulations  are  showered  upon  the  assassins  (e.  g.,  /^.,  12,  2,  i,  to  Cas- 
sius;  F.,  II,  5,  1-2,  to  Decimus  Brutus';  B.,  2,  5,  2,  to  Marcus  Brutus). 
"  The  Ides  of  March  "  is  used  as  a  technical  designation  for  the  glorious 
deed  which  is  his  comfort,  and  in  which  he  wishes  he  had  had  a  share  (e.  g., 
A.,  14,  4,  2;  F.,  12,  4,  i).  The  doers  of  the  deed  are  "  heroes  "  or  "demi- 
gods" {A.,  14,  4,  2,  etc.),  nay  even  "gods"  (A.,  14,  11,  i).  "Tyrannicides" 
tyrannoctoni,  A.,  14,  6,  2)  and  "liberators"  (^.,  14,  12,  2)  are  other 
terms  for  the  slayers  of  Caesar,  while  "  tyrant "  is  the  habitual  designa- 
tion of  the  dictator,  particularly  in  the  letters  to  Atticus  {A.,  15,  20,  2; 
14,  6,  2;  14,  14,  2,  etc.).  "O  ye  good  gods  I  The  tyranny  lives,  it  was  the 
tyrant  who  fell!"  (A.j  14,  9,  2)  seems  the  expression  of  genuine  siu-prise. 
The  Ides  of  March  "have  secured  for  our  friends,  those  inspired  heroes, 
an  entrance  to  heaven;  but  have  not  secured  liberty  for  the  Roman 
people"  (A.,  14,  14,  3).  This  discovery  prompts  the  oft-repeated  sugges- 
tion that  the  work  was  not  thorough  enough,  that  it  was  a  fatal, mistake  to 
leave  Antony  alive:  "O  glorious  deed,  yet  ineffectual!"  {A.,  14,  12,  i); 
"I  wish  you  had  invited  me  to  your  banquet  on  the  Ides  of  March;  there 
would  have  been  nothing  left  over"  {F.,  12,  4,  i;  cf.  A.,  14,  21,  3;  F.,  12, 
3,1).  In  all  this  there  is  not  the  slightest  suggestion  of  any  moral  or  legal 
objection  to  the  killing  of  a  tyrant.  His  unconstitutional  position  makes 
him  an  outlaw  with  no  more  rights  than  the  noisome  reptile. 

This  opposition  to  arbitrary  power  was  referred  to  broad  principles. 
Everything  is  uncertain  where  law  is  abandoned  and  the  future  made  to 
depend  upon  the  will  or  caprice  of  another  (F.,  9,  16,  3).  Cicero  is  himself 
anxious  to  comply  with  the  letter  of  the  law,  though  that  letter  is  no  fetish 
when  higher  interests  of  the  state  are  involved.  In  case  of  an  invasion  of 
the  provinces  by  the  Parthians  he  will  remain  on  guard  beyond  his  legal 
time  of  office,  and  thus  act '" contrary  to  the  decree  of  the  senate"  (A.,  6, 

I  "Tibi  gratulor;  mihi  guadeo;  te  amo;  tua  tueor;  a  te  amari  et  quid  agas 
quidque  agatur  certior  fieri  volo"  (F.,  6,  15). 


< 


74 

6,  3) ;  yet  he  declares  it  is  an  insane  suggestion  that  he  be  sent  by  Pompey 
direct  from  Cilicia  to  Sicily,  as  being  already  in  possession  of  the  imperium; 
"For  neither  did  the  senate  decree,  nor  the  people  bid  me,  to  exercise  the 
imperium  in  Sicily"  {A.,  7,  7,  4).  The  ambition  of  Octavius,  his  ostensible 
ally,  to  obtain  the  consulship  under  illegal  conditions  occasioned  a  most 
notable  protest  against  the  rule  of  force  rather  than  law:  "Each  demands 
for  himself  power  in  the  state  in  proportion  to  the  force  which  he  commands ; 
neither  reason,  nor  moderation,  nor  custom,  nor  duty,  has  any  weight; 
neither  judicial  decision,  nor  public  opinion,  nor  respect  for  posterity" 
(5.,  I,  10,  3). 

Loyalty  to  party  is  closely  connected  with  loyalty  to  state.  This  loyalty 
manifests  itself  in  various  aspects — adherence  to  the  political  doctrines 
which  the  party  profess,  desire  to  be  consistent  with  former  party  affilia- 
tions, support  of  the  specific  policies  which  the  party  advocate,  and  regard 
for  the  idividuals  composing  the  party.  It  must  be  evident  that  the  first 
two  do  not  necessarily  involve  the  others. 

The  senatorial  party  are  to  Cicero  "the  good  "  (boni).  Even  at  the  time 
of  the  greatest  alienation  from  the  party  he  wrote  to  Lentulus:  "But  you 
realize  how  difficult  it  is  to  lay  aside  one's  political  sentiments  {sensum  in 
re  publico),  especially  when  they  are  right  and  thoroughly  settled"  {F.,  1,8, 
2;  56  B.  C).  If  a  variously  interpreted  sentence  of  a  few  months  earlier' 
be  interpreted  in  view  of  this  passage,  it  may  naturally,  with  this,  be  taken 
as  an  acknowledgment  of  the  soundness  of  the  political  doctrines  of  the 
optimates,  at  the  time  when  resentment  against  the  leaders  of  the  party 
was  keenest.  Incredible  treachery,  according  to  Cicero,  has  been  shown 
by  these  men,  who  wish  to  be  leaders,  and  who  might  be  if  they  had  a  par- 
ticle of  good  faith.  Spurned  by  these  discredited  leaders,  Cicero  will  culti- 
vate the  good- will  of  those  who  have  power  {A.,  4,  5,  2-3;  cf.  F.,  i,  7,  7). 
So  far  as  party  loyalty  is  here  concerned,  the  professed  conflict  is  primarily 
between  the  worthy  doctrines  and  their  unworthy  exponents.  During  the 
contest  between  Caesar  and  Pompey,  while  there  is  less  personal  resentment 
toward  the  members  of  the  senatorial  party,  they  are,  with  exceptions, 
pronounced  unworthy  of  the  doctrines  and  traditions  of  the  party:  "I  do 
not  understand  whom  you  call  'the  good.'  I  myself  know  of  none;  that  is, 
if  we  look  for  classes  of  'the  good;'  for  there  are  'good'  individuals"  {A.,  7, 
7,  5);  "I  have  no  confidence  in  your  optimates"  {Optimatibus  vero  tuis 
nihil  confido,  A.,  9,  5,  3).  Once  he  mentions  "the  good,"  to  add  "none  of 
whom  exist"  {A.,  9,  i,  4),  and  again  refers  to  those  who  are  called  "the 
good"  (A.,  9.  2a,  3). 

^  "Sed  valeant  recta,  vera,  honesta  consilia"  (A.y  4,  5,  i;   cf.  the  entire  letter.) 


SOCIAL  GOOD  75 

But  even  when  thinking  of  those  who  are  truly  loyal  to  constitutional 
principles,  Cicero  objects  to  their  policy  of  pushing  the  war.  Should  one  cast 
in  his  lot  with  "the  good,"  even  if  he  disapproves  of  their  policy  (A.,g,  4,  2)  ? 
How  this  question  was  debated  down  to  the  death  of  Pompey  we  have 
already  seen.  When  Cicero  accepted  Pharsalus  as  the  end  of  the  war  and 
returned  to  Italy,  submitting  to  Caesar,  he  had  no  less  reason  for  disapprov- 
ing the  policy  of  those  who,  like  Cato,  chose  to  fight  on.  This  pohcy  could 
only  mean  utter  ruin  to  the  remnants  of  the  republic  (F.,  15,  15,  i);  or,  if 
by  any  unexpected  chance  the  Pompeians  should  win,  Cicero  would  be 
placed  in  a  decidedly  awkward  position  (A.,  11,  13,  i). 

Yet,  in  spite  of  strictures  upon  the  members  and  the  policy  of  the  sena- 
torial party,  that  party  is  frequently  mentioned  in  Cicero's  serious  estimates 
of  value.  In  the  autumn  of  48  he  craves  assurance  that  he  has  not  altogether 
sacrificed  the  good- will  of  his  party  (iudicium  bonorum,  A.,  11,  7,  3). 
Passages  of  this  type  have  already  been  examined.  We  may  put  beside 
them  his  direct  expressions  of  desire  to  share  the  fortunes  of  the  boni,  or 
regret  at  being  separated  from  them.  He  would  aid  in  their  victory  or 
share  in  their  defeat  (A.,  7,3,  2 ;  50  B.  C.) ;  "  As  an  animal  follows  the  herd, 
I  vnll  follow  'good  men,'  or  whoever  shall  bear  the  name  of  'good,'  even  if 
they  rush  to  ruin."^  The  cause  of  the  optimates  (causa  bonorum)  urges 
him  to  retire  from  Italy  (A.,  7,  20,  2).  Later  he  regrets  that  he  is  not  with 
"the  good,"  however  rash  their  undertaking  (^.,  9,  6,  4).  In  certain  moods 
he  is  distressed  that  he  did  not  after  Pharsalus  go  with  the  "many  loyal 
men"  who  continued  the  struggle  in  Africa  (A.,  11,  7,  3),  although  he 
stoutly  defends  the  wisdom  of  his  course  rather  than  theirs  (F.,  15,  15,  i). 
He  was  alive  to  the  anomaly  of  a  position  that  made  his  personal  interests 
demand  what  he  had  always  deprecated,  i.  e.,  a  defeat  of  the  boni  (A.j  11, 
13,  i).  If  oiu-  analysis  of  party  loyalty  was  correct,  this  hold  of  the  party 
upon  Cicero,  in  spite  of  estrangement  from  its  membership  and  repudiation 
of  its  policies,  is  largely  to  be  attributed  to  sympathy  with  its  doctrines  and 
a  desire  for  consistency. 

IV.    SUBJECTS,   SLAVES,   AND   FOREIGNERS 

The  interests  of  family,  friends,  and  fellow-citizens,  as  estimated  by 
Cicero,  have  been  reviewed.  It  remains  to  inquire  what  weight  he  gives 
to  the  interests  of  fellow-men  who  are  outside  these  special  groups. 

Our  knowledge  of  Cicero's  estimate  of  the  welfare  of  provincials  as 
affecting  the  pohcy  of  the' provincial  governor  is  mainly  derived  from  two 

^  "  Ut  bos  armenta,  sic  ego  bonos  viros  aut  eos  quicumque  dicentur  boni  sequar 
etiam  si  nient"  {A.,  7,  7,  7). 


76  MORAL  VALUES  IN  CICERO'S  LETTERS 

distinct  bodies  of  material  in  the  letters — the  comprehensive  letter  to  Quin- 
tus  {Q.  F.J  I,  i),  to  which  reference  has  already  been  made  (p.  27),  and 
the  letters  which  about  ten  years  later  Cicero  wrote  from  his  own  province. 
The  two  series  of  judgments  so  separated  in  time  and  circumstance  present 
an  interesting  parallel. 

We  have  seen  the  happiness  of  citizens  made  the  proper  goal  of  the  ruler 
of  the  state  {A.,  8,  11,  i).  The  principle  is  extended  to  apply  to  the  sub- 
jects in  the  provinces  as  well.  In  some  sense  it  is  to  apply  even  to  slaves 
and  dumb  beasts  (Q.  F.,  i,  i,  24).'  The  whole  province  should  recognize 
that  the  welfare  of  all,  their  children,  their  reputations,  and  their  fortunes, 
are  precious  in  their  governor's  eyes  (Q.  F.,  i,  i,  13).  The  reputation  of 
the  governor  and  the  welfare  of  the  provincials  are  placed  side  by  side  as 
entirely  consistent  aims.  The  reputation  is  to  come  from  the  public  recog- 
nition of  an  administration  that  secured  the  welfare  of  the  subjects  (see 
pp.  29  ff.).  Accordingly,  we  find  Cicero  repeatedly  urging  his  brother  to 
pursue  fame  (e.  g.,  Q.  F.,  i,  i,  30;  i,  i,  41;  i,  i,  45).  As  governor  he  pro- 
fessses  the  same  motive  for  himself  (^.,  6,  i,  8;  7,  i,  6). 

To  be  respected,  the  provincial  courts  must  be  free  from  all  suspicion 
of  partiality  (Q.  F.,  i,  i,  20).  Justice  and  impartiality  are  claimed  for 
Cicero's  own  administration  (Nihil  ea  iiiris  dictione  aequabilius,  A.,  5,  20,  i ; 
of.  F.y  15,  4,  I ;  ^.,  5,  21,  5).  More  significant  is  a  declaration  of  principles 
called  out  by  actual  pressure  to  support  unfair  demands.  To  comply 
would  be  to  abandon  the  platform  of  principles  which  he  had  laid  down 
for  his  administration,  and  would  besides  utterly  ruin  his  province  (A.,  6, 
1,5).  He  will  not  confer  a  prefecture  upon  Scaptius  simply  to  enable  him 
to  use  legalized  force  in  collecting  the  debts  of  Brutus.  He  will  not  recog- 
nize the  claim  for  interest  at  the  rate  of  48  per  cent.,  12  per  cent,  compound 
interest  being  the  legal  maximum.  The  collection  of  the  debt  by  legal 
methods  and  with  legal  interest  has  Cicero's  hearty  support.  No  personal 
influence,  not  even  that  of  Brutus  seconded  by  Atticus,  can  induce  him  to 
do  more  (A.,  6,  i,  5-8;  cf.  5,  21,  10-13;  6,  2,  7-9). 

The  province  can  demand  of  its  governor  security  and  impartial  taxation 
(Q.  F.,i,i,  25).  The  mere  fact  of  taxation  cannot  reasonably  be  considered 
a  grievance.  Roman  rule  brings  security  from  foreign  war  and  internal 
strife,  a  security  for  which  the  tribute  is  only  a  fair  compensation  {Q.  F., 
I,  I,  34).  The  great  difficulty  which  the  governor  encounters  is  the  task 
of  holding  the  balance  between  the  public ani  and  the  provincials,  so  that 
the  former  shall  not  be  alienated,  nor  the  latter  oppressed  (Q.  jP.,  i,  i,  33- 

I  "  Est  autem  non  modo  eius,  qui  sociis  et  civibus,  sed  etiam  eius,  qui  servis,  qui 
mutis  pecudibus  praesit,  e(jrum,  quibus  praesit,  commodis  utilitatique  servire." 


SOCIAL  GOOD  77 

34).  It  is  precisely  this  that  Cicero  claims  to  have  accomplished  by  a 
happy  expedient  in  Cilicia  {A.,  6,  i,  16).  Quintus  is  congratulated  on 
having  freed  Asia  from  burdensome  tributes  for  the  support  of  the  aediles' 
games  in  Rome  {Q.  F.,  1,  i,  26).  When  Cicero's  friend  Caelius  asked 
panthers  and  apparently  money  from  Cilicia  for  his  games,  the  occasion 
was  used  to  emphasize  the  fact  that  in  that  province  only  debts  were  col- 
lected, and  that  no  hunting  expeditions  at  public  expense  were  counte- 
nanced (^.,  6,  I,  21).  So  far  did  Cicero  carry  this  principle  that  he  refused 
to  accept  the  legalized  traveling  expenses  for  himself  and  his  staff  (.4.,  5, 
10,  i).  He  trusts  that  in  the  entire  year  the  province  will  not  contribute  a 
farthing  for  his  personal  expenses  (A.j  5,  20,  6;  cf.  6,  2,  4).  Atticus  had 
evidently  advised  this  course  (ex  praeceptis  tuts,  -4.,  5,  15,  2).  It  is  evident 
that  the  lawful  traveling  expenses  might  easily  be  made  the  pretext  for 
oppressive  exactions.  Cicero  hopes  his  staff  will  be  as  scrupulous  as  him- 
self, but  he  has  some  apprehensions  (A.,  5,  14,  2). 

A  suggestion  is  made  that  the  man  who  offers  a  bribe  be  treated  as 
severely  as  the  man  who  accepts  it  (Q.  F.,  i,  i,  13).  An  end  is  put  to  the 
custom  of  receiving  payment  from  communities  that  wish  to  avoid  having 
soldiers  quartered  among  them  for  the  winter  (^.,  5,  21,  7).  A  well- 
managed  household  is  presented  as  the  model  for  provincial  administration 
(^.,  6,  I,  2).  All  this  suggests  that  the  problems  connected  with  securing 
government  in  the  interest  of  the  governed  have  changed  little  with  the 
centuries. 

The  best  intentions  on  the  part  of  the  governor  are  useless  imless  his 
subordinates  co-operate  to  carry  out  his  policy  (Q.  F.,  1,  1,  10).  A  distinc- 
tion is  recognized  in  the  responsibilitv  of  a  governor  for  subordinates  assigned 
him  by  the  state  and  his  personal  appointees.  The  latter  should  be  most 
strictly  held  to  account.  Perniciously  self-seeking  activity  on  the  part  of 
the  former,  considering  the  lax  standards  of  the  time,  may  best  be  checked 
by  limiting  their  opportunities  for  mischief  (Q.  F.,  i,  i,  11-12).  We  have 
seen  the  hopes  which  Cicero  had  for  the  self-denial  of  his  staff  at  the  outset 
(i4.,  5,  14,  2).  At  the  close  of  his  term  of  office  he  is  forced  to  exclaim 
over  the  difficulty  of  virtue  or  of  its  continued  simulation.  There  is  a  sur- 
plus from  the  appropriation  for  the  year's  administrative  expenses;  and 
his  staff  are  so  selfish  as  to  complain  because,  instead  of  distributing  the  sum 
among  them,  he  intends  to  hand  it  over  to  his  successor;  and  yet  he  has 
conferred  all  possible  honors  upon  them  (A.,  7,  i,  6).  There  is  warm 
praise  for  one  of  the  staff  who  has  so  far  come  to  himself  as  to  value  honors 
at  Cicero's  hands  more  highly  than  any  amount  of  money  (^4.,  7,  3,  8). 

The  governor  of  a  province  must  have  self-control  in  the  matters  of 


78  MORAL   VALUES   IN   CICERO'S   LETTERS 

money,  pleasure,  and  the  indulgence  of  anger,  the  last-mentioned  evidently 
being  Quintus'  besetting  sin  (Q.  F.,  i,  i,  7-9,  and  37-40).  Self-restraint 
/  (abstinentia,  continentia)  is  claimed  as  a  characteristic  of  Cicero's  own 
administration  (^4.,  5,  16,  3 ;  F.,  15,  4,  i) ;  yet  self-control,  he  assures  Atticus, 
is  hardly  the  proper  term  for  a  policy  which  is  in  itself  a  source  of  genuine 
pleasure  {A.,  5,  20,  6). 

There  is,  besides,  in  both  periods  insistence  on  the  gentler  virtues  of 
mercy,  courtesy,  and  accessibility — virtues  which  conciliate  favor  and 
temper  needed  severity  {Q.  F.,  i,  i,  20-25;  ^.,  5,  16,  3;  5,  21,  5;  6,  2,  5). 

The  welfare  of  the  provincials  is  throughout  presented  as  the  fudamental 
aim  of  a  proper  provincial  administration.  At  the  same  time,  the  strongest 
emphasis  is  placed,  not  upon  that  welfare  as  per  se  a  good  to  the  governor, 
but  upon  the  admirable  administration,  conceived  abstractly  or  contem- 
plated like  a  beautiful  work  of  art.  We  have  noticed  the  emphasis  upon 
the  reputation  to  be  won  for  the  governor  by  such  an  administration. 

We  have  just  met  the  statement  that  the  ruler  even  of  slaves  should  con- 
sider their  happiness  {Q.F., 1,1,  24).  The  sentiment  would  have  more  weight 
as  an  expression  of  regard  for  humanity,  were  not  dumb  beasts  included 
under  the  same  rule.  There  is  in  the  passage  no  recognition  of  the  slaves' 
rights  as  grounded  in  their  common  humanity.  The  statement  that  inti- 
macy with  slaves  detracts  from  the  prestige  of  a  public  man  simply  registers 
public  opinion,  and  refers  to  social  intercourse  rather  than  to  rights  as  men 
{Q.  F.,  T,  2,  3).  At  the  time  of  the  exile  Cicero  made  an  arrangement 
whereby  he  expected  that,  in  case  of  the  confiscation  of  his  property,  his 
slaves  would  be  regarded  as  freedmen,  but  would  remain  slaves  in  case 
there  should  be  no  confiscation.  To  give  any  attention  to  such  a  matter, 
while  so  occupied  with  his  own  troubles,  implies  a  certain  interest  in  the 
slaves;  yet  in  referring  to  the  matter  in  a  letter  to  Terentia  he  dismisses  it  as 
unimportant  (minora,  F.,  14,  4,  4).  A  confession  of  grief  at  the  death  of  a 
slave,  while  indicating  the  writer's  tenderness  of  heart,  closes  with  an 
apology:  "The  circumstance  disturbed  me  more  than  it  seems  the  death 
of  a  slave  ought"  {A.,  i,  12,  4).  The  tone  is  practically  such  as  one  might 
use  in  speaking  of  the  loss  of  a  favorite  animal.  Still  the  warm  personal 
regard  expressed  for  Tiro  shows  that  it  was  possible  for  Cicero  personally 
and  practically  to  recognize  the  fellow-man  and  friend  in  the  slave  and 
freedman. 

What  was  the  attitude  of  our  author  toward  the  gladiatorial  butcheries 
of  his  time  ?  It  is  obvious  that  he  often  speaks  slightingly  of  the  games. 
The  important  question  is  concerning  the  ground  of  the  disparagement. 
Once  we  find  Cicero  hastening  to  Antium,  and  eagerly  leaving  behind  the 


SOCIAL  GOOD  79 

gladiatorial  show  of  Metellus  (A.,  2,  i,  i).  Again,  although  he  has  intended 
to  take  Tullia  to  see  games — gladiators  are  not  specified  {A.,  2,  8,  2) — he 
gives  up  the  plan  on  the  ground  that  it  would  be  somewhat  incongruous 
for  one  who  wishes  to  avoid  all  suspicion  of  luxury  (deliciae)  to  tmdertake  a 
journey  for  the  sake  of  amusement,  and  foolish  amusement  at  that  {non 
solum  delicate  sed  etiam  inepte,  A.,  2,  10).  On  another  occasion,  the  exten- 
sion of  the  games  for  an  additional  day  is  a  reason  for  being  content  to 
spend  that  day  quietly  at  one  of  his  villas  (A.,  4,  8a,  i).  While  others  are 
sweltering  at  the  games,  Cicero  is  refreshing  himself  with  the  rare  beauty 
of  the  scenery  along  the  river  at  Arpinum  (Q.  i^.,  3,  i,  i).  He  discourages 
Curio  from  giving  gladiatorial  funeral  games  in  memory  of  his  father. 
Other  means  which  involve  talent  and  character  are  more  effective  for 
gaining  popularity.  Games  are  merely  a  matter  of  money,  and  everybody 
is  tired  of  them  anyway  (F.,  2,  3,  i).  While  in  Cilicia  he  rallies  his  friend 
CaeUus  for  filling  letters  with  gladiatorial  gossip  which  no  one  would  venture 
to  tell  him  at  Rome  (F.  2,  8,  i).  Still  he  expresses  a  friendly  interest  in 
the  gladiators  of  Atticus  (4,  4a,  2;  4,  8,  2),  and  suggests  that  Tiro  witness  a 
gladiatorial  exhibition  (F.,  16,  20).  These  incidental  references  are  in 
general  keeping  with  the  detailed  discussion  of  the  subject  in  the  letter 
consoling  a  friend  for  his  inability  to  attend  the  games  (F.,  7,  i),  though  in 
such  a  letter  we  should  expect  the  attitude  of  disparagement.  ''The  games 
were  splendid,  but  not  to  your  taste"  {F.,  7,  i,  2) — this  is  the  keynote  of 
the  letter.  The  elaborate  stage  accessories  were  vulgar;  e.  g.,  six  hundred 
mules  in  Clytcemestra  or  three  thousand  goblets  in  The  Trojan  Horse. 
Cicero  approaches  the  subject  from  the  point  of  view  of  taste.  So,  speaking 
of  the  fighting  of  men  and  beasts,  he  says  (F.,  7,  i,  3):  "But  what  pleas- 
ure can  there  be  to  a  cultivated  man  when  a  weak  man  is  mangled  by  a 
powerful  beast,  or  a  fine  beast  is  pierced  with  a  hunting  spear  ?"  The  sac- 
rifice of  the  man  and  that  of  the  beast  are  spoken  of  in  the  same  tone. 

So  far  as  we  may  judge  from  the  letters,  gladiatorial  contests  were  not 
to  Cicero's  personal  liking,  vulgarity  and  extravagance  being  the  assigned 
groimds  of  his  disfavor,  rather  than  immoral  disregard  for  the  life  and 
happiness  of  fellow-men.  Here,  as  above,  we  look  in  vain  for  any  recogni- 
tion of  the  rights  of  the  slave  as  a  man. 

In  Cicero's  accoimts  of  hostihties  in  Cilicia,  in  the  most  matter-of-fact, 
businesslike  tone  he  tells  of  laying  waste  the  enemy's  coimtry  {F.,  15,  4, 
8-9),  or  selling  the  captives  into  slavery  (^4.,  5,  20,  5),  giving  no  indication 
of  humanitarian  sentiments  of  pity  for  the  enemy  to  differentiate  him  from 
his  contemporaries. 


CHAPTER  IV 
ABSTRACT   GOOD 

There  is  no  fixed  line  between  abstract  and  concrete  goods.  Devotion 
to  literature  and  philosophy  might  have  been  treated  as  the  recognition  of 
knowledge  as  an  ideal.  The  aim  to  secure  the  welfare  of  others  might 
have  been  discussed  as  an  expression  of  the  virtue  of  justice.  So  the  atti- 
tude toward  personal  danger  and  the  self-control  especially  needed  by  the 
provincial  governor  might  have  been  considered  under  courage  and  temper- 
ance. But  in  all  these  cases  it  seems  more  in  keeping  with  the  spirit  and 
character  of  our  material  to  place  the  emphasis  upon  the  concrete  ends  at 
which  the  doer  aims,  rather  than  on  the  abstract  qualities  of  the  doer  aS 
shown  by  these  aims.  Still  Cicero  in  the  letters  not  infrequently  empha- 
sizes the  quality  of  the  agent  or  of  the  act,  as  in  itself  a  good  or  an  evil. 

In  presenting  tyipes  of  character  as  admirable  or  the  reverse,  Cicero 
makes  little  use  of  the  traditional  categories  of  the  cardinal  virtues.  By 
examining  his  complimentary  enumerations  of  the  characteristics  of  various 
men,  we  get  a  clue  as  to  what  qualities  or  virtues  he  emphasizes  as  desirable. 
The  comparison  of  ten  such  prominent  characterizations  reveals  two  prac- 
tically constant  elements — some  term  or  terms  for  stability,  firmness,  or 
spirit,  usually  balanced  by  some  expression  for  gentleness,  mercy,  or 
courtesy,  ^  The  terms  of  the  first  are,  in  order  of  frequency,  constantia, 
gravitas,  magnitudo  animi,  severitas;  those  of  the  second  group,  humanitaSj 
dementia^  suavitas,  lepos,  benevolentia.  From  this  it  would  seem  that,  to 
Cicero,  the  proper  balance  between  stability  and  the  gentler  qualities  was  a 
prominent  element  in  an  admirable  character.  What  the  collocation  of  terms 
in  other  instances  suggests  is  in  two  instances  definitely  stated.  Concerning 
a  friend  recently  deceased  Cicero  writes  to  Atticus  (4,  6,  i)  that  they  have 
lost  a  man  in  whom  were  mingled  in  due  proportion  high  spirit  and  gentle- 
ness.' Thirteen  years  later  he  writes  that  such  is  the  balance  of  a  friend's 
character  ''that  the  greatest  seriousness  is  united  with  the  greatest  kindli- 
ness."3     Here  we  find,  as  a  matter  of  practical,  everyday  thinking,  the  ideal 

1  The  passages  in  question  are:   A.,  4,  6,  i;   7,  2,  7;    12,  4,  2;    14,  17A,  5;  F.,  2, 
6,4;   10,3;    11,27,6;    12,27;   13.  55»  2;   5.,  2,  5,  3. 

2  "Virum  bonum  et  magnum  hominem  et  in  summa  magnitudine  animi  multa 
himianitate  temperatum  perdTdimus." 

3  "  Est  autem  ita  temperatis  moderatisque  moribus,  ut  summa  severitas  summa   V 
cvun  himianitate  iungatur"  {F.,  12,  27). 

81 


82 

which  Plato  elaborated,  particularly  in  his  Politicus.  As  between  the 
sturdier  and  the  gentler  element,  we  observe  that  Cicero  places  the  emphasis 
o«  the  former.  This  forms  the  basis  of  character.  The  gentle  and  the 
kindly  element  is  an  admixture,  tempering  and  making  attractive  what 
otherwise  would  be  forbidding  and  harsh.  To  the  ruler  especially,  as  we 
have  seen,  courtesy  is  valuable  as  a  means  of  conciliation,  reconciling  the 
governed  to  necessary  acts  of  severity  {Q.  F.,  i,  i,  21).  The  Stoics  are 
approved  for  making  courtesy  (urhanitas)  a  virtue  (F.,  3,  7,  5).  A  discour- 
teous call  {A.,  15,  15,  2)  or  letter  (F.,  7,  27,  1-2)  meets  prompt  resentment. 
A  letter  protesting  against  the  discourtesy  of  the  freedman  Dionysius  con- 
tains some  instructive  details  as  to  the  demands  of  courtesy.  The  freedman 
has  curtly  refused  to  act  further  as  young  Cicero's  tutor.  His  language 
was  such,  Cicero  writes,  ''as  I  never  used  to  anyone  whose  case  I  declined. 
For  I  always  said,  'If  I  am  able,  if  I  am  not  hindered  by  some  case  pre- 
viously undertaken.'  I  never  to  any  defendant,  however  obscure,  however 
shabby,  however  guilty,  however  much  a  stranger,  gave  so  abrupt  a  refusal 
as  he  without  disguise  or  qualification  gave  me"  (^.,  8,  4,  2). 

The  two  terms  most  frequently  occurring  in  what  we  have  called  the 
sturdier  group  are  gravUas  and  constantia.  These  same  terms  are  frequently 
used  in  a  complimentary  sense  throughout  the  letters.  The  two  terms  show 
a  tendency  to  appear  together,  as  in  four  of  the  ten  cases  cited  above,  includ- 
ing B.,  2,  5,  3,  where  the  adjectives  gravis  and  constans  take  the  place  of 
the  abstract  nouns  (cf.  i^.,  3,  8,  6). 

The  literal  meaning  of  the  two  words  is  obviously  similar,  as  weight 
suggests  stability,  steadiness,  firmness.  When  used  together  in  general 
commendations,  where  they  receive  no  special  color  from  the  context,  they 
may  well  have  been  felt  as  together  forming  an  amplified  expression  for  the 
idea  of  stability  of  character.  So  when  Metellus  is  said  to  have,  at  the  time 
of  his  exile,  surpassed  everyone  in  firmness  and  resoluteness  {constantia  et 
gravitate),  the  expression  is  used  to  balance  the  phrase  "of  a  crushed  and 
humiliated  spirit"  (jracto  animo  et  demisso,  F.,  i,  9,  16). 

Cicero  after  the  death  of  Pompey  characterized  him  as  gravis — a  man 
of  weight  of  character,  of  importance,  of  worth  (.4 .,  1 1 ,  6,  5) .  It  is  a  natural 
transition  from  the  conception  of  weight  of  character  or  influence  to  that  of 
conduct  or  manner  consistent  with  such  weight.  Cicero  writes  that  it  is 
inconsistent  with  his  friend's  gravitas  to  mourn  excessively  {F.,  5,  16,  5). 
Gravitas  requires  that  Cicero  and  his  brother  both  take  the  same  attitude 
toward  young  Quintus  {A.,  13,  41,  2).  When  we  are  told  that  Cicero 
retained  his  gravitas  in  his  interview  with  Caesar  {A.,  9,  19,  4),  we  have  an 
example  of  the  farthest  stage  of  this  development. 


ABSTRACT  GOOD  83 

LevUas,  the  literal  antithesis  of  gravitas,  is  used  of  the  contrasting  type 
of  character.  For  example,  it  is  applied  to  the  instability,  fickleness,  unre- 
liability, of  contemporary  Greeks  as  a  class,  the  accompanying  attributes 
being  deceitfulness,  obsequiousness,  and  the  time-serving  spirit.' 

Lepidus  by  forsaking  the  cause  of  the  senate  for  that  of  Antony  brings 
upon  himself  the  charge  of  lemtatem  et  inconstantiam  (J5.,  2,  2,  i;F.,  12,  8, 
i).  This  combination  of  terms,  we  notice,  is  both  verbally  and  in  applica- 
tion the  exact  antithesis  of  gravitas  et  constantia.  Levis,  "unstable," 
"unreliable,"  "fickle,"  "worthless,"  seems  a  favorite  term  with  which  to 
characterize  Lepidus  after  his  peculiarly  exasperating  defection  (cf.  F.,  12, 
10, 1 ;  J5.,  1, 15, 9).  The  use  of  the  terms  gravitas  and  constantia  in  connec- 
tion with  their  common  opposite  levitas  frequently  indicates  consciousness 
of  the  literal  meaning  and  the  common  associations  of  the  terms;  note  F., 
I,  7,  7,  where  the  three  terms  occur  in  the  same  paragraph,  and  F.,  5,  2, 
10,  in  which  animo  mobili  and  (animo)  stabili  are  contrasted  where  levis 
or  levitas  and  constans  or  constantia  might  well  have  been  used. 

We  have  seen  constantia  used  with  gravitas  in  the  sense  of  stability  or 
firmness  of  character.  This  use  of  constantia  and  the  related  adjective 
constans  may  be  illustrated  from  letters  widely  separated  in  time.  Metellus 
upon  assailing  Cicero  discovered  that  he  had  to  contend  with  a  brave  and 
resolute  man  (ut  sentiret  sibi  cum  viro  jorti  et  constanti  esse  pugnandum,  F., 
5,  2,  8;  62  B.  C).  The  senate  is  an  Areopagus;  nothing  could  be  more 
determined,  more  austere,  or  more  valiant  (nihil  constantius,  nihil  severius, 
nihil  fortius,  A.,  i,  14,  5).  Cicero  tells  of  conducting  himself  "with  firm- 
ness and  independence"  (constanter  et  libere,  A.,  4,  18,  i).  While  adopting 
a  conciliatory  attitude  toward  the  opposition,  he  .still  maintains  firmness 
in  the  interests  of  the  state  (ut  rei  publicae  constantiam  praestem,  A.,  i,  19, 
8).  In  a  letter  of  recommendation  assigned  to  51  he  expresses  the  hope 
that  he  may  not  by  repeating  his  request  seem  to  have  forgotten  the  con- 
stantia of  the  man  petitioned — "the  stability  of  your  character,"  as  Mr. 
Shuckburgh  admirably  renders  it.  In  a  letter  of  43  we  find  the  same  use 
of  constantia.  Octavius  while  co-operating  with  Cicero  is  described  as  of 
"fine  natural  gifts,  and  admirable  stability  of  character,"  and  yet  he  is  now 
listening  to  those  who  would  incite  him  to  the  hope  of  gaining  an  unconstitu- 
tional consulship  (B.,  i,  10,  3). 

Constantia  is  also  used  as  a  term  for  constisency.  In  view  of  the  promi- 
nence which  the  idea  of  consistency  has  in  the  letters — an  idea  which  recurs 

I  "Propter  hominum  [i.  e.,  Graecorum]  ingenia  ad  fallendum  parata  ....  Quae 
feci  omnia,  non  quo  me  aut  hi  homines  aut  tota  natio  delectaret;  pertaesum  est  levitatis, 
adsentationis,  animorum  non  officiis,  sed  temporibus  servientium"  (Q.  F.,  i,  2.  4). 


84  MORAL   VALUES   IN   CICERO 'S   LETTERS 

SO  persistently  under  varied  circumstances  and  with  varied  terminology — 
it  is  important  to  determine,  if  possible,  the  relation  in  Cicero's  thought  of 
consistency  and  steadfastness.  The  secret  of  provincial  administration, 
we  are  told,  is  that  the  governor  have  constantia  and  gravitas  to  withstand, 
not  only  influence,  but  even  the  suspicion  of  it  {constantia  est  adhibenda  et 
gravitas,  quae  resistat  non  solum  gratiae  verum  etiam  suspicioni,  Q.  F.,  i, 
I,  20.)  Here  it  is  quite  possible  to  take  constantia  and  gravitas  together 
with  the  usual  meaning  of  the  steadfastness  and  firmness  which  withstand 
all  pressure  to  pervert  justice  at  the  promptings  of  personal  favor;  but  sta- 
bility of  character  manifesting  itself  under  such  circumstances  might  appro- 
priately be  called  consistency.  In  the  interest  of  a  friend,  Cicero  wrote: 
*'I  have  no  doubt  that,  though  formerly  [you  showed  him  favor]  for  my 
sake,  you  will  continue  to  show  the  same  favor  and  generosity  to  preserve 
your  character  for  consistency"  (F.,  13,  41,  2),  to  quote  the  translation  of 
Mr.  Tyrrell,  who  in  general  is  jealous  of  admitting  consistency  as  a  rendering 
of  constantia.  But  in  accepting  the  rendering  consistency,  do  we  pass  to  a 
distinct  conception,  which  by  some  half-forgotten  train  of  association  has 
become  connected  with  the  same  symbol  as  that  for  stability  ?  In  this  par- 
ticular case  CuUeolus  has  been  kind  to  Lucceius  at  Cicero's  request.  The 
argument  is  that  to  refuse  to  continue  the  same  favors  under  the  same  cir- 
cumstances would  bring  CuUeolus'  consistency  into  question.  This  con- 
sistency, the  practice  of  performing  similar  acts  under  similar  circumstances, 
is  simply  one  way  in  which  stabihty  of  character  manifests  itself;  or  since 
another's  character  is  known  only  through  its  manifestations,  we  may  say 
that  consistency  in  such  a  case  is  but  an  aspect  of  stability  of  character.  It 
is  stability  of  character,  seen  under  certain  circumstances  which  the  context 
supplies.  The  same  analysis  applies  to  Cicero's  statement  to  Crassus: 
"The  defense  of  your  position  which  I  undertook  in  your  absence  I  will 
maintain  in  the  interest  of  my  consistency  as  well  as  of  our  friendship"  (F., 
5 ,  8,  5) ;  or  to  the  similar  statement  to  C.  Antonius :  ''In  what  I  have  hitherto 
done  in  your  interest  I  have  been  actuated,  first  by  good-will,  then  by  con- 
siderations of  consistency"  (voluntate  sum  adductus  posteaque  constantia, 
^'1  S>  5)  3)-  "The  reproach  of  inconsistency"  {jamam  inconstantiae,  F., 
I,  9,  11),  carries  similar  implications.  Variations  in  conduct  not  satis- 
factorily accounted  for  by  variations  in  circumstances  argue  instability  in 
the  actor's  character  which  will  subject  him  to  reproach. 

Our  conclusion,  therefore,  is  that  consistency,  at  least  in  passages  of  the 
type  here  examined,  is  thought  of  primarily  as  stability.  It  is  not  to  be 
referred  to  some  Hellenic  notion  of  harmony,  symmetry,  and  aesthetic  con- 
gruity,  as  might  at  first  be  supposed;  but  it  is  an  aspect  of  that  conception 


ABSTRACT   GOOD  85 

of  steadfastness  which  we  think  of  as  distinctly  Roman,  and  which  is  so 
conspicuous  in  the  enumerations  of  practical  virtues  which  we  have  been 
considering. 

As  we  examine  further  applications  of  the  idea  of  consistency,  we  may 
note  that  what  is  urged  is  consistency  with  the  worthy  and  social  element 
in  a  man's  past.  The  admonition  is  practically:  "Be  true  to  the  noblest 
and  most  unselfish  elements  of  your  past." 

What  a  man  should  do  in  a  given  situation  may  depend  upon  what  he 
has  done  in  the  past ;  that  is,  consistency  with  our  past  deeds  is,  according 
to  Cicero,  a  real  object  to  be  aimed  at  in  determining  our  course.  He  did 
not  approve  of  the  course  of  the  triumvirs,  for  to  do  so  would  be  to  condemn 
all  that  he  had  himself  ever  done  {A.,  2,  19,  2).  In  opposing  Pompey  he 
showed  himself  forgetful  of  his  interests  {temporum) ,  but  mindful  of  his 
past  career  (acHonum,  F.,  i,  9,  8).  The  example  of  others  cited  to  show 
Cicero  what  he  should  do  in  49,  he  pronounced  inconclusive ;  ''for  what  brave 
deed  of  theirs  in  public  life  has  ever  been  conspicuous  ?  or  who  expects  from 
them  anything  worthy  of  praise  ?"  (A.,  8, 14,  2) ;  "But  their  opinions  influ- 
ence me  less,  for  they  have  given  fewer  pledges  {pignora)  to  the  state" 
{A.,  8,  9,  3);  that  is,  having  once  adopted  an  unusually  patriotic  course  of 
action,  he  may  properly  be  judged  by  a  severer  standard  than  that  applied 
to  ordinary  citizens.  The  suggestion  that  with  Pompey  he  be  a  party  to 
leading  foreign  troops  against  Italy  causes  him  to  exclaim  that  once  he  had 
been  called  preserver  and  father  of  the  city  (A .  9, 10,  3).  The  revolutionary 
party  of  Caesar  he  thinks  of  as  those  against  whom  the  senate  (in  his  consul- 
ship) armed  him  with  special  power  to  keep  the  state  from  suffering  harm. 
Hence  he  must  not  yield  to  them  (A.,  10,  8,  8).  Even  to  withdraw  from 
Italy  does  not  seem  the  part  of  a  man  who  has  been  so  eminent  in  public 
Hfe(^.,  8,  3,  2). 

In  urging  others  to  adopt  a  particular  course  Cicero  frequently  bases 
his  appeal  on  their  former  deeds.  Of  this  nature,  for  example,  is  an 
appeal  to  Decimus  Brutus  in  F.,  11,  5, 1-3.  The  deed  done  demands  other 
deeds.  "If  you  reflect  by  day  and  by  night  how  great  a  deed  you  have 
done,  as  I  am  confident  you  do,  you  surely  will  not  forget  how  great  deeds 
you  ought  still  now  to  do Free  the  state  forever  from  tyranni- 
cal rule,  that  the  end  may  be  in  harmony  with  the  beginning  "  (ut  principiis 
consentiant  exitus).  While  we  have  here  the  statement  of  fact  that  the 
death  of  Caesar  necessitates  the  struggle  with  Antony,  the  more  general 
doctrine  that  achievement' calls  for  achievement  is  clearly  stated.  Some- 
what different  are  appeals  based  on  past  deeds  which  are  more  or  less 
apocryphal.     "In  inciting  and  spurring  on  it  is  very  effective  to  praise  the 


86  MORAL  VALUES  IN  CICERO 'S  LETTERS 

man  whom  you  are  exhorting"  {F.,  15,  21,  4),  is  a  frank  statement  of  a 
principle  which  receives  striking  illustration  in  a  letter  to  the  rascally  Dola- 
bella  during  his  brief  antagonism  to  the  party  of  Antony.  The  following 
is  the  paragraph  of  the  letter  which  best  illustrates  the  appeal  to  past  achieve- 
ment: "Therefore  with  what  appeal  shall  I  urge  you  to  devote  yourself  to 
honor  and  renown?  Shall  I  hold  before  you  the  example  of  illustrious 
men,  as  is  the  practice  of  those  who  admonish  ?  I  have  no  one  to  cite  more 
illustrious  than  you  yourself;  you  should  imitate  yourself,  vie  with  yourself. 
Now  after  such  achievements  it  surely  is  not  permissible  for  you  to  fail  to 
be  Uke  yourself  "  (Ne  licet  quidem  tibi  iam  tantis  rebus  gestis  non  tui  sitnilem 
esse,  F.y  9,  14,  6). 

We  have  seen  how  prominent  a  place  the  opinion  of  others  occupied  in 
/  Cicero's  thinking.  The  necessity  for  consistency  between  his  past  and 
his  present  acts  was  therefore  naturally  at  times  presented  from  the  point 
of  view  of  the  observing  public.  It  was  necessary  for  him,  he  claims,  to 
withstand  with  spirit  the  attacks  of  the  brother  of  his  friend  Metellus,  for 
otherwise  everyone  would  think  that  in  his  consulship  he  had  been  brave, 
not  by  design,  but  by  chance  (F.,  5,  2,  8).  So  in  the  weightier  matter  of 
favoring  the  triumvirs  at  the  risk  of  displeasing  the  senatorial  party,  Cicero 
assures  Atticus  (i,  20,  2-3)  that  the  steadiness  of  his  course  will  be  such 
that  his  past  deeds  will  not  seem  to  have  been  fortuitous.  This  introduces 
an  idea  already  noticed  in  another  connection  (pp.  32) — the  preservation 
and  defense  of  reputation.  The  suppression  of  the  conspiracy  indicated 
bravery.  Subsequent  brave  deeds  would  confirm  this  estimate  of  Cicero's 
character.  Timidity  or  wavering  on  his  part  would  indicate  that  the 
earlier  acts  should  be  attributed,  not  to  settled  character,  but  to  mere 
caprice. 

In  connection  with  the  matter  of  party  loyalty  (pp.  74,  75),  we  have 
seen  how  Cicero  shrank  from  changing  his  political  affiliations,  and  how 
sensitive  he  was  to  criticism  from  those  with  whom  he  had  acted.  A  typical 
expression  is:  "Shall  I  change  my  views  {aliter  sensero)  ?  I  am  abashed 
not  only  before  Pompey,  but  before  the  Trojans  and  the  Trojan  dames'* 
{A.,  7,  I,  4;  Tyrrell's  punctuation).  We  have  also  seen  his  eagerness  to 
show  that,  in  spite  of  apparent  change,  his  aims  are  still  the  same  as  they 
always  were  (e.  g.,  ^.,  i,  20,  2-3 ;  i^.,  i,  9,  6-8).  All  this,  with  the  elaborate 
plea  for  the  sailor  who  makes  a  detour  when  necessary,  rather  than  risk  all 
in  a  stubborn  attempt  to  hold  to  his  course  (-F.,  i,  9,  17-21),  is  a  recognition 
of  the  demand  for  consistency  and  stability— in  this  case  consistency  with 
the  general  policy  which  a  man  has  once  adopted. 

Another  aspect  of  consistency  to  which  we  find  reference  in  the  letters 


ABSTRACT  GOOD  87 

is  that  between  a  man's  acts  and  his  former  writings.  Balbus  is  exhorted 
to  remember  his  writings,  in  which  he  has  always  manifested  a  lofty  spirit, 
resolute  and  ready  for  all  exigencies.  Now  that  he  is  devoting  himself  to 
recording  the  deeds  of  brave  men,  he  ought  by  all  means  to  show  himself 
as  Uke  as  possible  to  those  whom  he  is  praising  (F.,  6,  12,  4-5).  The 
greater  number,  however,  of  the  references  to  consistency  between  deed 
and  book  are  found  in  letters  written  to  Atticus  in  50  and  49,  and  testing 
Cicero's  own  conduct  by  the  principles  laid  down  in  the  De  Re  Puhlica, 
which  was  published  at  about  the  time  when  Cicero  went  abroad  to  his 
province.  The  tone  of  these  passages  may  be  indicated  by  citing  several 
in  order.  As  a  reason  for  refusing  the  improper  requests  of  Brutus  he 
writes:  "Especially  since  I  have  bound  myself,  as  if  by  sureties,  by  the  six 
books  your  decided  approval  of  which  gives  me  joy  "(^.,6,1,8).  Referring 
to  the  same  temptation  he  wrote:  **And  shall  I  ever  have  the  hardihood 
to  read  or  even  touch  those  books  which  you  approve,  if  I  do  any  such  deed 
as  that"  (^.,  6,  2,  9)  ?  Later  the  assurance  is  given  that  Cicero's  adminis- 
tration is  worthy  of  these  same  books  {A.,  6,  3,  3).  He  carefully  points 
out  how  a  proposed  gift  to  Athens  does  not  fall  under  certain  strictures  in 
"my  books"  {A.,  6,  6,  2).  Upon  returning  from  the  province  he  writes 
that,  if  he  were  not  hampered  by  his  canvass  for  a  triumph,  he  would  very 
nearly  come  up  to  the  measure  of  the  character  delineated  in  his  sixth  book 
{ne  tu  hand  muUum  requireres  ilium  virum,  qui  in  sexto  libro  injormatus  estj 
.4 .,  7, 3,  2).  Early  in  49  Cicero  thanks  Atticus  for  an  admonition  to  remem- 
ber his  deeds,  words,  and  writings,  but  suggests  that  there  is  room  for  differ- 
ence of  opinion  as  to  what  the  right  and  worthy  course  is  {A.,  8,  2,  2). 
Because  he  is  doing  nothing  to  help  the  situation,  he  fears  that  he  will  be  a 
disgrace  to  his  studies  and  his  writings  (ne  ....  etiam  dedecori  sim  studiis 
ac  litteris  nostris,  A.,  8,  11,  i).  For  one  thing,  it  is  clear  that  Cicero  took 
the  opinions  expressed  in  his  Republic  seriously.  Here  is  one  at  least  of 
his  philosophical  works  which  he  did  not  consider  a  mere  epitome  of  current 
speculative  views  for  which  he  was  not  particularly  responsible.  To  such 
an  extent  did  he  feel  himself  sponsor  for  the  opinions  expressed  in  this  work 
that  not  only  his  subsequent  statements,  but  his  subsequent  acts  as  well, 
must  be  subject  to  comparison  with  them.  The  book  professes  to  give  the 
author's  beliefs  as  to  the  proper  aims  and  policies  of  government.  If  his 
acts  did  not  coincide  with  these  expressed  convictions,  he  could  not  escape 
the  charge  of  inconsistency.  Past  deeds  are  pledges  (pignora) ;  past  state- 
ments are  bondsmen  (praedes).  They  seem  to  occupy  the  same  plane,  so 
far  as  binding  subsequent  conduct  is  concerned. 

Sometimes  the  appeal  is  for  consistency  with  character  and  training. 


88  MORAL   VALUES   IN   CICERO'S   LETTERS 

The  most  explicit  examples  of  this  appeal  are  found  in  consolations.  To 
Plancus,  for  example,  Cicero  wrote  in  46:  "What  is  worthy  of  a  brave  and 
discreet  man,  what  is  demanded  of  you  by  your  seriousness  and  elevation 
of  spirit,  what  by  your  past  life,  what  by  the  studies  and  pursuits  for  which 
you  have  been  conspicuous  from  youth,  you  yourself  will  discern"  {F.,  4, 
13,  4);  and  to  Caecina:  ''Therefore  in  the  first  place  be  brave  and  high- 
spirited;  for  such  is  your  birth,  such  your  training,  such  your  learning,  such 
your  reputation,  that  your  are  under  obligations  to  do  this."*  Titius  is 
told  that  it  does  not  comport  with  the  seriousness  and  wisdom  (non  est  iam 
gravitatis  et  sapientiae  tuae)  which  he  has  displayed  from  childhood,  to  bear 
certain  trouble  immoderately;  ''For  you  have  always  shown  yourself  such 
a  man,  in  affairs  both  private  and  pubhc,  that  you  should  have  regard  for 
your  dignity  and  let  your  stability  of  character  prevail"  (i^.,  5,  16,  5).^  In 
these  cases  the  character  or  training  of  the  man  is  held  up  before  him  as  a 
reason  why  he  should  now  act  in  a  particular  way.  He  is  not  only  encour- 
aged by  past  steadfastness  to  hope  that  he  can  again  be  firm,  but  his  char- 
acter as  shown  in  the  past  is  represented  as  creating  an  obligation  to  act 
now  in  a  manner  consistent  therewith. 

In  i*'.,  4,  13,  4,  this  obligation  of  consistency  was  expressed  by  the  adjec- 
tive dignus,  "worthy,"  later  so  amplified  as  to  make  the  meaning  entirely 
clear.3  This  circumstance,  as  well  as  the  general  appropriateness  of  the 
interpretation,  connects  with  the  group  just  examined  passages  in  which 
without  amplification,  conduct  is  commended  as  being  worthy  of  one. 
Examples  are :  "So  you  were  afraid  you  would  appear  a  substantial  (gravis) 
citizen,  that  you  would  appear  too  brave,  too  worthy  of  yourself  "  (ne  nimis 
te  dignus  videres,  F.,  12,  28,  i);  "You  do  not  agree  with  me  as  to  what  in 
this  case  is  right  and  worthy  of  me"  {honestum  meque  dignum,  -4.,  8,  2,  2) ; 
"They  thought  this  course  base  and  unworthy  of  me "  {turpe  et  me  indignum, 
A.,  9,  6,  4);  and  "So  far  I  have  avoided  all  active  service,  especially  since 
nothing  can  be  done  in  a  manner  suitable  to  my  character  or  my  circum- 
stances" (ut  mihi  et  meis  rebus  aptum  esset,  A.,  11,  4,  i). 

In  so  far  as  character  is  presented  as  a  good  in  itself,  apart  from  the 
objective  goods  at  which  a  man  should  aim,  we  have  in  this  steadfastness, 

'  "Ita  enim  natus,  ita  educatus,  ita  doctus  es,  ita  enim  cognitus,  ut  tibi  id  facien- 
dum sit"  (F.,  6,  5,  4). 

2  The  words  are:  "Etenim  eum  semper  te  et  privatis  in  rebus  et  publicis  prae- 
stitisti,  tuenda  tibi  ut  sit  gravitas  et  constantiae  serviendum." 

3  "Quid  sit  forti  et  sapienti  homine  dignum,  quid  gravitas,  quid  altitude  animi, 
quid  acta  tua  vita,  quid  studia,  quid  artes,  quibus  a  pueritia  floruisti,  a  te  flagitent,  tu 
videbis." 


ABSTRACT  GOOD  89 

associated  especially  with  the  terms  gravitas  and  constantia,  the  cardinal 
trait  emphasized  in  the  letters  of  Cicero.  As  applied  to  a  man's  perform- 
ance of  his  part  toward  others  in  the  various  relationships  of  human  society, 
it  appears  as  loyalty  and  faithfulness,  expressed  in  such  terms  as  pietas  and 
■fides .^  As  applied  to  a  man's  attitude  toward  danger  and  trouble,  it  appears 
as  courage  and  fortitude.  Fortune  "as  a  trivial  and  feeble  thing  should 
beat  as  harmlessly  against  a  Strong  and  steadfast  spirit  as  a  wave  beats 
against  a  rock."*  Lucceius  in  return  for  a  letter  of  condolence  is  congratu- 
lated on  holding  himself  superior  to  the  vicissitudes  of  human  affairs,  and 
being  well  armed  against  fortune;  the  greatest  achievement  of  philosophy 
is  its  doctrine  of  self-sufficiency  and  its  refusal  to  reckon  a  hfe  good  or  bad 
on  grounds  outside  the  man  {F.,  5,  13,  i).  Cicero  evidently  is  here  using 
the  language  of  Stoic  philosophy.  But  a  little  later  he  continues  to  the 
effect  that  the  spectacle  of  Lucceius'  strength  and  steadfastness  of  spirit  is 
a  greater  comfort  than  the  formal  consolations  which  he  has  presented 
{F.,  5, 13,  3).  This  is  quite  in  keeping  with  the  ordinary  language  of  the 
letters;  but  the  significant  thing  is  the  essential  harmony  of  the  philosophical 
and  the  non-philosophical. 

This  same  quality,  steadfastness  of  spirit,  as  applied  to  the  temptations 
of  pleasure,  anger,  or  greed,  is  self-control.  As  to  anger,  we  find  the  reflec- 
tion that  to  hold  the  tongue  when  angry  sometimes  seems  no  less  a  virtue 
than  never  to  be  angry  at  all,  for  the  latter  may  sometimes  be  the  result,  not 
of  stability,  but  of  apathy.3  Note  the  implication  that  calmness  in  order 
to  be  a  virtue  must  be  an  expression  of  gravitas.  It  is  noteworthy  that 
financial  integrity  is  regularly  represented  as  an  aspect  of  self-control,  lust 
of  gold  in  this  connection  being  placed  on  a  plane  with  other  desires.  ''You 
withstand  the  allurements  of  money,  of  pleasure,  and  of  the  desire  of  all 
manner  of  objects,"  Cicero  wrote  to  Quintus  {Q.  F.,  i,  i,  7).  It  is  a  noble 
record  that  ''neither  statue,  nor  painting,  nor  vessel,  nor  raiment,  nor 
slave,  nor  the  beauty  of  anyone,  nor  proffered  money" — objects  in  which 
Asia  abounds — has  caused  Quintus  to  swerve  from  his  integrity  and  self- 
control  (Q.  F.,  I,  I,  8).     Cicero's  numerous  references  to  his  own  self- 

^  In  F.,  I,  7,  7,  fides,  in  the  sense  of  "good  faith,"  appears  coupled  with  gravitas, 
their  common  antithesis  being  levitas.  In  F.,  11,  29,  2,  fides  is  similarly  joined  with 
constantia.  Fides  is  the  term  which  Cicero  applies  to  his  loyalty  to  Appius  Claudius 
in  the  latter's  absence,  F.,  3,  9,  i.  Other  examples  of  fides  in  the  sense  of  "faithful- 
ness" are  in  A.,  16,  7,  2;    F.,  13,  55,  i;   and  A.,  7,  2,  7. 

2  "  Quam  existimo  levem  et  imbecillam  ab  animo  firmo  et  gravi  tamquam  fluctum 
a  saxo  frangi  oportere"  {F.,  9,  16,  6). 

3  "Nam  illud  est  non  solum  gravitatis,  sed  non  numquam  etiam  lentitudinis " 
(Q.  F.,  I,  I,  38). 


90  MORAL  VALUES  IN  CICERO 'S  LETTERS 

restraint^  in  his  province  must  refer  primarily  to  property.  A  striking 
claim  for  the  rank  of  the  virtue  of  self-control  was  made  in  a  letter  to  Cato 
from  Cilicia:  ''In  all  ages  the  men  found  able  to  conquer  their  own  desires 
have  been  fewer  than  those  able  to  conquer  the  forces  of  the  enemy. "^ 

In  several  of  the  summaries  of  desirable  traits  of  character  noted  at  the 
opening  of  this  chapter  there  were  included  terms  for  wisdom  or  ability; 
e.g.jingenium  (A.,  14,  17A,  5),  consilium  (F.,  11,  27,  6),  prudentia  (F.,  10, 
3,1);  and  power  to  foresee  the  future  (^.,12,4,2).  Passages  where  wisdom 
is  incidentally  mentioned  as  a  desideratum  could  be  further  cited;  and  we 
have  seen  how  emphatically  Cicero  in  various  crises  expressed  his  desire 
to  decide  wisely.  Still  in  reflections  upon  character  the  importance  of 
wisdom  is  rather  assumed  than  emphasized  or  amplified.  We  have  also 
seen  how  the  milder  virtues  of  courtesy,  gentleness,  and  mercy  are  enjoined 
as  a  counterpoise  to  keep  the  more  stalwart  traits  from  being  harsh  and 
forbidding. 

If,  then,  we  should  venture  to  summarize  in  a  definition  the  conception 
of  desirable  character  reflected  in  the  correspondence  of  Cicero,  it  would 
be  something  like  this:  Desirable  character  is  steadfastness  in  the  pursuit 
of  proper  aims — a  steadfastness  resting  upon  wisdom  and  limited  by  gentle- 
ness. 

The  satisfaction  arising  from  the  approval  of  one's  own  acts  or  purposes 
is  frequently  in  this  correspondence  represented  as  a  good.  In  the  earlier 
letters,  as  compared  with  the  later,  the  expressions  of  self-approval  are  more 
direct  and  objective,  as  where  Cicero  declares  that  he  is  free  from  fault  in 
the  matter  of  his  exile  (e.  g.jQ-  F.,  1,4,  i),  or  where  he  assures  the  captious 
and  complaining  Appius  Claudius  that  his  own  correct  conduct  toward  him 
is  a  matter  of  great  satisfaction  (F.,  3,  6,  3).  While  governor  in  Cilicia, 
Cicero  expressed  direct  satisfaction  in  his  fine  administration;  for  example: 
**I  did  not  understand  myself,  nor  did  I  realize  what  I  could  accomplish  in 
this  fine;  I  am  properly  puffed  up"  (.4.,  5,  20,  6);  and,  "Nor  does  the 
reputation,  great  as  it  is,  so  much  delight  me  as  does  the  thing  itself"  (ibid.). 

1  E.  g.,  continentia,  A.,  5,  3,  3;   5,  20,  6;   F.,  15,  4,  i;   abstinentia,  A.,  5,  21,  5; 
5,  16,  3. 

2  "In   omnibus   saeculis  pauciores  viri  reperti  sunt,  qui  suas  cupiditates  quam 
qui  hostium  copias  vincerent"  {F.,  15,  4,  15)     This  reminds  one  of  Horace's: 

Latins  regnes  avidum  domando 

Spiritum  quam  si  Libyam  remotis 

Gadibus  iungas  et  uterque  Poenus 

Serviat  uni  {Od.  2,  2,  9-12); 
and,  "He  that  is  slow  to  anger  is  better  than  the  mighty;  and  he  that  ruleth  his  spirit 
than  he  that  taketh  a  city"  (Proverbs  16:32) 


ABSTRACT   GOOD  91 

The  more  reflective  and  abstract  references  to  self-approval — cases 
where  it  is  the  consciousness  of  having  done  right  that  is  dwelt  on  as  the 
good— are  found  chiefly  in  the  letters  of  the  later  years.  Some  belong  to 
49  and  48,  but  the  greater  number  were  written  in  46  and  45,  being  consola- 
tions addressed  to  friends,  or  self- justifying  reflections  upon  his  own  career, 
suggested  by  the  disasters  that  had  befallen  the  party  of  the  repubhc.  The 
self-sufficiency  of  virtue  is  a  philosophical  idea  which  we  shall  find  intro- 
duced more  or  less  expUcitly  in  connection  with  these  consolations  and 
reflections. 

The  question  naturally  arises  whether  the  late  predominance  of  the 
more  philosophical  form  of  the  doctrine  of  conscience  is  due  primarily  to 
the  circumstances  in  which  Cicero  and  his  party  were  placed  in  the  later 
period,  or  to  his  philosophical  studies  during  these  years.  We  may  gain 
some  light  on  this  question  from  a  letter  written  to  the  exiled  Sittius  in  52, 
before  the  composition  of  any  of  Cicero's  ethical  works,  except  the  Republic, 
and  at  a  time  when  he  was  not  using  abstract  terms  for  his  approval  of  his 
own  course.  Sittius  should  find  comfort  in  the  character  and  affection  of 
his  son,  in  the  loyalty  of  his  friends,  and  especially  in  his  own  conscience 
{animi  tui  conscientia,)  when  he  reflects  that  his  troubles  have  not  come 
upon  him  by  his  deserts,  and  that  it  is  the  part  of  a  wise  man  to  be 
troubled  by  disgrace,  not  by  disaster,  and  by  his  own  fault,  not  by  others' 
wrongdoing  {F.,^,  17,4-5).  Here  we  find  reference  to  conscience  in  the 
most  general  terms,  joined  with  a  statement  of  the  sufficiency  of  virtue- 
In  49  right  in  general,  or  specific  duties  and  interests,  are  the  goods  aimed 
at;  but  when  Cicero  turns  to  review  the  more  or  less  immediate  past, 
we  find  various  expressions  for  self -approval :  ''I  am  comforted  by  what 
you  write,  concluding  that  so  far  I  have  done  nothing  wTong"  (A.,  9,  10, 
10) ;  "So  I  presume  that  he  [Caesar  after  his  overtures  were  rejected]  is  not 
satisfied  with  me.  But  I  was  satisfied  with  myself  {ego  me  amavi) — a 
a  thing  which  has  not  happened  for  some  time"  {A.,  9,  18,  i);  "Therefore 
I  shall  never  regret  my  resolve  [to  abandon  the  struggle  after  Pharsalus]; 
my  method  of  carrying  it  out  I  do  regret"  {A.,  11,  6,  2).  Far  more  impor- 
tant for  our  purpose  is  a  letter  of  49  in  which  Cicero  gives  a  detatiled  com- 
parison between  his  own  career  and  that  of  Caesar  and  of  Pompey,  in  the 
course  of  which  he  remarks :  "lam  therefore  supported  by  a  clear  conscience 
when  I  reflect  that  I  have  either,  where  possible,  served  the  state  efficiently, 
or  else  at  all  events  I  have  entertained  for  it  none  but  loyal  purposes."^ 
This  passage,  as  well  as  F.,  5,  17,  4-5,  considered  above,  antedates  Cicero's 

^  "Praeclara  igitur  conscientia  sustentor,  cum  cogito  me  de  re  publica  aut  meru- 
isse  optime,  cum  potuerim,  aut  certe  numquam  nisi  pie  cogitasse"  {A.,  10,  4,5). 


92  MORAL   VALUES   IN   CICERO  S   LETTERS 

distinctly  ethical  works;  yet  both  present  conscience  abstractly;  both  look 
back  upon  past  acts  which  from  external  indications  seemed  ineffectual. 
Sittius  is  in  exile,  Cicero  is  without  his  old-time  political  power.  But  each 
may  find  consolation  by  reflecting  that  his  aims  and  motives  have  been 
worthy.  Now,  this  was  just  the  situation  of  Cicero  and  his  fellow-optimates 
in  46  aud  45,  when  the  abstract  references  to  conscience  were  most  numer- 
ous. A  natural  conclusion  seems  to  be  that,  while  the  tone  of  the  passages 
in  question  may  reflect  the  philosophical  studies  of  Cicero's  later  years,  yet 
the  circumstances  in  which  he  and  his  correspondents  in  these  years  were 
placed  suppUed  independent  reasons  for  such  consolation. 

We  note  how,  in  the  passage  last  cited  (A.,  10,  5,  4),  loyal  sentiments 
are  placed  on  a  plane  with  efficient  services  as  a  ground  of  satisfaction.  To 
different  friends  he  writes  of  the  comfort  which  he  has  in  the  consciousness 
of  his  former  plans  (F.,  9,  16,  6;  4,  3,  i ;  cf.  6,  21,  i) ;  and  to  Lucceius:  ''For 
you  give  me  pleasant  reminders  of  the  good  conscience  which  is  mine,  and  of 
the  deeds  which  I  did  especially  upon  your  advice  "  {F.,  5,13,4).  That  the 
purposes,  independently  of  outcome,  is  a  matter  for  congratulation  is  again 
emphasized  in  a  letter  to  Torquatus.  There  is  no  greater  comfort  for  their 
common  ills  than  the  consciousness  of  good  intentions  {bonae  voluntatis). 
They  are  free  from  fault,  the  one  great  evil,  in  that  their  sentiments  were 
most  loyal.  It  was  the  outcome  of  their  plan  rather  than  the  plan  that  is 
open  to  criticism  (F.,  6,  4,  2). 

Thus  does  Cicero  profess  to  find  comfort  for  himself;  though  the  pur- 
pose of  his  declarations,  as  in  the  last  case,  may  be  the  comfort  of  another. 
This  same  comfort  is  directly  commended  to  others.  The  consciousness 
of  past  deeds  and  counsels  should  console  Caecina  and  Trebianus  (F.,  6,  6> 
12;  6,  10,  4).  The  liberatores  will  have  as  a  comfort  the  consciousness  of 
their  great  and  glorious  deed,  although  they  have  not  really  freed  the  citizens 
by  killing  the  king  (^4.,  14,  11,  i);  they  will  always  be  blessed  in  the  con- 
sciousness of  their  act,  but  their  fellow-citizens  will  still  be  in  bondage  (^., 
14,  12,  2).  Here  too,  in  what  might  at  first  seem  congratulation,  there  is 
the  contrast  between  the  good  intention,  the  consciousness  of  which  brings 
happiness,  and  the  failure  of  that  good  intention  to  gain  its  practical  objec- 
tive end.  A  word  of  cheer  to  Torquatus  presents  the  famihar  consola- 
tion of  conscience,  and  at  the  same  time  with  peculiar  emphasis  states 
the  ethical  doctrine  of  the  sufficiency  of  right  expressed  in  language  which 
a  Stoic  might  use:  "For  if  to  purpose  well  and  act  rightly  suffice  for 
the  good  and  happy  life,  I  fear  lest  it  be  monstrous  to  call  him  wretched 
who  can  sustain  himself  with  the  consciousness  of  noblest  motives."  It 
was  duty  that  led  us  to  leave  fatherland  and  children  and  fortunes,  and  to 


ABSTRACT  GOOD  93 

enter  war.  We  took  into  account  the  possibility  of  defeat.  There  is  no 
occasion  for  dejection.  We  are  free  from  fault,  and  that  is  all  we  should 
claim  in  life  (F.,  6,  i,  3-4).  We  have  already  seen  Cicero's  reply  to  the 
protest  of  Atticus  at  a  seemingly  undue  exaltation  of  fame.  It  was  an  inad- 
vertence to  speak  of  fame  as  if  nothing  were  better.  He  still  professes  an 
aim  consistent  with  his  philosophic  pursuits,  not  to  swerve  a  hair's 
breadth  from  the  dictates  of  a  good  conscience  (^.,  13,  20,  4;  cf.  7,  3,  11). 

From  the  passages  examined  above  it  must  be  clear  that  Cicero  freely 
speaks  of  "right"  and  "duty"  as  abstract  terms,  without  specif)dng  the 
particular  interests  involved. 

Apart  from  the  unambiguous  rectum,^  the  terms  most  frequently  thus 
employed  are  ofjicium  and  honestum.  We  have  found  the  word  ojjicia 
applied  to  the  specific  services  which  Pompey  rendered  to  Cicero  (^.,  9, 
5,  3).  Again  ofjicium  has  stood  for  the  type  of  service  which  one  normally 
renders  in  some  particular  relationship ;  as  the  duty  of  a  friend  or  the  duty 
of  a  citizen  {nee  solum  civis,  sed  etiam  amid  officio  revocor,  A.,  7,  12,  s)-^ 
Then  "duty"  without  quaUfication  is  assigned  as  a  reason  for  following 
Pompey  (F.,  6,  6,  6).  The  limit  of  the  series  is  found  where  offi^ium  is 
used  of  duty  in  the  most  general  sense,  as  where  Cicero  writes  of  "duty 
which  the  few,  or  glory  which  the  many,  follow"  (F.j  10,  26,  3).  This 
is  the  term  which  Cicero  selected  as  the  best  Latin  equivalent  for  the 
general  term  in  Greek  for  duty,  yet  the  appropriateness  of  the  translation 
seems  to  have  been  questioned  by  Atticus,  for  Cicero  writes:  "But,  to 
pass  to  another  point,  I  have  no  doubt  that  what  the  Greeks  expressed 
by  KaOrJKov  we  express  by  officium.  And  now  why  do  you  question  the 
appropriateness  of  the  word  as  appHed  to  political  relations  ?  Do  we  not 
say  'the  duty  (officium)  of  the  consuls,  the  duty  of  the  senate,  the  duty 
of  a  general  ?'  It  corresponds  admirably;  or  else  suggest  a  better  term" 
(A.,  16,  14,  3). 

Honestum  is  also  a  word  which  appears  in  the  letters  with  several  grades 
of  meaning.  In  some  cases  it  means  "tending  to  confer  or  win  honor,"  as 
where  Cicero  writes  of  having  a  report  so  rendered  as  to  contain  what  was 
honestum  et  utile  for  his  correspondent;  that  is,  to  his  credit  and  advantage 
(F.,  $,  20,  2).  For  honestissimo  in  ^.,  9,  7,  3,  Tyrrell  suggests,  "that  which 
involves  least  personal  humiliation."  Cicero  is  here  contemplating  the 
acceptance  of  that  one  of  the  many  threatening  perils  which  involves  least 

I  For  this  use  of  rectum  see  quod  ita  rectum  sit  {A.,  i,  20,  3),  given  as  a  reason  for 
adhering  to  the  senate;  si  erit  rectius  followed  by  quod  honestius  {A.,  7,  3,  2);  so  ^4., 
8,  II,  4;  8,  12,  3;  8,  15,  3;  9,  7,  3.  Notice  that  these  appeals  to  "right"  are  chiefly 
from  the  correspondence  of  49. 


94  MORAL   VALUES   IN   CICERO 'S   LETTERS 

discredit.  From  'Handing  to  honor"  the  transition  is  natural  to  ** worthy 
of  honor",  ''honorable;"  and  it  is  doubtless  this  use  that  led  Cicero  to 
choose  the  word  to  express  the  highest  abstract  right.  In  his  philosophical 
works  he  defined  honestum  as  that  which  "even  if  praised  by  no  one  is  by 
nature  worthy  of  praise  "  {De  Officiis,  i ,  4, 14) .  So  in  the  De  Finibus  (11,14, 
45)  the  honestnm  is  an  object  "such  that  apart  from  all  utiHty,  without  any 
compensations  or  fruits,  it  can  for  its  own  sake  justly  be  praised."  It  is 
difficult  to  beUeve  that  the  term  would  have  been  chosen  for  such  service  in 
the  ethical  works,  were  it  not  generally  recognized  as  a  word  naturally 
designating  what  by  nature  is  admirable — the  honorable  in  the  best  sense; 
and  it  is  certainly  so  used  in  the  letters,  as  where  Cicero  tells  Atticus  that  he 
will  give  up  the  hope  of  the  triumph  upon  which  he  has  set  his  heart,  if 
canvassing  for  it  will  interfere  with  his  usefulness  as  a  citizen ;  he  will  take 
the  course  which  is  honestius  {A.,  7,  3,  2).  Honestas  and  honestum  must 
certainly  have  their  high  ethical  force  in  the  vehement  denunciation  of 
Caesar  a  few  days  after  he  crossed  the  Rubicon.  Caesar  claims,  forsooth, 
to  be  acting  for  the  sake  of  his  honor  {dignitatis  causa) ,  but  where  is  honor 
(dignitas)  apart  from  right  (honestum)  ?  Is  it  right  {honestum) y  then,  to 
ride  roughshod  over  the  constitution,  devising  numberless  iniquities,  includ- 
ing the  crowning  one  of  tyranny  {A.,  7,  11,  i)  ?  There  should,  then,  be 
no  presumption  against  the  higher  ethical  meaning  of  honestum  and  honestas 
where  the  context  calls  for  it;  still  the  meanings  "conducing  to  honor," 
"creditable,"  "respectable,"  "honorable,"  "right,"  so  blend  together  that 
more  than  one  of  them  are  often  appropriate  to  a  given  context.  The  reg- 
ular antithesis  of  honestum  in  practice  is  turpe,  the  "ugly,"  "base," 
"dishonorable,"  "wrong."^ 

The  fact  that  Cicero  in  his  letters  uses  rectum,  honestum,  and  officium 
as  general  terms  of  approval  does  not  require  detailed  proof.  It  is,  how- 
ever, important  to  determine  whether  we  have  in  the  appeal  to  right  a  dis- 
tinct motive,  with  sanctions  distinct  from  the  obligations  already  considered ; 
or  whether  we  have  simply  these  same  obligations  stated  in  more  abstract 
terms. 

In  the  first  place,  careful  scrutiny  fails  to  show  in  the  letters  the  shghtest 
recognition  of  a  supernatural  sanction  for  right  and  duty.  The  only  refer- 
ences to  religious  considerations  as  affecting  action  apply  to  purely  cere- 
monial matters;  Terentia  is  to  offer  certain  sacrifices  in  view  of  her  husband's 
I  This  is  clearly  shown  by  such  an  antithesis  as  "nihil  esse  bonum  nisi  quod 
honestum,  nihil  malum  nisi  quod  turpe  sit"  (A.  10,  4,  4);  cf.  "turpe  et  me  indignum" 
(A.,  9,  6,  4),  as  the  correlative  of  "honestum  meque  dignum"  (A.,  8,  2,  2);  and  ,"0 
rem  turpem  et  ea  re  miseram !  Sic  enim  sentio,  id  demum  aut  potius  id  solum  esse 
miserum  quod  turpe  sit"  (A.,  8,  8,  i). 


ABSTRACT   GOOD  95 

recovery  from  some  indisposition  (F.,  14,  7,  i) ;  a  way  is  suggested  by  which 
Ptolemy  may  be  restored  to  his  throne  without  violating  the  oracle  {F.,  i, 
7,  4);  and  certain  references  are  made  to  the  familiar  manipulation  of 
auspices  for  pohtical  ends  (e.  g.j  Q.  F.,  2,  4,  4-5).  To  Terentia  he  wrote, 
while  on  his  way  into  exile:  "Neither  gods  whom  you  have  piously  rever- 
enced, nor  men  to  whom  I  have  always  devoted  myself,  have  made  us  any 
return"  (F.,  14,  4,  i).  Possibly  his  Hking  for  rhetorical  antitheses  had 
something  to  do  with  the  form  in  which  this  family  division  of  labor  is 
stated. 

If  we  examine  the  application  of  these  terms,  we  find  that  the  acts  to 
which  they  are  specifically  applied  are  acts  of  social  service.  Officium  we 
find  given  as  a  reason  for  seeking  the  interests  of  son  (^4.,  14,  7,  2),  wife  (^4., 
12,  21,  3),  or  friend  (F.,  6,  6,  6),  as  well  as  of  commonwealth  (F.,  15,  2,  i  ; 
6,  I,  3;  10,  26,  3);  or  the  reference  may  be  to  the  combined  or  conflicting 
interests  of  country  and  friend;  as,  Officii  me  deliberatio  cruciat  (^.,  8, 15,  2). 
Honestum,  as  we  have  seen,  is  so  colored  with  associations  of  social  approval 
that  it  is  difficult  to  fix  the  point  at  which  it  becomes  an  absolute  term.  We 
find  it  coupled  with  rectum  repeatedly  in  49  to  designate  the  course  com- 
mended by  loftiest  considerations  (^.,  8,  2,  4;  F.,  5,  19,  i ;  4,  2,  2).  During 
the  same  crisis  honestum  without  rectum  is  similarly  used  (e.  g.,  A.^  10,  4, 
4;7,  II,  i;8,2,  2).  The  same  term  is  applied  to  the  patriotic  course  under 
other  circumstances  (e.  g.,  ^.,  7,  3,  2;  14,  7,  2;  F.,  10,  25,  1-2).  So  it  is  in 
connection  with  duty  to  state  or  family  or  friends,  as  contrasted  with  imme- 
diate individual  interests,  that  the  conspicuous  intstances  of  rectum  or 
honestum,  assigned  as  a  motive,  are  found.  One  of  the  reasons  for  adhering 
to  the  senate  in  60  is  "because  it  is  right"  (^.,  i,  20,  3).  In  50  Cicero  will 
give  up  the  hope  of  a  triumph,  if  right  shall  dictate  that  course  {si  id  erit 
rectius,  ^.,  7,  3,  2);  that  is,  if  he  finds  that  the  canvass  for  the  triumph 
seriously  hinders  him  from  doing  his  duty  as  a  citizen.  Most  of  the  remain- 
ing instances  of  rectus  in  this  sense  which  we  have  noted  occur  in  connection 
with  his  attitude  toward  Pompey's  cause  in  49.  "What  is  right  and  what 
I  ought  to  do  ?"  is  a  question  which  Cicero  wishes  time  to  consider  (A.,  8, 
12,  3).  He  tells  us  that  he  remained  in  Italy  instead  of  following  Pompey 
because,  among  other  reasons,  the  balance  of  right  was  on  that  side  {hoc 
juit  rectius,  ^.,  8,  11,  4.).  It  is  better  {rectius)  to  suffer  anything  at  home 
rather  than  join  in  an  assault  on  Italy  (^.,  9,  7,  4). 

We  have  to  do,  then,  with  terms  primarily  connected,  so  far  as  these 
letters  are  concerned,  with  a  man's  duty  to  his  fellows,  but  not,  so  far  as 
the  letters  indicate,  connected  with  any  supernatural  sanctions.  Have  we 
in  the  correspondence  any  definite  and  affirmative  data  as  to  how  Cicero 


96 

would  relate  his  thought  of  the  right  and  honorable  with,  for  example,  the 
assumption  that  the  citizen  should  strive  and  make  sacrifices  for  the  welfare 
of  his  country  ? 

The  facts  presented  in  our  second  chapter  indicate  how  powerful  an  influ- 
ence, practically,  the  opinion  of  others  was  to  Cicero  and  his  contemporaries 
in  the  enforcement  of  social  service.  The  relatively  high  rank  assigned  to 
reputation  and  glory  indicates  an  ethical  stage  when  social  pressure  was 
frankly  acknowledged,  as  well  as  powerfully  felt,  to  be  a  prominent  sanction 
for  conduct.  The  selection  of  honestum — a  word  so  intimately  connected 
with  social  approval — to  express  the  most  general  idea  of  right,  points  in 
the  same  direction. 

At  the  beginning  of  our  third  chapter  (p.  43)  we  considered  a  passage  of 
the  greatest  importance  for  our  present  question  (^4.,  7,  2,  4).  Cicero  inci- 
dentally, and  under  circumstances  which  indicate  seriousness  and  sincerity, 
seeks  to  impress  upon  Atticus  the  Academic  view  of  virtue.  He  argues  for  a 
goodness  which  is  right  by  nature — natura  rectum.  This  seems  to  include 
all  that  is  in  the  honestum  and  rectum  now  in  question.  The  specific  exam- 
ple which  Cicero  here  gives  of  how  right  should  be  derived  from  nature, 
rather  than  from  individual  utility,  is  an  unfolding  of  the  implications  of 
natural  parental  instinct  and  the  attending  disposition  to  cherish  ofifspring. 
From  this  beginning  in  the  family  are  derived  natural  altruistic  bonds 
holding  together  with  mutual  obligation  the  members  of  the  various  social 
units.  We  saw  how  this  brief  passage  coincided  with  the  theory  repeatedly 
approved  in  Cicero's  ethical  works.  It  sketches  a  doctrine  of  social  virtue 
which  harmonizes  with  what  we  have  found  throughout  the  letters.  It 
makes  social  virtue  independent  of  the  pleasure  or  whim  of  the  individual, 
without  being  supernatural  or  mystic.  Right  conduct  rests  upon  nature; 
that  is,  it  is  determined  by  the  requirements  of  those  social  relationships 
which  spring  from  the  nature  of  man;  and  the  realtionships  which  actually 
have  arisen  among  men  are  assumed  to  be  the  natural  outgrowths  of  man's 
constitution. 

If  this  represents  Cicero's  point  of  view,  the  question,  ''What  is  it  right 
to  do?"  as  appUed  to  social  relations  means  simply;  "What  do  the  inter- 
ests of  those  associated  with  me  in  this  unit,  or  in  various  social  units, 
demand  of  me  ? "  To  make  honestum  the  primary  consideration  is  to 
C  consider  not  merelv  individual  interests,  but  the  interests  of  family,  friends, 
party,  and  fellow-citizens  as  well.  Such  conduct  is  evidently  likely  to 
coincide  with  the  dictates  of  popular  sentiment  within  the  several  groups 
concerned. 

The  antithesis  between  right  and  expediency  is  the  antithesis  between 


ABSTRACT   GOOD  97 

individualistic  and  social  conduct.  Cicero  recognizes  that  in  the  ordinary 
sense  of  the  language  such  an  antithesis  may  exist — a  man's  immediate 
individual  interest  maybe  counter  to  the  promptings  of  patriotism;  but  at 
the  same  time  he  maintains  that  in  a  higher  philosophical  sense  a  man's 
truest  interest  must  coincide  with  his  duty.  The  two  points  of  view  are 
brought  into  formal  comparison  in  two  letters  written  to  different  corre- 
spondents at  about  the  same  time  in  49  (F.,  4,  2,  2,  and  5,  19,  1-2).  In 
both  cases  the  dictates  of  right  are  said  to  be  clear,  and  those  of  expediency 
uncertain.  In  both  cases  the  popular  language  is  corrected  by  the  state- 
ment of  the  philosophical  doctrine,  definitely  referred  to  as  philosophical.' 
From  the  precedence  regularly  given  to  social  as  against  individuahstic 
good  we  should  expect  generalized  statements  of  the  supremacy  af  right, 
such  as,  *'But  do  not  doubt  that  the  more  honorable  course  is  the  one  to 
which  I  shall  give  precedence"  {A.,  7,  3,  2);  or  the  exhortation  to  Fumius 
during  the  final  struggle  (F.j  10,  25,  2),  "For  what  is  more  honorable,  or 
what  is  to  be  esteemed  more  highly,  than  the  honorable  ?  " 

The  passages  which  so  exalt  abstract  right  as  to  leave  Uttle  place  for  any 
other  good  have  their  epitome  and  explanation  in  a  passage  already  cited. 
The  desperate  political  situation  is  admitted.  It  is  called  a  great  evil. 
Whatever  philosophers  may  say,  each  man  is  thrown  back  for  comfort  upon 
his  own  natural  powers  of  endurance.  Then  the  philosophical  comfort  is 
introduced  by  the  proviso:  "For  if  loyal  sentiments  and  right  actions 
suffice  for  living  well  and  happily  .  .  .  ."  In  a  philosophical  sense  men 
cannot  be  called  wretched  while  they  have  virtue,  and  with  this  reflection 
Cicero,  "in  vaew  of  the  loss  of  all  things,"  seeks  consolation  (P.,  6,  i,  3-4). 
Nothing  really  terrible  can  happen  to  the  man  who  is  free  from  blame 
(F.J  5,  21,  5).  Freedom  from  fault  is  the  one  great  comfort  (F.,  6,  3,  4); 
all  else  can  be  borne  w^th  a  brave  heart  (F.,  12,  22,  2).  This  might  be 
but  an  emphatic  statement  of  the  relative  importance  of  right — a  doctrine 
common  both  in  Cicero's  letters  and  in  his  ethical  works.  Sometimes,  how- 
ever, he  goes  farther  and  employs  Stoic  language  inconsistent  with  his  usual 
position.  To  Cornificius  he  writes  in  44  that  nothing  from  which  fault  is 
absent  should  be  counted  among  ills  (F.,  12,  23,  4).  So  in  49  (A.,  10,  4,  4) 
he  quoted  approvingly  from  his  De  Re  Publica  the  sentiment  that  noth- 
ing is  good  save  what  is  virtuous  (honestum) ,  and  nothing  evil  save  what 
is  morally  base  (turpe) .  Such  utterances,  probably  to  be  taken  rhetorically, 
are  altogether  sporadic  and  apart  from  what  Cicero  regularly  maintains. 

I  "Quid  rectum  sit  apparet;  quid  expediat  obscunim  est,  ita  tamen,  ut,  si  nos 
ii  sumus,  qxii  esse  debemus,  id  est,  studio  digni  ac  litteris  nostris,  dubitare  non  possi- 
mus,  quin  ea  maxime  conducant,  quae  sint  rectissima"  (F.,  5,  19,  2). 


98  MORAL  VALUES  IN  CICERO'S  LETTERS 

The  right  and  honorable  (honestum)  is  the  supreme,  but  not  the  exclusive, 
good.     The  morally  base  (turpe)  is  the  deepest,  but  not  the  exclusive,  evil. 

A  survey  of  the  motives  expressed  or  approved  in  this  corrrespondence 
indicates  that  its  writer  and  the  people  from  whom,  and  in  great  measure 
for  whom,  he  spoke,  recognized  as  the  good,  the  possession  of  which  was 
happiness,  no  single  principle  of  the  philosopher,  but  the  varied  elements 
entering  into  the  complex  of  man's  individual  and  social  life.  Life,  health, 
pursuits,  and  possessions;  the  variously  expressed  approval  of  one's  fellows; 
the  welfare  of  kindred,  friends,  fellow-citizens,  and  fellow-men;  character, 
conscience,  and  right  in  its  most  general  and  abstract  forms — these  are  the 
ends  which  we  find  presented  as  worthy  of  man's  endeavor.  Our  study 
yields  no  specific  formula,  but  its  end  has  been  attained  in  proportion  as  it 
exhibits  in  true  perspective  and  relation  the  varied  aims  presented  in  this 
unique  transcript  of  ancient  thought  and  feeling. 


INDEX  TO  CITED  PASSAGES 


Ad  Auicum 


PAGE 
18,19 
■      -^9 

•-•49 
...18 
...19 
...18 


...19 
...19 
...78 

•••57 
...18 

•  •.83 
...  66 
...29 

36,39 
...66 


4,3 

5,2 

6,  2 

6,18 

7 

9,2 

10,3 

10,4 

11,3 

12,4 

13,4 

13,6 

14,5 

16,  2 

16,5 

17,5 

17,6 

17,8 

18,1 44,45 

18,7 66 

19,6 12,31 

19,7 12 

19,8 83 

20,  2 12 

20,  2-3 86 

20,  3....  12,  32,  33, 93,  95 
20,7 19 

I.I 79 

1,6 12,56 

1,8 66 

1, 12 19 

3.1 57 

4,2 20 

5,1 26,27,31,32 

5,2 20 

8,  2 79 

9,3 65 

10 79 

13,2 57 

14,1 57 

16,  4 66 

17,3 57 

19,2 57,85 

21,3-4 57 

22,  2 56 

23.1 57 

24,4 II 

5,1 51 

7,2 16 

7,3 44 

8,3 46 


Ad  Auicum  PAGE 

3,9,2 16 

3,13,2 47 

3,14,1 57 

3,19,3 47 

3,20,1 38,39 

3,22,2 58 

3,22,3 :    .  .44 

3,23,5 47 

4,8,2 19,79 

4,  8a,  I 79 

4,  10,  I 21 

4,  10,  2 18 

4,  II,  2 21 

4,15,7 56 

4,18,1 83 

4,  18,  2 18,63,64 

5,1,3-4 49 

5,3,3 27,90 

5,5,2 18 

5,6,1-2 58 

5,10,1 77 

5,14,2 77 

5,15,2 77 

5,16,3 78,90 

5,17,2 28 

5,  17,4 44 

5,17,5 28 

5,  20,  1 76 

5,20,5 79 

5,20,6 17,27,33, 

77,78,90 
5,21,5 76,78,90 

5,21,7 77 

5,21,10-13 53,76 

6,1,2 77 

6,1,15 76 

6,1,5-8 76 

6,1,6 53 

6,1,8 87 

6, 1,  II 58 

6,1,16 77 

6,1,21 53,77 

6,1,8 33,76 

6,2,4 77 

6,2,5 78 

6,2,8 33 

6^2,9 54,87 

6,2,10.... 53,58 

6,3,2 49 

6,3,3 87 

6,3,8 49 

99 


Ad  Auicum 
6,  6,  I  


6,2. 

6,3- 
7,2. 
8,5. 
9,2. 

I,  2. 


•50 
•87 

73 
•47 
■35 
•35 

59 


1,4 26,86 

1.6 17,76,77 

2,4 43,96 

2,  6 35 

2,7 34,81,89 

3,  2 

••35,75.87,93.94,95,97 

3.3 67 

3,4 68 

3,8 77 

3,11 93 

4, 1 28 

5,2 50 

5,4 71.72 

6,  2 67,  69 

7,4 74 

7,5 74 

7.7 72,75 

11,1 41.94,95 

II,  1-2 92 

12,3 14,26,59,64,93 

12,5 54 

13,1-2 68 

13.3 47 

14,3 40,69,70 

15,1 50 

17,4 42 

18,1 69 

18,2 69 

20,2 59.72,7s 

21, 1  and  3 6& 

22,  2 14 

23.2 II 

23,3 14 

26,2 13 

1,3 26 

1.4 59 

2,2 60,87,88,94,9s 

2,4 67,69,9s 

3,2 59,67,85 

3.2-5 13 

3.3 60 

4,2 55,82 

7,2 59 


lOO 


MORAL   VALUES   IN   CICERO 'S   LETTERS 


Ad  Atticum  page 

8,8,1 94 

8,9,3 i8,8s 

8,11,1 65,76,87 

8,  II,  2 64,65,68,  72 

8,11,4 93,95 

8,  iiD,  7 14,69,70 

8,  iiD,  8 59,64 

8,12,3 93,95 

8,12,4 64,67 

8,12,5 13 

8,14,2 8,51,59,60,85 

8,15,2 26,85 

8,15,3 93 

8,16,1 25 

8, 16,  2 26,  72 

9,1,3 13,26 

9,1,4 25,59,74 

9,  2a,  2 15,  25,  60,  68 

9,  2a,  3 74 

9,4,2 14,61,65,75 

9,5,2 60,68 

9,5,3 15,59,60,74,93 

9,  6,  2 66 

9,6,4 60,75,88,94 

9,6,5 23 

9,6,7 64 

9,  7, 1 64,  68 

9,7,3 59,61,93 

9,7,4 60,61,68,95 

9,7,5 37 

9,7,6 26 

9,9,1 60 

9,9,2 61,63,64 

9, 10,  2 21 

9,  10,3 15,64,68,69,85 

9,10,5 66 

9, 10, 10 26 

9,11,2 70 

9,11,3 68 

9,  iiA 70 

9,  iiA,  1-2 70 

9,  "A,  3 61,64,67 

9,12,3 13 

9, 12,  4 61 

9,12,7 15 

9,13,3 26,60,61,68 

9,13,8 69 

9,14,2 69 

9,17,1 63 

9, 18, 1 14,  62,91 

9,19,2 60 

9,  19,  4 82 

9,20,3 63 

10,1,3 72 

10,4,2 67 

10,  4,  3 68 

10,4,4 63,65,94,95,97 

10,4,5 47,49,91 

10,5,4 92 


Ad  Atticum  page 

o,  6,  2 49 

o,  7,  I ....  61,  64,  68,  69,  72 

0,7,3 48 

0,8,  2 68,  72 

0,8,5 13 

0,8,6-8 72 

0,8,8 85 

0,8,9 i3> 

0,9,2 48 

0,10,  5 65 

o,  12,  6 68 

0,  12a,  1 13 

1,  1, 1 28 

,  1, 1-2 18 

1,3,1 47 

1,4,1 88 

1,  6,  1-2 28 

1,6,2 35,91 

1,6,4 47 

1,6,5 62,82 

1,7,1 35 

1,7,3 75 

1,7,6 47 

1,8,2 45 

1,9,2 45,48 

1,9,3 45,47 

1, 10, 1 45 

1, 12,  2 49 

1,13,1 75 

1,15,2 45 

2,4,2 15,81,90 

2,  6,  2 21 

2, 14,  3 22,46 

2, 18, 1 16,  46 

2,21,3 45,48,95 

2,  22, 1 45 

2,23 45 

2,23,1 46 

2,28,1 45 

2,  28,  2 46 

2,  36,  I 46,51 

2,38,1 22 

2,  38a,  I 22 

2,44,4 22 

2,51,2 66 

2,53 51 

3,  10,  I 22 

3,20,4 33,93 

3,21,7 50 

3,28,2 73 

3,31,3 73 

3,38,1 49 

3,39,1 49 

3,41,2 49,82 

3,42,1 49 

4,4,2 73 

4,  6,  2 73 

4,7,2 .....33,49,95 

4,9,2 63,73 


10,  4. 
II, I. 
12,1. 
12,  2 . 


Ad  Atticum 

14, 
14, 
14, 
14, 
14, 
14, 
14, 
14, 
14, 
14, 
15, 
15, 
15, 
16, 
16, 
16, 
16, 
16, 
16, 
16, 
16, 
16, 
16, 


PAGE 

49 

....73,92 

73 

....73,92 
I3,4...i4,  28,48,63,  67 

14,2 73 

14,3 73 

16,3 48 

i7A,5 81,90 

21,3 73 

15,2 82 

16, 1 48 

20,2 73 

1,3 28 

3,4 48 

6,  2 63 

7,1 28,63 

7,2 89 

11,2 52 

11,8 44 

14,3 93 

16C,  1 52 

16A-16F 52 


Ad  Familiar es 

,1,1 • 55 

,1,2 58 

,  1-9 55 

,4,3 15,55 

,5,1 55 

,5a,  4 41 

,5b,  2 58 

,7,4 95 

,7,7 12,42,74,83,89 

,7,8 12,39 

,7,9 29 

,  7,  10 12,42 

,8,2 12,74 

,8,3 39 

,9,4 55,63,65 

,9,5 55,63 

,9,6-8 86 

,9,8 85 

,9,  II 84 

,  9,  12 62 

,9,16 82 

,  9,  17-21 86 

,  9,  21 12,  66 

,9,22 41 

.9,23 21 

9,25 38 

3,1 79 

6,  I 55 

6,4 28,81 

7,  1 29,31 

8,1 79 

8,2 58 

9,1 39 

II, 1 28 


INDEX  TO  CITED  PASSAGES 


lOI 


Ad  Familiares  page 

2,15,3 54,58,64,66 

2, 16, 1 14 

2,16,3 II 

2,16,4 14,67 

2,16,5 32 

2,17.4 17 

2,18,1 38 

3.4,1 29 

3.5.4 21 

3.6,3 90 

3.7.5 36,82 

3,8,6 82 

3.9 34 

3.9.  1 38,89 

3.9.2 21,38,44 

3.9.4 38 

3,  10.  1 38,42 

3.10.7 20 

3.10.9 50 

3,10,10 39,50,58 

3.«o,  II 42 

3.12,2-3 50 

3.  13.  I 29 

4, 1, 1 68 

4.2,2 95,97 

4,3,1 92 

4,3,3-4 21 

4,3,4 62 

4,4,4 22 

4,  6,  2 46,  62 

4,6,3 73 

4,8,2 62 

4.  13.  1-2 15 

4.13.4 88 

4.14,1 38.39 

4,14,3 48 

5,2,6 48 

5,2,8 83,86 

5,2, 10 48,83 

5,5,3 55,84 

5,7,2-5 56 

5,7,3 52 

5.8,4 29 

5.8,5 40,84 

5. II. 1 55 

5.12.3 30 

5.12,7 31 

5,13.1 22,89 

5.13.3 89 

5.13.4 92 

5.15.2 50 

5.15.3-4 22 

5.16,3-4 62 

5,16,4 17 

5,16,5 82,88 

5,17,3 52 

5,17,4 49 

5,17,4-5 91 

5,19,1 95 


Ad  Familiares  page 

5.  19. 1-2 97 

5.20,2 .93 

5.21,2 21 

5.21,4 15 

5.21,5 97 

6,1,1 47 

6,1,3 41,64,95 

6,1,3-4 23,93,97 

6,1,6 23 

6,3.3 15.23 

6.3.4 97 

6,4,2 92 

6,  4,  3 20,  44 

6,4.4 16 

6,5,4 88 

6,6,6 27,33,93,95 

6,  6, 12 92 

6,  10,4 52,92 

6,12,4-5 87 

6,  12,5 20,21,62 

6,  14, 1 •. II 

6,15 73 

6,21,1 11,42,64,92 

7,1,2 79 

7.1.3 79 

7.2,3 55 

7,3.4 16,21,31 

7.7,1 17 

7.9.2 17 

7.23.2 18 

7.27.1-2 82 

7,  28,  3 66 

7.30.1 73 

7.32.3 55 

7.33.1 32 

8,1,3 56 

9.1.2 20,21 

9,  8,  2 22 

9, 14,  6 86 

9.  15. 1-2 50 

9.16,3 73 

9,  16,  5 64 

9.  16,6 89,92 

9.24.3 52 

9.24,4 15,64,65 

10,1,1 15,33.66 

10,1,3 29 

10,  2,  2 42 

10,3 81 

10,3.1 90 

10,3.2 50 

10,3,2-3 38 

10,3.3 31 

10,5,1 54 

1-0.5.2 31.64 

10,  6,  1 71 

10,6,2-3 41 

10,6,3 71 

10,10,2 31.50,67 


Ad  Familiares  page 

0,12,5 31 

0,13,1 38 

0,13.2 29,31,35 

o,  14,  2 31 

0,19.1 55 

o,  19,  2 67 

0,20,3 71 

0,25 37 

0,25,1-2 95 

0,25,2 97 

0,26 37 

0,26,3 34,93.95 

0,27, 1...  15, 38, 42, 67,  71 

1,5,1-2 73 

1,5,1-3 85 

1,5,3 15,29,67,71 

1,12,2 55 

1,14,3 71 

1,22,1 48 

1,27,6 81,90 

1,27,8 54 

1,29,2 89 

2,2,1 73 

2,2,3 32 

2,3,1 73 

2,4,1 73 

2,7,1 29,39 

2,8,1 83 

2,10,1 83 

2,  22,  2 29,97 

2,22,4 52 

2,23,4 97 

2,24,1 38 

2,25,2 67 

2,27 81 

2,28,1 88 

3.1 52 

3.5 53 

3.10,2 50 

3. 12 29 

3.14.2 17 

3.15.1 31 

3.41.2 84 

3.53.1 42 

3.55.1 81 

3.55.2 53,81 

3.57.2 40 

3.59 53 

3.61 53 

3.61,1 42 

3.63.2 53 

3.64.2 52 

3.65.2 56 

4.1,1 47 

4,2,2 58 

4,2,3 18,45 

4.3.1-2 47.48 

4,3.5 45 

4,4,1 45 


I02 


MORAL  VALUES  IN  CICERO'S  LETTERS 


Ad  Familiar es  page 

14,4,2 55 

I4,4i3 46 

14,4,4 78 

14,4,5 15 

14,4,6 45,46 

14,7,1 95 

14,7,2 42 

14,14,1 47 

14,  18,  1 47 

15,1 34 

15, 1,  6 40,42 

15,2,1 95 

15,4 34 

15,4,1 76,78,90 

15,4,8-9 79 

15,4,13 29,34 

15,4,15 90 

15,4,16 23 

15,6 34 

15,6,1 31,34 

15,6,2 35 

15,7,1 40;4i 

15,8,  1 41 

15,10 34 

15, 12,  1 40 

15,13 34 

15,13,3 28 

15,15,1 75 

15,21,4 86 

16,1 52 

16, 12, 1 13 

16, 12,  2 70 

16, 12,4 60 

16,18 52 

16,  20 52,79 


Ad  Quintum  Fratrem     page 

1 76 

1,3 27 

1,7 89 

1,7-^ 78 

1,8 89 

1. 10 40,77 

1,1-12 77 

1,13 76,77 

1,20 76,84 

1,20-25 78 

I,  21 82 

1,24 76,78 

I,  25 76 

1,26 77 

1,27 55 

1,  28 23 

1,30 76 

i»  33-34 76 

1,34 76 

1,37-40 78 

1,38 89 

1,41-43 32 

1,41 27,32,76 

1,43 32 

1,44 32 

1,45 27,76 

2.3 78 

2,4 83 

2,  12 49 

2,13 48 

3,1 » 46 

3,3 44.45 

3,5 20 

3,9 59 

4,1 90 


Ad  Quintum  Fratrem      page 

1,4,4 16,57 

2,4,1 55 

2,4,3 17,  18 

2' 4,  4-5 95 

2,  10,  5 40 

3,1,1 79 

3,1,15 58 

3,5,3-4 62 

3,4,1 39,64 

3,5,3-4 36 

3,5,4 64 

Ad  BrtUum 

1,15,2 33 

1,15,9 29,35 

1,2,2 42 

1,2,4 38 

1,3,2 30 

1,10,3 74,83 

1,10,4 67 

1,12,  1 65 

1,14,2 67 

1,15,5 65,67 

1,15,9 83 

1,18,2 38,65 

2,2,1 83 

2,5,1 71 

2,5,2 73 

2,5,3 81,  8^ 


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